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Introduction
In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education, a 
panel of distinguished educators appointed by Secretary of Education 
Terence Bell, released a report on the condition of American education 
entitled A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform. The 
provocative message of the report—that if a foreign power had tried to 
impose on America the mediocre educational performance of our 
schools, we might well have regarded it as an act of war—set off a 
debate about the nation's schools that continues today.
Teacher Quality
Not the least of the commission's concerns centered on the quality 
of teaching. Among their claims were the following:
1. Too many teachers had been poor students themselves.
2. Programs of teacher education placed too much emphasis on 
courses in educational methods, too little on the subjects to be 
taught.
3. There were severe shortages of qualified teachers in certain sub 
ject areas, such as mathematics and science.
4. Too many newly employed teachers were not qualified to teach 
the subjects they were assigned.
These concerns were not new. In 1963 the president of the Council 
for Basic Education described teacher education in the following 
terms: "A weak faculty operates a weak program that attracts weak stu 
dents" (Koerner 1963). Researchers reported that SAT scores of educa-
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tion majors ranked near the bottom of all college graduates (Weaver 
1983). Subsequent developments confirmed these criticisms, as sub 
stantial proportions of the workforce and even larger percentages of 
new teacher trainees were unable to pass teacher examinations that 
amounted to little more than tests of basic literacy (Toch 1991).
Worse still, there were signs in the early 1980s that the quality of the 
teaching workforce was deteriorating. The decline in the average SAT 
scores of high school seniors intending to major in education had out 
paced the drop in scores among college-bound students in general. A 
similar pattern was found in an analysis of IQ scores of college gradu 
ates who entered teaching: in 1967, graduates with IQ scores of 100 
and 130 were about equally likely to become teachers; by 1980, the 
ratio was 4:1 (Murnane et al. 1991).
Problems in teacher recruitment were exacerbated by two other 
trends. One, women were finding new careers open to them and no 
longer entered education in the same numbers. This was especially true 
of bright, capable women who had formerly provided public school 
systems with a low-cost pool of talented teachers. Second, by the early 
1980s, the decline in school enrollments that had marked the previous 
decade was coming to an end; enrollments began to rise again in the 
lower elementary grades. Thus policy makers foresaw not only a sus 
tained decline in teacher quality, but an absolute shortage of trained 
instructors, particularly in critical areas such as mathematics and sci 
ence (Darling-Hammond 1984).
The Response
By one count, A Nation at Risk was followed by more than two hun 
dred reports on American education, each setting out recommendations 
for educational reform (Wayson 1988). Many proposed to improve 
teaching effectiveness by raising standards for teacher education and 
licensing. Such reforms included higher admissions standards for 
teacher education programs; more rigorous course content in teacher 
education, with increased emphasis on subject matter; and basic skills 
and subject matter competency testing for teacher certification. These 
reforms were, however, unlikely to accomplish much alone. In the
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words of one of the most prominent studies of the teaching workforce: 
"It will do little good to raise the standards for entry into the profession 
of teaching and greatly improve the professional preparation of teach 
ers if nothing is done to make teaching a more attractive career" (Carn 
egie Forum on Education and the Economy 1986).
The leading reports dealing with teachers were unanimous in regard 
to one recommendation: in order to attract more capable persons into 
the profession, salaries needed to be raised (Boyer 1983; The Holmes 
Group 1986; Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy 1986; 
National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983). Over and 
again it was pointed out that teachers' salaries ranked below those of 
most occupations requiring a college degree. Moreover, while teaching 
had never been regarded as a well-paid career, during the 1970s teach 
ers had lost ground. In the ten years that followed the 1971-72 school 
year, average teacher salaries fell more than 10 percent in constant dol 
lars (U.S. Department of Education 1993). The fact that this decline 
paralleled a drop in academic ability among new teachers enhanced the 
case for higher pay.
As state legislatures and local school districts responded to the rec 
ommendations of the commissions, a few dissenting voices questioned 
the accuracy of the diagnosis and efficacy of the cure. It was argued 
that teachers were not as poorly paid as alleged. Teacher salaries had 
been understated. 1 In addition, most interoccupational comparisons of 
salaries omit fringe benefits. Since teachers, like other public sector 
employees, receive more generous benefits than most private sector 
workers, this omission led to an understatement of their relative com 
pensation. Finally, teachers also work shorter years than most other 
Americans; earnings during summer vacations (or the value of leisure) 
further increase teachers' total income.
More important, there had been no analysis of the teacher labor mar 
ket to support the recommended salary increases. "[N]o one seems to 
have any idea of either how much additional teacher talent would be 
attracted by increases in teacher compensation, or how much students 
would learn if teachers were paid more" (Lieberman 1986). Indeed, the 
notion that increasing spending on schools would improve educational 
outcomes was (and remains) a contentious one, with a substantial body 
of research failing to detect a strong relationship between per-pupil 
expenditures and student achievement (Hanushek 1986).
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In addition, some doubted that the nation was prepared to spend the 
sums of money proposed to make teaching competitive with other 
careers. By one reckoning, the suggestion of the president of the Carn 
egie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching to raise teacher sala 
ries by 25 percent after inflation would cost the nation $9 billion 
annually, not including the cost of additional pension benefits or the 
increases for others in the education system (such as administrators 
and clerical staff) that were likely to ensue (Lieberman 1986).
In one respect, at any rate, the skeptics were wrong: the nation 
proved willing after all to commit vast additional sums to teacher com 
pensation. Although there were large differences across states in the 
rate of salary growth, on the whole the United States came close to 
implementing the proposed 25 percent raise. Between 1979 and 1989, 
teachers' average salaries rose 20 percent after inflation. In some states 
real increases were extraordinary: 36 percent in New Hampshire, 35 
percent in Virginia, 52 percent in Connecticut (U.S. Department of 
Education 1993).
Increases in salaries for beginning public school teachers substan 
tially restored the competitiveness of teaching vis-a-vis other careers. 
Between 1979 and 1989, salaries for new teachers rose 13 percent. 
Average earnings in entry-level positions for all college graduates 
increased by only 3.5 percent over the same period. 2 By 1991 the ratio 
of teachers' starting salaries to those of other graduates had reached 
.86, exceeding the 1976 ratio of 83 percent.
Rather surprisingly, there has been little effort to assess the results 
of this policy. Surveys conducted by the National Center for Education 
Statistics now provide more detailed information about the teaching 
workforce than ever before available, yet no analysis of these data 
attempting to relate changes in teacher recruitment to salary growth has 
appeared. Previous scholarly work has focused on pieces of the story 
(e.g., the relationship between salaries and teacher retention). The 
analysis of the teacher labor market that would provide the foundation 
for the formulation of effective policy remains to be done.
In the meantime, the debate over teacher salaries has grown more 
acrimonious. Voters who have witnessed dramatic increases in teacher 
compensation without seeing commensurate improvements (at least in 
their view) in the education provided their children have elected school 
boards that now pressure teacher unions for salary concessions; teach-
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ers are striking because boards have reneged on earlier agreements. 
Adding to the clamor are the voices of those who believe that teacher 
salaries are still too low, that we have not done enough to make the pro 
fession attractive, and of their opponents who see no point in providing 
additional funds to an educational system that has demonstrably failed 
the nation's children and wonder why many of our school systems 
must now spend upwards of $7,000 per pupil when many private 
schools cost substantially less.
This monograph is an attempt to clarify the facts as well as the 
underlying issues in this debate. We ask a simple question: have higher 
salaries improved the quality of newly recruited teachers? Since we 
find little evidence to support an affirmative response, we ask two more 
questions. First, what went wrong? Second, which reforms are likely 
to meet with more success? To answer these questions, we review data 
on the characteristics of newly recruited teachers. We also show how 
important features of the labor market for teachers systematically 
undermine efforts to improve teacher quality. Finally, we undertake a 
comparison of personnel policies and staffing patterns in public and 
private schools, an exercise that sheds light on what can be accom 
plished by lifting some of the regulatory (and other) constraints now 
imposed on public school administrators.
Organization of the Book
The remainder of the text is divided into six chapters. In chapter 2, 
we take up an important preliminary question—how to measure 
teacher quality. We select several indicators of quality, which are then 
used in chapter 3 to assess the evidence on salary growth and teacher 
recruitment. Chapter 4 offers an analysis of the operation of the teacher 
labor market that explains our findings, while chapter 5 reviews the 
implications for teacher recruitment of various other reforms of current 
interest. Chapter 6 looks at teacher salaries and personnel policies in 
the private sector to see whether private schools offer a model for 




1. As Myron Lieberman (1986) points out, A Nation at Risk understated the average teacher 
salary in 1981-82 by 13 percent.
2. Data on real salary growth are from the Surveys of Recent College Graduates, adjusted for 
changes in the Consumer Price Index. Salary gains by new teachers exceeded those of nonteach- 
ing graduates in the humanities (2.6 percent), in the social sciences (5.7 percent), and in science, 
mathematics, and computer science (11.5 percent).
Various other data are available on salaries of new college graduates. Some of them offer a dif 
ferent picture of the relative wages of teachers. We have used the data that seem to be most 
broadly representative of the jobs taken by new graduates. An alternative series prepared by the 
College Placement Council is based on information provided by placement offices. These data are 
heavily influenced by the results of on-campus recruitment and are not intended to represent the 
experience of new graduates generally (College Placement Council 1994). Surveys of entry-level 
salaries at major corporations are even less representative.
Academic studies have also made varying claims about teachers' relative salaries. While there 
seems to be no dispute that teachers' pay rose in real terms during the 1980s, different claims have 
been advanced regarding the salaries of teachers relative to college graduates in other occupations. 
Examining data from the National Longitudinal Survey and the Current Population Surveys, Flyer 
and Rosen (1996) conclude that relative salaries, while improving during the 1980s, did not 
recover to the level of the mid-1960s, controlling for teacher education and experience. Hanushek, 
Rivkin, and Jamison (1992) analyzed data from the Census of Population and concluded that 
while relative pay improved for male teachers between 1980 and 1990, it fell for women, again 
conditioning on education and experience.
Some caution is called for when interpreting these numbers. Census and Current Population 
Survey data provide only rough measures of workforce experience, generally age minus years of 
education. This is a notoriously poor proxy for the work experience of female teachers, many of 
whom spend years away from teaching in order to raise families. In addition, while many teachers 
hold master's degrees, one may reasonably question whether this investment in advanced training 
is comparable to the additional education represented by other professional degrees.
We do not pursue this question further, since it has no real importance for the thesis of this 
book. Whether or not teachers' relative pay recovered to earlier levels during the 1980s for the 
nation as a whole, there is no doubt that salary growth varied considerably across states, both in 
real and relative terms. It is this variation we examine in chapter 3 to ascertain whether higher pay 
led to improvements in teacher recruitment.
CHAPTER
Indicators of Teacher Quality
This research examines the relationship between teacher salaries 
and the quality of newly recruited teachers. An important preliminary 
question is how we intend to measure improvements in the teaching 
workforce.
Student Achievement
Perhaps the surest sign that schools have been hiring more effective 
teachers would be improvement in student achievement. Unfortunately, 
several conceptual and practical difficulties prevent our using such an 
indicator. (We ignore the question whether standardized tests or some 
other assessment best measures student learning, since sufficiently 
many problems arise on other grounds.)
In the first place, it takes time to renew the workforce. Teacher sala 
ries began to rise at the beginning of the 1980s, with the most rapid 
increase between 1983 and 1986, after the appearance of A Nation at 
Risk. Given the time it takes prospective teachers to react to salary 
developments and to complete a teacher education program, it is 
unlikely that much change could have occurred in the quality of new 
teacher recruits before the middle of the decade. Throughout this 
period, moreover, new entrants in any given year comprised no more 
than 5 percent of all teachers. Low rates of entry, coupled with high 
rates of attrition among new instructors, have kept the share of recently 
recruited teachers down. Thus in 1991, teachers with no more than 
three years' experience comprised only 9.7 percent of the workforce 
(U.S. Department of Education 1993). As a result, it is unlikely that
8 Indicators of Teacher Quality
students were exposed to enough newly recruited teachers—even if the 
latter were, on average, superior to teachers hired earlier—to affect the 
statistical relationship between teacher salaries and aggregate measures 
of student performance.
Even if this difficulty could be resolved, any such study faces the 
problem of distinguishing the impact of new teachers' superior abilities 
(if such they are) from the fact that inexperience per se reduces their 
effectiveness. This considerably complicates the investigators' task 
even when disaggregated data are available, as in the National Educa 
tional Longitudinal Study begun in 1988 (NELS-88).
Teacher Attributes
In chapter 1 we reviewed the recommendations of several commis 
sions and task forces concerning teacher recruitment and teacher sala 
ries. Virtually all reports expressed concern about the academic ability 
of the workforce: the general level of teachers' cognitive skills as well 
as specific subject-area knowledge. The near-unanimity of these 
reports suggests that a reasonable assessment of the effect of salary 
reforms would examine the academic backgrounds of persons newly 
recruited into teaching. We employ the following indicators:
1. The quality of the college or university that awarded the teacher's 
bachelor degree, as indicated by the "selectiveness" of the insti 
tution, according to Barton's Profiles of American Colleges. Rat 
ings are based on entering classes' college board scores and high 
school records, as well as the percentage of applicants admitted. 1
2. A degree in an academic subject rather than in education (appli 
cable only to teachers in secondary schools).
3. An undergraduate major in mathematics or science (secondary 
school teachers only).
4. Undergraduate GPA.
5. SAT scores of prospective education majors.
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We do not suppose that these indicators cover all the qualities that 
contribute to effective teaching or that someone cannot be a good 
teacher who fares poorly by these measures. Indeed, this much was 
acknowledged by the task forces and commissions cited above. How 
ever, it would seem to be a fair test of salary reform that it improve the 
workforce where it has been found wanting. In the words of a former 
assistant secretary of education:
What I hear from principals is that teachers coming in do not have 
content background. They have compassion and sensitivity, but 
they lack the content background to be great teachers (Diane Rav- 
itch, quoted in The Washington Times, May 18, 1994).
Even if there were not this consensus among the commissions about 
the needs of our educational system, a strong case can be made for 
using these indicators of teacher quality. In the first place, the notion 
that brighter individuals make better teachers is inherently plausible.
Teachers should have a good grasp of the ways in which all kinds 
of physical and social systems work; a feeling for what data are 
and the uses to which they can be put, an ability to help students 
see patterns of meaning where others see only confusion.... They 
must be able to learn all the time, as the knowledge required to do 
their work twists and turns with new challenges and the progress 
of science and technology. . . . We are describing people of sub 
stantial intellectual accomplishment" (Carnegie Forum for Educa 
tion and the Economy 1986, p. 25)
The research literature also lends support to the proposition that 
instructors with stronger academic backgrounds are, other things being 
equal, more effective teachers. Analyzing data on reading achievement 
of elementary school students in southern California, Winkler (1975) 
found a positive association between test score gains and the "presti- 
giousness" of the teacher's undergraduate college. (Prestigious institu 
tions included Stanford and the University of California system; 
nonprestigious were represented primarily by the California state col 
lege system.) In a study of Philadelphia schools, Summers and Wolfe 
(1977) found that student test score gains between third and sixth grade 
varied positively with the quality of their teacher's undergraduate col 
lege. An analysis of data from High School and Beyond found a posi 
tive association between student test score gains from tenth to twelfth
10 Indicators of Teacher Quality
grades and the selectiveness of the colleges attended by teachers at 
their school, as rated by Barren's Profiles (Ehrenberg and Brewer 
1994). The sources of this influence are probably severalfold: the fact 
that more selective colleges screen applicants on the basis of measures 
of scholastic aptitude, the higher quality of the education they provide 
undergraduates (not least of which is a peer effect), and the possibility 
that these higher achieving students are more enthusiastic about the 
subjects they teach. Indeed, it has been shown that secondary school 
teachers who graduated from selective colleges or who majored in the 
subject they teach assign homework more frequently and put in longer 
hours grading papers and preparing lessons (Ballou and Podgursky 
1995a).
In addition, unless teaching requires a very idiosyncratic set of 
skills, characteristics that predict success in other fields should help to 
identify effective teachers as well. Studies of human capital have found 
a positive relationship between earnings and the quality of the college 
attended (James et al. 1989; Solmon 1975). 2 College quality also has a 
positive impact on the likelihood that a new graduate finds a job in the 
field for which he or she trained (Ballou 1996).
Other research with access to teacher test scores has confirmed the 
importance of teachers' verbal ability. Several of these studies ana 
lyzed data collected by the Office of Equality of Educational Opportu 
nity (OEEO) in the mid-1960s, made famous by the Coleman Report 
(Coleman et al. 1966): Hanushek (1970); Bowles and Levin (1968); 
and most recently, Ehrenberg and Brewer (1993). Hanushek (1971) 
investigated the relationship between the achievement of California 
third graders and the characteristics of their second and third grade 
teachers, including experience, hours of graduate education, and scores 
on a test of verbal ability with more discriminating power than the 
OEEO exam. Of all teacher characteristics, scores on this exam were 
the most important determinants of student learning. Webster (1988) 
found a significant positive correlation between teachers' scores on the 
Wesman Personnel Classification test, a test of verbal and quantitative 
ability, and scores of middle school students on the Iowa Tests of Basic 
Skills as well as the scores of secondary students on the Iowa Tests of 
Educational Development. Ferguson (1991) reported that student 
achievement was positively related to district average scores on the 
Texas Examination of Current Teachers and Administrators (TECAT).
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Using data from the Longitudinal Survey of American Youth, Monk 
(1994) found a strong positive association between the subject matter 
preparation (college course work) of high school mathematics and sci 
ence teachers and their students' achievement test scores. The fact that 
researchers employing a variety of data sets and test instruments have 
found a positive association between teachers' tested ability and stu 
dent learning attests to the robustness of this relationship.
It should be noted that not all studies replicate these findings. In par 
ticular, some researchers have found that performance on the National 
Teachers' Examination (NTE) appears to be a poor predictor of teach 
ing ability (Haney et al. 1987). However, Strauss and Sawyer (1986) 
found that higher NTE scores among North Carolina teachers were 
inversely related to student failure rates on a standardized competency 
examination, with a 1 percent increase in teacher quality accompanied 
by a 5 percent decline in failures. Since the impact of NTE scores on 
mean student achievement was much weaker, this study reveals the 
importance of examining more than one outcome measure.
In summary, the link between teachers' cognitive abilities and stu 
dent learning stands out in a literature that frequently fails to find sig 
nificant relationships between other teacher attributes and student 
achievement: "The only reasonably consistent finding seems to be that 
'smarter' teachers do better in terms of student achievement." 
(Hanushek 1981). Moreover, evidence is not limited to scholarly 
research. An incidental demonstration of the relationship between aca 
demic ability and teaching effectiveness occurred during implementa 
tion of the Florida master teacher program. Two instruments were used 
to evaluate teachers: a written test of subject matter knowledge and 
classroom observation. Participants had to score in the top quartile on 
both instruments in order to qualify as master teachers. The proportion 
of successful applicants was one in six (Brandt 1990). Although this 
figure is sometimes cited as evidence of the low correlation between 
effective teaching behavior and subject matter knowledge, it demon 
strates, of course, precisely the opposite: two-thirds of the teachers 
who satisfied one criterion also met the other.
Finally, the criteria we propose are currently used by other research 
ers and policy makers to assess the efficacy of educational reforms. 
Our choice of indicators is therefore far from idiosyncratic. Changes in 
SAT scores among prospective education majors have been adduced as
12 Indicators of Teacher Quality
evidence that teacher quality is responding to improvements in salary 
(Kirst and Kelley 1993). The Connecticut State Board of Education 
cites the percentage of new teachers who graduated from more selec 
tive colleges—as rated by Barren's Profiles—to demonstrate that 
higher salaries combined with more rigorous academic standards for 
new teachers have raised the quality of its teaching workforce (Beau- 
din, various years). A study of mathematics and science education 
commissioned by the National Science Foundation recommended that 
the federal government use the following indicators to monitor the 
quality of the teaching workforce: undergraduate major, test scores, 
GPA, and subject area certification (Shavelson et al. 1989). In recent 
years, states have strengthened requirements in subject area prepara 
tion; several now require secondary school teachers to major in the 
subject they will teach (NASDTEC 1991).
Principals© Ratings of Their Staffs
While we believe that the indicators we have chosen represent rea 
sonable criteria for judging the impact of salary reforms, we are aware 
that there exist differences of opinion over the importance of these 
measures. Many educators and researchers deny that there is an impor 
tant link between what teachers know and how well they teach. The 
following is a strong but probably fair statement of what many educa 
tors believe about the importance of teachers' cognitive ability:
Given prevailing methods of training and selecting teachers, char 
acteristics such as basic communication skills, general knowl 
edge, professional knowledge, and even knowledge of subject 
matter taught have small relationship to teaching effectiveness. 
Whatever the power of such cognitive aspects of teacher qualifica 
tions to predict teaching effectiveness, it appears to be no more 
than that associated with aspects of personality, attitudes, and per 
sonal habits (Haney et al. 1987).
This view is not, of course, universal among educators. Indeed, claims 
that teachers' tested knowledge and academic preparation are unrelated 
to their ability to teach have been termed preposterous by the president
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of the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (Wise 
1992).
Since opinion is divided, we also include an indicator of teacher 
quality that is not tied to any particular view of pedagogy but rather 
reflects the views held by educational practitioners, whatever they may 
be. The Schools and Staffing Survey of 1990-91 contained an item ask 
ing each school principal to rate the quality of his staff. Separate 
assessments were obtained for new teachers (no more than three years' 
experience) and experienced staff. This breakdown makes it possible to 
compare new teachers to experienced teachers, and to measure this 
change against salary growth. Since the criteria used for these assess 
ments are determined by principals themselves, the relationship 
between ratings and teacher salaries signals whether principals have 
been able to recruit staffs that meet their needs, however they conceive 
them.
Other Indicators
There are two widely used indicators of teacher quality that we do 
not employ—the percentage of teachers who hold advanced degrees 
and teachers' experience. Although teacher compensation is generally 
based on these factors, their demonstrated relationship to teacher qual 
ity is slight or nonexistent. Advanced degrees have not been found to 
improve teacher effectiveness, while the contribution of experience 
appears weak, at best, and limited to the first few years of teaching 
(Hanushek 1986). To the extent that higher salaries have raised the pro 
portion of teachers who have taught long enough to become effective, 
our investigation will understate the consequences of salary reform. 
(See, however, the discussion of turnover in chapter 4.) Given the over 
riding importance of recruiting more capable persons into teaching, it 
seems reasonable to focus on the attributes they bring to their jobs.
To summarize, by the early 1980s, it was widely reported that many 
of the nation's teachers had weak cognitive skills and poor preparation 
in their subjects. Such findings prompted recommendations that sala 
ries be raised (along with other measures to improve teacher profes 
sionalism). It would seem of considerable interest, then, to learn
14 Indicators of Teacher Quality
whether these policies have produced improvements of the kind 
desired.
NOTES
1. Colleges ranked in the top two categories ("most competitive" and "highly competitive") 
have been reassigned to a single group ("selective"). At the other end of the scale, colleges rated 
"less competitive" or "noncompetitive" have also been grouped together ("below average").
2. We use college quality as a broader indicator than do some of the researchers we cite, who 
ask whether college quality contributes to earnings after one controls for individual ability, family 
background, etc. The latter question concerns the value added by a college education. By contrast, 
we use college quality for all that it might represent—as a proxy for higher ability, family inputs, 
etc., and as a measure of value added during one's undergraduate years. While some of the litera 
ture suggests there is little value added from attending a more selective institution, selectivity in 
the broad sense in which we use it is correlated with subsequent earnings and career opportunities.
CHAPTER
Teacher Pay and Recruitment
In this chapter, we investigate the effect that higher salaries have had 
on the quality of the teaching workforce. This is not the first study to 
examine the relationship of teacher quality to salaries. Earlier research, 
exploiting variation in cross-sectional data, has found a modest but sta 
tistically significant association between pay and indicators of quality 
similar to ours. This may indicate that better-paying districts enjoy an 
advantage in recruitment, though it is also possible that more qualified 
teachers are drawn to these districts for other reasons (for example, 
they may be more likely to live in them). 1 While these findings are of 
interest for some purposes (e.g., assessing effects of disparities in 
school financing), they primarily reflect the way the market sorts teach 
ers across districts and, as such, say little about the question that con 
cerns us. The commissions and task forces that recommended raising 
teacher salaries in the early 1980s were not interested in one district's 
gain at the expense of another, but in the possibility of recruiting into 
education persons who would otherwise choose more attractive and 
remunerative careers. Salary coefficients in such studies overstate the 
increase in teacher quality that results when salaries rise in all schools 
simultaneously.
This problem does not entirely disappear, of course, at higher levels 
of aggregation, since high-wage states can recruit teachers away from 
states with lower levels of pay. However, the evidence on teachers' 
interstate mobility presented below suggests that using the state as the 
unit of analysis substantially reduces this bias. And at the national 
level, no such problem arises. We therefore focus on the relationship 
between teacher salaries and quality at the state and national levels, 
beginning with national trends.
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National Trends in Teacher Recruitment
We examine data from three sources: SAT scores from the College 
Board, the Schools and Staffing Surveys (SASS) of 1987-88 and 1990- 
91, and the Surveys of Recent College Graduates (SRCG), conducted 
four times between 1981 and 1991. All reported statistics are weighted 
to take account of stratification and clustering in sample designs. 
Descriptions of these data sources are provided in appendix 3A.
SAT Scores
We begin with SAT scores of college-bound seniors (College 
Entrance Examination Board, various years). If recent salary increases 
have attracted brighter individuals into teaching, evidence to that effect 
will likely appear in SAT scores of students intending to major in edu 
cation.2 Indeed, board scores among prospective education majors have 
risen. In 1980, combined SAT verbal and math scores among would-be 
teachers averaged 807, compared to 890 among all examinees. In 
1992, the corresponding averages were 850 and 899. Thus over twelve 
years the gap between prospective education majors and others closed 
by 50 percent. The number of prospective teachers also rose. In 1980, 
6.1 percent of SAT test-takers declared an intention to major in educa 
tion. By 1992 this proportion had risen to 8 percent.
Quality of College
Figure 3.1 presents information from the 1987-88 SASS on the 
quality of the institution awarding the teacher's undergraduate degree. 
The SASS provides a snap-shot of the workforce at a point in time, not 
a profile over time. To investigate changes in the workforce, we sepa 
rate full-time public school teachers into two categories: new (less than 
three years' experience) and experienced. As figure 3.1 shows, there 
was no pronounced difference between these two groups with respect 
to the quality of the colleges attended. The proportion of new teachers 
who graduated from colleges rated selective or above average was 
slightly higher than the corresponding share among experienced 
instructors. In the above-average category this difference is statistically 
significant at 10 percent. However, this artificial "before and after"
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comparison makes no allowance for the effects of attrition. Earlier 
studies have found that teachers with stronger cognitive skills are more 
likely to quit teaching (Schlechty and Vance 1981; Murnane and Olsen 
1990). If so, the proportion of experienced teachers from better col 
leges will fall below the share among new instructors, even without 
increases in pay. Thus the modest "improvement" shown in figure 3.1 
overstates the true gain.
Math and Science Teachers
The picture is decidedly more positive when it comes to the recruit 
ment of teachers with bachelor's degrees in mathematics or science. 
Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of such individuals among new and 
experienced teachers at the secondary level. 3 Math and science majors 
rose to 9.9 percent of the new recruits in 1987-88 and to 11.7 percent in 
1990-91—statistically significant gains.
Secondary School Instructors with Academic Majors
Progress was also made in this area, though it was neither as dra 
matic nor as sustained as in the recruitment of math and science 
majors. As shown in figure 3.2, in 1987-88, new secondary school 
teachers were more likely than experienced teachers to have an aca 
demic major. The trend appears to have reversed in 1990-91, though 
one should be cautious comparing results across surveys. Changes on 
the survey format may well have increased the number of miscoded 
responses.
Undergraduate GPA
Grades of new graduates entering teaching (as reported to the Sur 
veys of Recent College Graduates) are displayed in figure 3.3. The pro 
portion of graduates who by their own report earned mostly A's in 
college has held steady. The same is largely true of those with lower 
grades, except for the sharp drop in the 1991 cohort. This drop is 
almost certainly due to changes in the way data were collected. In a 
departure from earlier practice, the 1991 survey was conducted by tele 
phone. Inflated responses appear to have been more common under 
these conditions. A cautious reading of the evidence from the SRCG
Figure 3.2 Changes in the Workforce: Subject Matter Preparation
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would therefore suggest that little change has occurred in the distribu 
tion of grades among new teachers.
To summarize, the evidence reviewed here indicates that the quality 
of new recruits to teaching improved modestly during the 1980s. The 
strongest sign of improvement is the rising share of teachers who have 
majored in mathematics or science. SAT scores have also risen among 
high school seniors who intend to major in education. Evidence that 
more secondary school teachers have majored in academic disciplines 
is weaker, as is the evidence that more teachers attended highly rated 
colleges and universities. There has been no gain in the proportion of 
top students, as measured by self-reported GPA, who become public 
school teachers.
Recruitment and Salaries
None of the analysis to this point indicates whether these changes 
were caused by increases in salary. To investigate this question, we 
compare recruitment to salary growth at the state level.
As noted in chapter 1, teacher salaries rose an average of 20 percent 
after inflation during the 1980s. While this is a substantial real 
increase, it should be measured against the gains for college-educated 
workers in general over the same period. Increases were particularly 
pronounced among women, as entry barriers in other professions con 
tinued to fall. Our measure of teacher salaries is therefore the ratio of 
teacher pay to a gender-weighted average of the earnings of college- 
educated workers.4 Even by this measure, teacher salaries rose in all 
but five states. In most states gains exceeded 10 percent (figure 3.4). 
More important for our purposes, there was considerable variation 
across states in real salary growth. This cross-sectional variation fur 
nishes us with an opportunity to see whether improvements in recruit 
ment were associated with higher salaries.
We begin by exploring the relationship between salary changes and 
the SAT scores of prospective education majors. Since state universi 
ties in many western and southern states require the ACT rather than 
the SAT, skewing the population of SAT examinees, we have restricted 
the sample to states where at least 40 percent of graduating seniors
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took the SAT. Figure 3.5 shows that there is essentially no relationship 
between state-level changes in teacher salaries and SAT scores 
between 1979 and 1989. Neither is there a strong relationship between 
salary increases and changes in the share of high school students 
intending to major in education. The slope of a regression line through 
the latter data is positive but statistically insignificant (figure 3.6).
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While figure 3.5 seems to show that salary changes are not responsi 
ble for test score gains among prospective education majors, this con 
clusion is valid only to the extent that these students plan to make their 
careers in their home states. Although we are unable to test this expla 
nation directly, we find that new teachers do not exhibit a great deal of 
mobility. According to the SRCG, more than 80 percent of newly 
trained teachers take jobs in the states where they attended college. 
This fraction is highest among graduates of state universities, lowest
Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality 23
Figure 3.5 Relative SAT Scores of Education Majors and Teacher Pay
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among persons who attended prestigious colleges. Since many of the 
latter presumably return to their home states after graduation, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the career plans of high school seniors, if 
they are influenced by teacher salaries at all, will be most responsive to 
trends in their home states.
Since the 1987-88 and 1990-91 SASS report the state in which each 
teacher is employed, mismatches of this kind are not an issue. Unfortu 
nately, state-level analyses of the SASS are of questionable validity, 
given the small sample sizes for most states. (In most states there are 
fewer than one hundred surveyed teachers who qualify as "new" by our 
definition.) We therefore adopt the expedient of classifying states into 
three groups: the top third, where the growth in relative teacher pay 
was highest (increases of 18.6 percent or more), those where growth 
was moderate (between 8.7 percent and 18.6 percent), and the bottom 
third, with increases of less than 8.7 percent. 5 While there is some loss 
of information from grouping states in this fashion, the loss does not 
obscure the answer to a simple yes or no question. If higher salaries 
have improved teacher recruitment, it should be evident when we con 
trast outcomes across these three groups.
The geographical distribution of high-, moderate-, and low-growth 
states is depicted in figure 3.7. There is a concentration of high-growth 
states in the northern plains (though lower population density in this 
area means the geographical distribution of teachers in high-growth 
states is considerably less concentrated). It should be remembered that 
salary growth is a relative measure, so that states awarding substantial 
increases in teacher pay are not necessarily high-growth states, if these 
increases only managed to match gains for other college-educated 
workers. Although there is some evidence that states in the high- 
growth category began the decade with lower levels of teacher quality 
(see below), we implicitly control for such differences by comparing 
new teachers to experienced teachers within each category. Other con 
founding influences (e.g., differential rates of teacher attrition) are dis 
cussed below.
We begin by revisiting the question of college quality. There is no 
evidence that raising teacher pay attracted more graduates of selective 
colleges into teaching (figure 3.8). The relationship between salary 
changes and the improvement in the workforce is not monotonic. 
Instead, the moderate-growth states appear to have gained the most. 6
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Similar remarks apply to other indicators of quality: graduates of the 
least selective colleges (figure 3.9), teachers with math and science 
degrees (figure 3.10), and instructors with academic majors (figure 
3.11). In none of these cases do the data support the hypothesis that 
improvements in teacher recruitment, such as they are, have resulted 
from salary increases. 7
The absence of any relationship between salary changes and the 
quality of new recruits is surprising, though it is not difficult to find 
other explanations for the modest improvement among new teacher 
recruits in the 1980s. These include the wide publicity given an 
impending "teacher shortage," a signal that job opportunities were 
about to increase. In addition, many states and districts placed new 
emphasis on recruiting teachers with better subject area preparation. 
Still, our negative finding is so unsuspected that it is worth pausing to 
consider whether it could be due to limitations of the data or faulty 
analysis. We discuss two of the more likely possibilities.
Measurement Error in Salaries
Average teaching salaries at the state level are compiled by the 
National Education Association from a survey of State Departments of 
Education. These state-level averages reflect changes in the composi 
tion of the workforce. This means that measured salary is not a pure 
price. Since teachers are rewarded for education and experience, a shift 
toward more experienced and better-educated teachers can cause aver 
age pay to rise even when there has been no change in underlying sal 
ary schedules. Thus part of the variation in state salaries may be 
irrelevant to career decisions, if the latter depend on salary schedule 
levels as opposed to movements along given schedules.
Changes in teachers' experience and education are not easily 
obtained at the state level, making it difficult to remove these effects 
from the salary series. However, since the SASS was administered 
twice, first in 1987-88 and again in 1990-91, it is possible to examine 
the sources of salary growth between those years. As shown in appen 
dix 3B, 95 percent of the variation in state-level salary growth between 
these years can be explained by upward shifts in schedules. (Changes 
in the education and experience of states' teachers alone explain no 
more than 20 percent of this variation.) Unless these three years are
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highly atypical, it is therefore quite unlikely that our three-way classifi 
cation of states by salary growth would be altered in any significant 
way by taking into account teachers' accumulation of additional 
degrees and experience.
A rise in the salary schedule need not occur evenly. Some districts 
may award larger raises to starting teachers (frontloading); in other dis 
tricts, experienced teachers may benefit most (backloading). Since new 
teachers are presumably not indifferent to the distribution of increases 
over the life cycle, state average pay may not accurately capture the 
incentives they face.
Unfortunately, there is little hard evidence about the extent of back- 
loading. Detailed analysis has been done for only a few states. Jacob- 
son (1988) and Lankford and Wyckoff (1994) found that most districts 
in New York State have backloaded teachers' raises over the past 
twenty-five years. According to an analysis of district pay scales in 
Michigan, during the economic decline of the 1970s and early 1980s, 
salaries offered beginning teachers fell more (in percentage terms) than 
did salaries at the top of the schedules (Murnane et al. 1987). However, 
when district salaries were weighted by the number of teachers 
employed, no such pattern was evident.
Even if more data on the prevalence of backloading were readily 
available, we strongly suspect it would not make any great difference 
to the analysis here. Backloading matters only to the extent that its 
incidence varies systematically across high-, moderate-, and low- 
growth states. Thus, if high-growth states also practiced more back- 
loading, this might account for the fact that teacher recruitment in these 
states improved no more than it did elsewhere. In fact, since backload 
ing appears to result from the influence of strong teacher unions on 
contracts, it is likely that precisely the opposite relationship holds. An 
inspection of figure 3.7 shows that many of the low-growth states (New 
York, New Jersey, Illinois) have strong teacher unions, while high- and 
moderate-growth states are concentrated in regions with weaker 
unions.
Job Growth in Undesirable Locations
Success in recruiting new teachers depends not just on salary but 
also on working conditions in the schools where vacancies occur.
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When job openings are concentrated in less-desirable school systems, 
recruitment will suffer. Perhaps, then, salary growth was greatest 
where new jobs were hardest to fill.
To explore this hypothesis, we compare the characteristics of dis 
tricts in which new and experienced teachers worked. These character 
istics include the percentage of students at each school eligible for free 
or reduced-price lunch (a proxy for the poverty rate), the percentage of 
black and Hispanic students, and indicators of a less-desirable location 
(urban or rural as opposed to small town or suburb). We also compare 
salaries of teachers with a BA and no experience to see whether job 
openings have been concentrated among poorer-paying districts.
The comparison of experienced to new teachers in the 1987-88 
SASS shows that experienced teachers were, indeed, more likely to 
hold jobs in districts with attractive characteristics (table 3.1). It does 
not appear, however, that this pattern varies systematically with salary 
growth. For example, the gap between new and experienced teachers 
with respect to poverty rates and the percentage of minority students at 
their schools was greatest in the moderate growth states which 
enjoyed, by and large, the largest improvement in teacher recruitment.
Compared to the 1987-88 workforce, new teachers in 1990-91 were 
somewhat more likely to work in districts with high poverty rates, less 
likely to take jobs in schools with high percentages of minority stu 
dents. These differences probably reflect economic recession and 
demographic changes in student enrollments, since the same trends are 
apparent among experienced teachers. However, some statistics offer 
support for the hypothesis under consideration. New teachers in low 
salary growth states were less likely to hold jobs in large central city 
school systems than were experienced teachers in the same states. In 
addition, while new teachers were more often employed in rural dis 
tricts in all three categories, the percentage was particularly high (com 
pared to experienced teachers) in those states with the highest rates of 
salary growth. If inner city and rural jobs are less attractive, states with 
high salary growth may have been at a relative disadvantage in filling 
vacant positions.
The disadvantage is unlikely to have had a pronounced effect on our 
findings, as a few calculations will show. First, the difference between 
the shares of new teachers and experienced teachers in rural districts 
never exceeds more than about 10 percentage points. Even if a rural






































































































































































































SOURCE: Schools and Staffing Surveys, 1987-88 and 1990-91. Experienced teachers in 1987-88 = more than three years' experience; in 1990-91, more 
than six years' experience. New teachers = three or fewer years' experience in both samples. Standard errors in parentheses.
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teacher is only half as likely to be of high quality (by whatever indica 
tor), the difference would cause the representation of high-quality 
teachers in the new workforce (vis-a-vis the experienced workforce) to 
fall by only 5 percent (= 50 percent of .10). This would reduce their 
share of the workforce from, say, 20 percent to 19 percent. Thus, the 
fact that more job opportunities in high-growth states arose in rural dis 
tricts would have, by itself, only a very small effect on the measured 
quality of new recruits. Moreover, this illustrative calculation probably 
overstates the true impact. The incidence of most of our quality indica 
tors varies only slightly from rural to nonrural districts: ratios are 
nearer 1:1 than 1:2. Recruitment effects involving such minute frac 
tions of the workforce cannot explain our findings.
We note finally that there are virtually no differences between expe 
rienced and new teachers with respect to district starting salaries. New 
teachers have not been channeled into jobs in the lowest-paying dis 
tricts.
Teacher Salaries and the Ratings Principals Give Their Staffs
It remains possible, of course, that higher salaries have improved 
teacher recruitment in ways unrelated to these indicators of teacher 
quality. As noted in chapter 2, the 1990-91 SASS requested principals 
to rate the quality of their teaching staffs on a five-point scale (poor = 
1, excellent = 5). Principals were free to evaluate teachers by whatever 
criteria they chose and presumably selected those most relevant to the 
needs of their schools as they saw them. A particularly valuable feature 
of the survey was the inclusion of separate ratings for experienced 
teachers (more than three years' experience) and new staff.
Overall, experienced teachers received higher ratings than new staff. 
The question of interest is whether the difference diminishes in states 
that raised salaries the most. Figure 3.12 depicts the ratings of new and 
experienced staff, by state salary growth. While ratings given experi 
enced staff were quite similar across all three groups, new teachers 
were, indeed, more likely to be rated "excellent" in states with high 
salary growth.
Since ratings were obtained from each school in the SASS, it is pos 
sible to explore this relationship in greater detail. We estimate two 
models. In the first, the ratings given new teachers are assumed to be a
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function of the relative growth of teacher salaries at the state level and 
the rating given the school's experienced staff. Because there are more 
than 8,000 public schools in the sample, we are able to use the actual 
measure of salary growth within the state rather than a three-way clas 
sification. This allows us to estimate with greater precision the contri 
bution of salary growth to new teacher ratings. By including the ratings 
given experienced teachers in the same school, we implicitly control 
for other factors that influence ratings, including idiosyncrasies in the 
standards of the evaluator. In our second model, we include as addi 
tional background controls the school and community characteristics 
examined in table 3.1.
The resulting estimates confirm the impression given by figure 3.12. 
(Details appear in appendix 3C.) Other things equal, new teachers are 
more often rated "excellent" in the states that have raised relative sala 
ries the most. Yet while the effect of salary growth is in the right direc 
tion, it is not statistically significant. In addition, the effect is modest. A 
20 percent increase in relative pay raises the estimated proportion of 
schools in which new teachers are rated "excellent" by less than 2 per 
centage points.
Testing for Bias and Robustness
Our analysis has shown that while the quality of new teacher 
recruits improved somewhat during the 1980s, this improvement had 
little or nothing to do with increases in teacher pay. These findings are 
disappointing from a policy standpoint. They are also surprising from 
the perspective of economic theory, since one would expect higher sal 
aries to affect career choices. This suggests that we would do well to 
consider sources of possible bias. In particular, our assessment of the 
impact of higher salaries has been based almost entirely on a compari 
son of new teachers to experienced teachers. For several reasons, one 
might suspect that this comparison will not reveal what it is intended 
to.
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Resumed Careers
Our experienced teacher category has included persons who 
recently resumed teaching careers. If higher salaries induced these per 
sons to take up teaching again, it would make more sense to group 
returning teachers with new entrants into the profession. To see 
whether this matters, we reclassify former teachers who reentered the 
profession after 1984 as "new" teachers. 8 This change has virtually no 
effect on the measured incidence of our quality indicators. Our analysis 
continues to show as much improvement in states with low and moder 
ate salary growth as in states where teacher pay rose the most.
Cohort Effects
Many experienced instructors started teaching well before the 
decline in teacher salaries during the late 1970s. Since these persons 
might not resemble teachers who entered when salaries were low, their 
inclusion with other experienced teachers skews the comparison we 
wish to make. A fairer test would exclude them.
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to construct precisely this 
comparison group. Instead, we exclude all persons who had ten or 
more years' experience in 1987-88. This will screen out most teachers 
who began their careers before the downturn in salaries. Moreover, 
those who slip through this screen are unlikely to have begun teaching 
much earlier than the mid-70s, since relatively few persons return to 
teaching after long interruptions (Murnane et al. 1991).
This change has a substantial effect on only one indicator, the per 
centage of experienced secondary school teachers with an academic 
major, which falls by 3 to 5 percentage points. Since the magnitude of 
this decline is independent of salary growth, our earlier conclusions 
stand.
Out of State Recruits
Teachers may move from states that have not raised pay to those that 
have. If better teachers tend to be more mobile, the quality of the expe 
rienced workforce rises in the recipient state and falls in the donor 
state. Both responses obscure the consequences of salary growth by
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shifting the quality of the experienced workforce in the same hypothe 
sized direction as the quality of new recruits.
It turns out, however, that the number of teachers who move across 
state boundaries is too small to affect our findings. Fewer than 2 per 
cent of the experienced teachers in 1987-88 gave up a teaching position 
in another state to begin their current jobs. Moreover, this figure 
includes all moves, not merely those subsequent to the onset of salary 
reforms. When we test the explanatory power of this hypothesis by 
excluding out-of-state movers from the comparison groups, there are 
virtually no changes in the values of our quality indicators.
Attrition Bias
Higher pay lowers attrition. If better teachers are more sensitive to 
salary levels in deciding whether to quit, their share of the experienced 
workforce will rise. This, of course, makes it more difficult to detect a 
relative improvement in the quality of new recruits.
Could this explain why high growth states do not appear to have had 
more success recruiting new teachers? Note that our experienced 
teachers were all hired before the 1985-86 school year. For salary 
reforms that began in the early 1980s to have much impact on the com 
position of this group via differential attrition, quit rates of better 
teachers must be considerably more salary-sensitive than those of other 
instructors. Yet Murnane and Olsen (1990) found that the exit decisions 
of North Carolina teachers with high scores on the National Teachers 
Examination were actually less responsive to salary than were the deci 
sions of teachers with lower scores. Our own investigation of data from 
the SASS Teacher Follow-Up Survey finds no statistically significant 
difference between the exit elasticities of teachers who attended selec 
tive colleges and others (Ballou and Podgursky 1993a).
In addition, attrition among experienced teachers is not very large. 
Even if wage elasticities did vary by teacher quality, the base quit rate 
is too low to produce a significant impact on the workforce in a span of 
three to four years.
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Omitted Policy Variables
Pay raises were not the only education reforms undertaken during 
the 1980s. Many states also raised standards for teacher training and 
certification. Thus states that did not increase salaries may have 
improved recruitment through other means. This would be particularly 
likely if policy makers tended to view pay raises and higher standards 
as alternatives, with some states choosing the first route, others the sec 
ond.
Several states now require that secondary school teachers have an 
undergraduate major in their principal subject area (NASDTEC 1991). 
To see whether the impact of this change could be confounded with 
that of salary growth, we sort states into two new classifications, those 
where such a requirement was in place in 1990-91, and the rest. 
Although salary growth was somewhat higher among the latter, the dif 
ference was not great (13 percent versus 10 percent). Thus it does not 
appear that salary reforms/higher standards constituted an either-or 
choice. Just as important, these requirements have had little effect on 
the qualifications of new teachers. The percentage of new secondary 
school teachers in the 1990-91 SASS who majored in an academic sub 
ject in college was virtually identical across the two groups: 41.6 per 
cent and 41.5 percent, respectively. Whether this is the result of weak 
enforcement or the slow phasing-in of new requirements, it does not 
appear that omitting this policy reform from the analysis has biased our 
earlier findings.
We also test whether our results are sensitive to changes in classifi 
cation schemes and definitions. We begin with salary growth. In our 
first test, teacher salaries are measured relative to a simple average (not 
a gender-weighted average) of the salaries of college graduates. This 
has little effect on measured growth rates. As a second alternative, we 
measure the growth in teacher salaries relative to the national Con 
sumer Price Index. These calculations are of particular interest if the 
decision to enter teaching is based not on a comparison of relative 
earnings but on the ability to attain a target standard of living. Measur 
ing the growth in teaching salaries this way considerably alters the 
classification of states by "high," "moderate," and "low" rates of salary 
growth. However, there is still no evidence that high growth states have 
systematically outperformed others.
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Reverting to the original measure of relative salary, we alter the end- 
points of the interval over which we measure salary changes, in the one 
case using 1978 and 1990, in the other, 1980 and 1988. 9 These changes 
make only slight differences to our results. Next, we restrict the cate 
gory of new teachers in 1987-88 to persons with no more than two 
years' experience. We then expand this category to include persons 
with four years' experience. Finally, we restrict the experienced group 
to persons with seven or more years' experience in 1990-91.
Results are generally quite robust to these respecifications. In the 
few cases where measures of teacher quality change significantly, these 
changes do not systematically favor the high growth states.
Conclusion
The evidence reviewed here indicates that the quality of new recruits 
to teaching improved during the 1980s. SAT scores rose among high 
school seniors intending to major in education. New teachers hired 
during this decade were more likely to have majored in an academic 
subject, especially mathematics or science. However, there was little if 
any gain by other indicators, among them teachers' undergraduate 
GPA and the quality of the colleges they attended.
These improvements do not appear to be related to salary increases. 
By virtually all indicators, progress has been independent of the rate of 
salary growth at the state level. The single exception is provided by 
principals' ratings of the staffs in the 1990-91 Schools and Staffing 
Survey. Even in this case, however, the practical import of this relation 
ship is limited: a 20 percent increase in teachers' salaries raises the 
share of schools with "excellent" new teachers by less than 2 percent 
age points—a statistically insignificant effect.
We have subjected our findings to a number of specification tests. 
The results indicate that our conclusions are not the result of obvious 
biases that might have affected the statistical analysis. Our findings 
also appear to be robust to alternative measurements of salary trends 
and to various ways of defining who is to be counted as an experienced 
teacher or a new teacher.
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It is possible, of course, that better analytical techniques might 
detect a positive relationship between salary growth and the quality of 
new teachers. In particular, it might be wondered if we have not placed 
too much emphasis on state variation in salary growth. After all, pro 
spective teachers may have responded to salary growth in other states, 
anticipating that their own state would follow. If so, the national trend 
in teacher pay may have had an important influence on career deci 
sions. This argument could also account for the fact that the quality of 
newly recruited teachers improved nationwide during the 1980s.
There may be some truth to this claim, but we do not believe it pro 
vides an adequate explanation for the near absence of a correlation at 
the state level between salary growth and improvements in the work 
force. Even if prospective teachers thought it likely that their state 
would match the growth in salaries elsewhere, one would still expect 
an actual boost in pay to carry more weight than one that remained 
speculative. Moreover, as time passed, it became clear that not all 
states were acting in the same manner.
As for the improvement in teacher quality nationwide, alternative 
explanations seem more compelling. In the first place, the job market 
improved for teachers during the 1980s. Indeed, there was a well-pub 
licized threat of a teacher shortage that probably led many to believe it 
would be easier to find a teaching job than it proved to be. In addition, 
by the end of this decade, virtually all states had raised standards for 
admission to teacher education programs and teacher certification. 
Finally, public education received a great deal of attention in the 
national media. This may have influenced career decisions.
This is not to say that the analysis presented here will have satisfied 
all skeptics. However, we do not believe that much can be gained by 
sifting the data further in an effort to confirm or refute our conclusions. 
Rather, we would argue that our findings raise, at the very least, serious 
doubts about the policy many states have followed. Certainly it would 
be unwise simply to assume that raising pay will improve teacher qual 
ity. That it should be so difficult to detect any gains from the salary 
increases of the 1980s suggests that we need to take a closer look at 
what happens in teacher labor markets when salaries rise.
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NOTES
1. Results of this kind have been found in studies using measures of teacher quality similar to 
ours (Ehrenberg and Brewer 1994; Ferguson 1991; Chambers 1985). Estimates of hedonic wage 
equations for teachers have also shown that teachers with more coursework in their subject areas 
(Smith and Lee 1990) and higher scores on a test of verbal ability (Antes and Rosen 1975) earn 
more, though the returns are quite modest.(For example, Antos and Rosen found that teachers 
who missed 50 percent or more of the test questions earned almost as much (96 percent) as 
higher-scoring instructors.) Other research has explored the relationship between teacher salaries 
and students' educational outcomes. These studies form part of a much larger literature that 
debates the relationship between spending on education and educational outcomes; much of this 
literature yields negative conclusions. For a review, see Hanushek (1986).
2. This is not to say that only and all of those high school seniors who intend to major in edu 
cation will ultimately become teachers. Indeed, evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of 1972 reveals that many of these persons pursued other careers, while many who had different 
plans in high school became teachers, at least for a time (Vance and Schlechty 1982). Nonethe 
less, even though final career decisions are uncertain, changes in board scores should signal 
whether higher salaries have led better students to consider careers in education.
3. We express math and science majors as a percentage of all secondary school teachers, not as 
a percentage of those teaching math or science, since the number of math and science teachers is 
strongly influenced by policies governing the assignment of teachers outside their areas of certifi 
cation. In any event, if there is excess demand for such personnel, a simple measure of their repre 
sentation in the workforce should indicate whether recruitment has improved.
4. To obtain these figures, average teachers salaries in each state were divided by a weighted 
average of the earnings of full-time workers with four years of college, as reported in the decen 
nial census (published statistics for 1980, 5 percent public use sample for 1990). Since teacher 
contracts typically run from September to September, academic years 1978-79 and 1988-89 pro 
vide the greatest overlap with the periods covered by the census (incomes for 1979 and 1989, 
respectively). Teacher salaries are from the Digest of Education Statistics. Weights are derived 
from the 1987-88 Schools and Staffing Survey and reflect the proportions of men and women in 
the teaching force of each state in that year.
5. To facilitate comparisons, this tripartite classification is based on relative salary changes 
from school years 1978-79 to 1988-89, even though the first SASS was conducted in 1987. The 
ranking of states as "high," "middle," or "low" is virtually the same when based on salary changes 
through 1987, leaving our conclusions unaltered.
6. Recall that data on teachers' undergraduate colleges are available for the 1987-88 school 
years but not for 1990-91. One might wonder if 1987 was too soon after the onset of salary reform 
for a response to be apparent. Fortunately, recently released data from the Schools and Staffing 
Survey of 1993-94 allow us to check this possibility, since the item on teachers' undergraduate 
colleges was restored in the 1992-94 SASS. Although these data arrived too late for us to include 
a full analysis of them in this monograph, we have used them to explore the possibility that 
improvement appeared with a lag.
Following the analysis for earlier years, we distinguish teachers who were new in 1993-94 (no 
more than three years' experience) from those who were experienced. There is no evidence that 
states that boosted pay the most over the 1980s benefited from a lagged effect on recruitment in 
the early 1990s. For example, among high-growth states, teachers from selective colleges made up 
5.1 percent of the new workforce, compared to 4.2 percent of the experienced workforce. But the 
difference was just as great in the states with moderate salary growth and substantially greater in
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states with low salary growth, where 11.7 percent of new teachers came from these colleges, com 
pared to 7.2 percent of the experienced workforce. (Omitted from this analysis are teachers who 
graduated from colleges not in the 1987-88 analysis; this is, however, a negligible proportion of 
the workforce, comprising for the most part graduates of foreign universities or small, obscure 
American colleges.)
As an alternative check on our findings, we dispense with the new/experienced breakdown and 
simply compare the 1993-94 workforce to the 1987-88 workforce. We find very little change in 
the composition of the workforce. Two statistics indicate a positive relationship between salary 
changes and teacher quality. Among states with low salary growth, the share of teachers from 
selective colleges fell from 8.8 to 7.7 percent (significant at 10 percent). In high-growth states, the 
proportion of the workforce from above-average colleges grew from 12.3 to 13.7 percent (signifi 
cant at 5 percent). There were no other statistically significant changes. Overall there was very lit 
tle alteration in the makeup of the workforce between the two surveys. And, of course, these 
changes take everything into account: retirement, in-migration, and retention, as well as recruit 
ment of new graduates.
7. Because the samples are smaller and more sensitive to sample design, we do not report a 
comparable breakdown on GPA data from the SRCG. Our attempts to conduct such an analysis 
found that statistics fluctuated implausibly with small changes in the classification of states as 
"high," "middle," or "low," and in the period over which relative salary changes are measured. 
This was not the case with the data from the SASS.
8. By "former teachers" we mean persons who took up another occupation during the inter 
vening years. This includes homemakers but not persons who attended school, since many teach 
ers who study during leaves or sabbaticals are pursuing professional development and intend to 
return to teaching afterward.
9. For this purpose, we extrapolate earnings of college graduates at the state level beyond the 
census year. Extrapolation is based on the rate of change of earnings at the state-level from 
Employment and Earnings, Annual State Averages. These data represent earnings of all types of 
workers, college-educated and noncollege-educated alike. Nonetheless, year-to-year changes 
should reflect local differences in economic conditions affecting economic prospects for all resi 




The principal sources of data for this study were the two Schools and Staff 
ing Surveys, conducted during the 1987-88 and 1990-91 academic years, and 
the series of Surveys of Recent College Graduates, conducted in 1976, 1978, 
1981, 1985, and 1991. The purpose of this appendix is not to provide an ex 
haustive description of these data, but rather to highlight features of these data 
sources of particular importance for this study. Readers desiring more informa 
tion about either series may wish to consult the following publications of the 
National Center for Education Statistics: Choy et al., Schools and Staffing in 
the United States: A Statistical Profile, 1987-88 (NCES 92-120); Choy et al., 
Schools and Staffing in the United States: A Statistical Profile, 1990-91 (NCES 
93-146); Frankel and Stowe, New Teachers in the Job Market, 1987 Update 
(NCES 90-336).
The Schools and Staffing Surveys
Each Schools and Staffing Survey comprised four questionnaires: (1) a dis 
trict (LEA) questionnaire, sent to approximately 5500 public school district of 
fices chosen through stratified sampling; (2) a school questionnaire, sent to 
selected schools within these districts; (3) an administrator questionnaire, sent 
to the principal or headmaster of each of these schools; (4) a teacher question 
naire, sent to several teachers at these schools. The number of teachers selected 
was a function of school size and grade level. On average, four to six teachers 
were sampled per school. For stand-alone private schools, the 1987-88 district 
questionnaire was also sent to the school. In the 1990-91 SASS, the district and 
school questionnaires were collapsed into one.
In both years surveys were sent to more than 9,000 public and 3,000 private 
schools. Response rates were high, averaging more than 90 percent of public 
schools and 80 percent of private schools. Just over 56,000 public school teach 
ers were surveyed in each year. The 1987-88 sample of private school teachers 
was slightly larger, at 11,529, than was the 1990-91 survey, at 9,166. Response 
rates among teachers ranged between 80 and 90 percent.
In 1987-88 the teacher questionnaire obtained information on the institution 
that awarded the teacher's undergraduate degree and the major program of 
study. The first of these items was dropped from the 1990-91 survey. No infor 
mation was obtained on other measures of academic achievement, such as un 
dergraduate grades and test scores.
In chapter 3 we assess the effect of salary increases on recruitment by com 
paring the characteristics of new public school teachers to those of experienced
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teachers. Full-time teachers only are used, thus excluding part-time instructors 
and persons who served part-time as administrators. Unfortunately, the number 
of new teachers surveyed in a given state tended to be small (often less than 
100). As a result, state-level, aggregates are far too noisy to conduct analysis at 
this level. Instead, we group states into those that experienced high growth, 
moderate growth, and low growth in teacher salaries.
The school component of the SASS provides information on student and 
community characteristics, which we use as indicators of job attractiveness in 
table 3.1.
We also make considerable use of the SASS in chapter 6, to compare com 
pensation and personnel policies across public and private schools. On virtual 
ly every point of interest, inconsistencies in the items covered between survey 
years generally prevented us from pooling data from the two surveys. Even so, 
estimates are generally precise enough to provide a clear picture of differences 
between the two sectors.
Surveys of Recent College Graduates
Six surveys were conducted at irregular intervals between the years 1976 
and 1991. Surveys were conducted in spring of the year following graduation. 
Thus, respondents to the 1976 survey were individuals who graduated between 
July 1, 1974 and June 30, 1975. Only recipients of bachelor's and master's de 
grees were surveyed. Our analysis uses responses of the former. The number 
of respondents varied from a low of 4,350 in the first year of the survey to a 
high of 17,276 in 1987. Teachers were oversampled, since a principal purpose 
of these surveys was to investigate the flow of newly trained teachers onto the 
job market.
The SRCG sample was obtained first by selecting a group of colleges and 
universities, who provided a list of recent graduates from which the survey 
sample was chosen. In 1987 and 1991, for example, 400 institutions were cho 
sen. Earlier waves of the survey used fewer schools. As a result of this survey 
design, the SRCG samples exhibit strong effects of clustering. Changes in the 
list of institutions surveyed can have a considerable impact on statistics com 
puted from the data. One must be very cautious in interpreting trends in the data 
for graduates who have come from a small set of schools. Statistics like the pro 
portion of newly trained teachers who graduated from selective colleges are en 
tirely unreliable at the state level; even for groups of states, estimates are 
sensitive to the way the group is defined (for example, states experiencing high 
growth in teacher pay). Because the estimates are not robust to fairly minor 
changes in the composition of groups, we do not report data from the SRCG at 
this level.
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Undergraduate GPA is self-reported on an interval scale, giving rise to ques 
tions about its reliability on two counts. Of the two problems, the one stemming 
from recall bias (or a tendency to enhance one's self-image) appears to be 
greater than the measurement error induced by mapping interval responses 
back onto a four-point scale. Access to transcript data for the 1987 survey co 
hort made it possible to check the accuracy of these self-reported data. We 
found a pronounced upward bias (except, of course, for the very best students, 
who could not overstate their grades). This effect was greater, the lower a stu 
dent's actual grades. As a result, two sorts of measurement error are present. 
Imprecision in the responses, particularly when converted to a numerical four- 
point scale, creates a classical errors-in-variables problem, tending to lower the 
coefficient on GPA in a regression analysis. However, the fact that the mea 
surement error is largely one-sided and inversely correlated with true GPA im 
parts an offsetting bias. Analyses of the effects of GPA (and other individual 
attributes) on subsequent earnings, one using reported GPA, the other actual 
GPA, showed that these effects were almost exactly offsetting, at least in this 
particular context.
There were many inconsistencies in the wording of survey items and the 
coding of responses from one survey to the next. We briefly review those 
which were most important for this study.
In all years but one (1985), new graduates were asked if they had earned a 
teaching certificate and, if not, whether they were eligible for a certificate 
(meaning, presumably, that they had completed the necessary course work and 
student teaching). In 1985 survey subjects were asked only if they were certi 
fied or eligible for certification; consequently, we have collapsed the two into 
a single category in order to preserve consistency of the data across all survey 
years. Where we write of "certified graduates," it should be understood that it 
includes persons who may not hold a certificate. This slight ambiguity should 
not cause great concern, however, since those with certificates are by far the 
larger group. The 1991 survey, for example, found 3,111 certified graduates 
and only 127 additional persons who indicated they were eligible but not cer 
tified.
Graduates who were certified or eligible for certification were also asked 
whether they had applied for a teaching job since or just prior to graduating. 
They were not asked whether this was their first choice or whether they had 
turned down a teaching position to take a preferred job or to continue their ed 
ucation. In order to avoid false inferences that might arise from taking this re 
sponse at face-value, we have used other survey items to determine whether an 
individual was likely to have turned down a teaching position, as explained in 
chapter 4.
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The SRCG inquired whether a teacher worked in a public or a private school 
and what grade levels and subjects were taught. Otherwise, no information was 
obtained about school characteristics or even school location. Indeed, in only 
about one-half of the survey years was the state in which the respondent 
worked reported. In other years, only the location of the college they had at 
tended was available. To preserve consistency across survey years, college lo 
cation is therefore used to place graduates within a state or region. Statements 
in the text about new graduates' mobility are based on an analysis of the sur 
veys that reported both college and job location.
Survey Design
Both the SASS and SRCG sampling designs exhibit stratification and clus 
tering. The SASS particularly oversampled small schools and rural schools. In 
addition, the SRCG is a choice-based sample, since new graduates who had 
completed a program of teacher education were more likely to be surveyed. Ex 
cept where otherwise noted, all statistics reported in this book are computed us 
ing sampling weights equal to the inverse probability of selection
Standard errors calculated on the assumption of simple random sampling 
are biased if observations from the same stratum or cluster exhibit residual cor 
relation. In complex survey designs, it is difficult to specify apriori the covari- 
ance matrix of the observations. Instead, resampling techniques can be used to 
estimate standard errors of parameter estimates. For statistics obtained from the 
Schools and Staffing Surveys, we use the method of balanced repeated replica 
tions (Wolter 1985). The only exception is table 6.7, where we report standard 
errors obtained from the conventional weighted least squares formula. Levels 
of statistical significance are so great in this table that allowing for design ef 
fects or heteroscedasticity would not change any of our inferences.
For various reasons, some rather technical, it was not possible to follow the 
same procedure for statistics obtained from the Surveys of Recent College 
Graduates. Standard errors reported in chapter 4 are obtained from the weight 
ed information matrix for maximum likelihood estimates (under the assump 
tion of independent observations) or, in the case of linear models, the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator described in White 
(1980). These estimates of standard errors are likely to be biased downward. 
This is not as great a cause for concern as might initially appear. Most of our 
findings are negative in character—that is, variables that one would have ex 
pected to matter are not found to have a statistically significant influence on 
outcomes of interest. This would not change if standard errors were corrected 
for downward bias. In addition, we are careful not to place great weight in our 
argument on statistical results of marginal significance.
Appendix 3B 
Components of State-Level Salary Growth
We begin our analysis of state-level changes in teacher salaries by specify 
ing a micro-level model of teacher pay:
CD Wist = t>st + bit NOBAist + b2t MAist + b3t MAPLUSist 
+ b4t EXPERist + eist
where wist is the annual base salary received by teacher i in state s and year t, 
and
NOB A = 1 if the teacher does not hold a bachelor's degree;
= 0 otherwise
MA = 1 if the teacher's holds a master's degree, but nothing 
higher;
= 0 otherwise 
MAPLUS = 1 if the teacher holds a degree above the master's level;
= 0 otherwise 
EXPER = years of teaching experience, if < 20;
= 20 if years of experience >20
EXPER is censored at 20 since salary schedules commonly top out after 15-20 
years of service.
Equation (1) is estimated by ordinary least squares with data from the 1987- 
88 SASS and from the 1990-91 SASS. These results can be used to express 
mean teacher pay in each state as
(2) WS)87 = bS;87 + B 87 Xs>87 
and
Ws,90 = bs,90 + B90 Xs,90
in which Xs represents the mean of the regressor vector for state S and Bt the 
vector of coefficients in year t. Mean salary growth between 1987 and 1990 can 
therefore be decomposed into changes in state intercepts, teacher education and 
experience, and coefficients on education and experience:
Ws,90' Ws>87 = (bS)9o-bs>87) + B90 (Xs 90-XS)87) + (B90-B 87) XS)87 .
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Of the three components on the right-hand side of this decomposition, the 
change in state means has by far the greatest explanatory power. A regression 
of mean salary changes on the change in state intercepts yields an R2 of .95. 
This increases to .98 when the second term is added to the model; however, a 
regression of mean salary changes on (Xs 90 -XS 87) alone explains only 20 per 
cent of the variation in Ws 90 - Ws 87 . We conclude that our three-way classi 
fication of states would scarcely be affected if we were to control for state-level 
changes in teacher experience and education.
These results also indicate that by far the greater part of the increase in av 
erage teacher pay between 1987 and 1990 resulted from upward shifts in salary 
schedules and not from movements along existing schedules to higher levels of 
teacher education and experience. We expect the same was true of the entire 
decade. Data from the quinquennial survey of NEA members (NEA 1992) in 
dicate that there was little change in the proportion of teachers with master's 
degrees, at least nationally: 49.3 percent of respondents held master's degrees 
in 1981, a number that had grown to only 52.6 percent by 1991. Mean years of 
experience rose from 13 in 1981 to 15 in 1986, where it remained in 1991. 
Since salary regressions indicate that teachers' pay increases by 2.5 to 3 per 
cent for each additional year of experience, these data suggest that rising levels 
of work force experience could have raised teacher compensation by 5 to 6 per 
centage points over this interval (out of a total real increase of 16.5 percent). 
However, this calculation substantially overstates the portion of salary growth 
due to changes in experience, since much of the increase in the latter occurred 
among older career teachers who had already reached the top of their districts' 
schedules.
Appendix 3C 
Ratings of New Teachers
We assume that principals' underlying assessments of their staffs vary con 
tinuously. Survey responses are recorded on a five-point scale, however. The 
mapping from the real line to a five-point scale is determined by the position 
of the continuous assessment vis-a-vis certain thresholds to be estimated. Thus, 
an assessment below the lowest threshold results in a rating of "1," whereas a 
latent assessment above the highest of the thresholds yields a rating of "5." 
Other ratings correspond to intermediate values. In the first formulation of the 
model, only state-level salary growth and the ratings given experienced teach 
ers influence the continuous assessment. In the second formulation, the contin 
uous assessment is a function of the other school-level variables examined in 
table 3.1 as well. By including the ratings given experienced teachers among 
the explanatory variables, we effectively ask the same question we have asked 
elsewhere in this chapter: to what extent is the quality of new teachers a func 
tion of salary growth, given the quality of experienced teachers. Finally, we as 
sume that the continuous assessment is also a function of a logistically 
distributed error term. The resulting estimator is known as an ordered logit 
model, differing from the usual, binary logit in that the dependent variable falls 
into one of several ordered categories.
We report two sets of estimates below. To interpret the coefficients, note 
that the probability that new teachers receive a rating below "5" is given by 
l/[l+exp(-Xb-t4)], where Xb is the inner product of the coefficients and the 
explanatory variables and t4 is the highest of four thresholds. Hence a nega 
tive component of Xb raises the probability of the highest rating, "5." The 
negative coefficient on relative salary growth therefore indicates that new 
teachers are more often rated "excellent" in the states that have raised relative 
salaries the most. The effect is not, however, statistically significant. Other 
variables behave largely as one would expect. High rates of poverty and con 
centrations of black and Hispanic students make it more difficult to recruit 
good teachers, though the effect of poverty is not statistically significant. Lo 
cation in a large central city or a rural area also impairs recruitment. The 
starting salary offered teachers with a bachelor's degree and no prior experi 
ence has a strong, positive effect on new teacher ratings. This confirms that 
higher paying districts have an advantage in teacher recruitment, though as 
we remarked above, these gains come at the expense of other districts.
By substituting different values for salary growth into Xb, it is possible to 
predict changes in the probability that new teachers receive an excellent rating. 
The magnitude of the predicted change depends on the other elements of X. To 
obtain the figure reported in the text, we evaluated all X at their actual values
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(except for the hypothesized change in salary growth) and averaged the result 
ing changes in the probability that a rating of "5" was given.
Appendix Table 3C.1 Influence of Salary Growth on Principals© Ratings 
of New Teachers
Explanatory variables
Proportional growth in relative teacher salary, 1980- 
1990
Experienced teachers rated 1
Experienced teachers rated 2
Experienced teachers rated 3
Experienced teachers rated 4
Starting salary for BA, no experience
Proportion of students eligible for free or reduced 
price lunch




























































SOURCE: Schools and Staffing Survey, 1990-91. Standard errors in parentheses.
CHAPTER
What Went Wrong
Attrition, Vacancies, and the Supply of New Teachers
There is little evidence that higher salaries have raised the quality of 
newly hired teachers, at least by the indicators of teacher quality we 
have examined. This calls for an explanation.
One obvious possibility is that teacher labor supply is simply unre 
sponsive to wages. This explanation derives some support from the 
small percentage of former teachers who cite low pay as their main 
reason for leaving the position (Choy et al. 1992). Nonetheless, we 
doubt that the wage elasticity is near zero. Teaching is among the most 
highly unionized occupations in the United States, a fact that suggests 
compensation is important to many teachers. 1 Fewer than one-half of 
the 1987-88 SASS respondents agreed with the statement, "I am satis 
fied with my salary." Salaries have been found to have a significant 
effect on teacher attrition (Murnane et al. 1991; Mont and Rees 1996). 
We present evidence below that salaries also affect the supply of new 
teachers.
As we will argue in this chapter, the failure of a high-salary policy 
has its origin in certain key features of the labor market for teachers. 
These features are the institution of tenure and other forms of job secu 
rity, the absence of merit pay or other systems for discriminating 
among teachers when awarding pay raises, costly barriers to entering 
the profession in the form of certification requirements, and procedures 
for screening and hiring job applicants that overlook valuable signals 
of teaching effectiveness. The purpose of this chapter is to describe 
how these features of the market systematically interact to thwart pol 
icy objectives.
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Teaching Careers: Preparation, Entry, Tenure
America obtains its public school teachers from the ranks of the col 
lege-educated who hold teaching certificates. While certification 
requirements vary from state to state, as a rule prospective teachers 
must complete a specified number of credit hours in the subjects for 
which they seek certification and in pedagogical theory and practice. 
Prospective teachers are also required to complete a practicum or stu 
dent teaching experience under the guidance of an established teacher. 
While the majority of newly certified teachers satisfy these require 
ments by completing bachelor's degrees in education, this is not the 
only program of study that leads to certification. College students who 
major in an academic subject (e.g., history) can meet certification 
requirements by taking additional courses from a department or school 
of education. Since the requirements for a major generally exceed the 
subject-area preparation needed for a certificate, the incremental cost 
of certification for such individuals is represented by course work in 
pedagogy (often known as "professional education") and student 
teaching. There are usually twelve to fifteen semester hours of the 
former (more for elementary school certification), while student teach 
ing often lasts the better part of a semester.
These are not the only routes into the teaching profession. Persons 
who have had no undergraduate training in education can become cer 
tified in a postgraduate program. Such programs also last a year; many 
award a master's degree. In recent years, approximately one-ninth of 
newly certified teachers have come onto the market with master's 
degrees (Frankel and Stowe 1990). In addition, many states have set up 
alternative certification routes, typically to facilitate the entry of older 
persons with work histories outside education. These programs allow 
such individuals to bypass, or at least postpone, some of the course 
work associated with certification. Paid internships or other forms of 
probationary employment generally replace the student teaching 
practicum. To date these alternative programs have supplied only a 
small fraction of the nation's newly hired teachers. We discuss them at 
greater length in the next chapter. 2
Virtually all states now test teachers. Some tests are a prerequisite 
for admission to a teacher education program, while others are needed
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for certification. Many states use tests at both stages. On the whole, 
passing rates appear to be quite high (80-90 percent), though data are 
not reported on a consistent basis for all states (Childs and Rudner 
1990).
New public school teachers are hired on a probationary status. After 
a specified period, typically two or three years, teachers who continue 
to be employed by the same district are granted tenure. While the pre 
cise significance of tenure varies with state law and the provisions of 
collectively bargained contracts, tenure confers important job rights 
and makes it difficult and expensive for administrators to remove 
instructors on grounds of incompetence. Other laws and contract provi 
sions also protect more senior teachers against layoffs.
Virtually all public school districts use salary schedules to determine 
teacher compensation. A schedule is essentially a grid specifying sal 
ary as a function of experience and education (degrees or credits). All 
teachers employed in a district, regardless of grade level or subject 
matter, are paid on this basis, hence the term, "single salary schedule." 
Teachers typically reach the top of a district's schedule after fifteen to 
twenty years' service, though they will continue to receive raises as the 
entire schedule shifts upward. Teachers who leave one district to take a 
job in another may or may not be credited in full for prior experience 
when placed on their new employer's salary schedule; there is consid 
erable variation in local practice here, and it can matter whether the 
move is within state or across state lines.
Various efforts have been made to change the basis of teacher com 
pensation by introducing performance incentives like merit pay. These 
reforms have usually been resisted by teacher unions. As a result, merit 
pay plans tend to be short-lived. Only about 12 percent of public 
school districts use merit pay, and the amounts at stake appear to be 
quite small, approximately 2 percent of base pay. (For additional dis 
cussion of incentive pay, see chapter 6).
Several features of this career path affect the relationship between 
salaries and recruitment. First is the single salary schedule, which 
ensures that when teacher salaries are raised to attract more capable 
individuals into the profession, all teachers gain.
Second, the institution of tenure and the use of seniority to deter 
mine layoffs mean that experienced teachers retain their jobs virtually 
at will. If higher pay prolongs their careers, there will be fewer job
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opportunities for newly certified graduates. Note that this is not a 
purely transitory phenomenon: the steady-state composition of the 
workforce tilts towards older teachers. There are fewer entry-level jobs 
in perpetuity.
Third, prospective teachers must invest in an occupation-specific 
credential that has no market value outside the teaching profession. 
They must do this before knowing whether they will find a job. As a 
result, job prospects for new teachers become a relevant consideration 
when individuals decide whether to undertake teacher training.
Vacancy Rates and the Supply of New Teachers
Figure 4.1 depicts the flow of newly certified teachers onto the labor 
market between 1976 and 1991, during the years in which the Survey 
of Recent College Graduates was administered. Flows are measured as 
a proportion of all new bachelor's degree recipients to control for cycli 
cal fluctuations in the size of the college-age population. Certification 
rates fell from 1976 through 1981, stabilized in the mid-1980s, and 
turned up again in the late-1980s. Also shown are the percentage of 
new graduates employed as full-time public school teachers and the 
ratio of their salaries to those of other new graduates working full time. 
Certification rates appear to track employment opportunities more 
closely than relative pay. Though relative salaries began to rise at the 
beginning of the 1980s, the percentage of graduates obtaining teaching 
certificates did not increase until more jobs became available. A cur 
sory inspection of figure 4.1 suggests, then, that employment opportu 
nities are at least as important, and quite possibly more important, than 
relative salaries in determining the supply of newly certified teachers.
Figure 4.1 also shows that the number of newly certified graduates 
has exceeded the number hired by public schools in every year of the 
survey. Although not all newly certified individuals look for teaching 
jobs, the number of applicants also exceeds the number hired, pointing 
up an important fact: for all the publicity given to teacher shortages, 
teacher labor markets typically exhibit excess supply. 3 (There is an 
excellent discussion of this issue, including the reasons so many fore 
casts were inaccurate, in Barro 1992.) Because there are fewer vacan-
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cies than applicants, prospective teachers are not assured of obtaining a 
job. The probability of obtaining a job therefore becomes a relevant 
consideration when deciding whether to invest time and money com 
pleting a program of teacher education.

























In order to see how large this effect is, we have estimated a probit 
model of the supply of newly certified graduates as reported by the 
Surveys of Recent College Graduates. The probability that a graduate 
has completed a program of teacher education leading to certification 
is assumed to be a function of job availability, relative salary, and a 
vector of individual attributes (sex, age, race, marital status, and qual 
ity indicators). To measure relative salary, we divide the average salary 
of new public school teachers by the mean earnings of nonteachers in 
the same survey cohort. Since state-level means are very noisy, aver 
ages are computed for each census region in each survey year. Due to 
data limitations, region corresponds to the location of the college rather 
than the graduate's residence or workplace. This ratio may not be the 
appropriate measure for persons who relocate after completing school, 
though the fact that the great majority of students remain in the same 
region suggests that the resulting bias will be slight. 4 Intraregional vari 
ation in salaries is also omitted from this measure. Lagged rather than
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current values enter the model, as the decision to pursue a program of 
teacher education often predates employment by two years or more.
We expect enrollment in teacher education to fall when jobs are hard 
to find. Labor market slack is measured as the proportion of applicants 
who failed to obtain full-time public school positions in the previous 
wave of the survey. Again, this proportion is calculated at the regional 
level. Lagged (previous survey) values are used, since prospective 
teachers must commit themselves to a program of teacher training 
before the market conditions they will face are revealed. 5 Because this 
is a regional rather than state-level variable, this measure of job avail 
ability raises some of the same concerns as the relative salary variable.
Personal characteristics also influence the decision to teach. Gender, 
age, and marital status in particular may serve as proxies for unob 
served, nonpecuniary returns to teaching. Regional dummies control 
for further unobserved variation in labor market conditions.
Several variables are introduced as measures of the quality of an 
applicant's academic background, among them the ranking of the col 
lege granting the bachelor's degree and the applicant's undergraduate 
grade point average. While these variables are intended to capture the 
influence of academic ability on the decision to teach, it is recognized 
that they also serve as proxies for personal tastes, since choice of col 
lege and the effort made to achieve high grades may well be influenced 
by career plans. A dummy variable signifying a degree in mathematics 
and science is also included.
Results are presented in the first column of table 4.1. All variables 
are statistically significant and have the anticipated signs. Certification 
probabilities are responsive both to salaries and job availability. The 
implied elasticities are 2.4 for relative salaries and .74 for job availabil 
ity. Students with strong academic backgrounds are less likely to com 
plete teacher education.
As noted above, both relative salaries and job availability have been 
measured imprecisely; while the results clearly indicate that salaries 
and job availability both matter, the estimated elasticities are only sug 
gestive. In addition, the limited variation in the data (by region and 
year only) makes it impossible to interact these regressors with mea 
sures of teacher quality, a point of some interest, since we would like to 
know whether persons with stronger academic backgrounds are more 
sensitive to salaries and job opportunities than others. Unfortunately,
Table 4.1 Influence of Salary and Job Availability on New Teacher Certification
Relative teacher salary, lagged 
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SOURCE: Teacher characteristics from Surveys of Recent College Graduates; state average teacher salaries from Digest of Education Statistics; earnings 
of colleges graduates from 1990 Census; proportion of new teachers from Schools and Staffing Survey, 1987-88. 
Significant at 10 percent (*), 5 percent (**), and 1 percent (***).
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better measures of job opportunities covering this entire period are not 
available. Proxies like the growth in enrollment are very imprecise, 
since demand for new public school teachers is also a function of turn 
over and the extent to which vacancies are filled by other sources of 
supply (returning teachers, in-migrants). Data on these determinants of 
demand are quite incomplete.
However, useful measures of job opportunities are available for the 
end of the 1980s. The 1987-88 Schools and Staffing Survey furnishes 
the number of full-time teachers in each school with fewer than three 
years' experience. Aggregated to the state level, these numbers provide 
a reasonable measure of demand for the services of new teachers. 6 
Since 1990 graduates were deciding on their courses of study at this 
time, we use these indicators of demand to investigate certification 
rates for that cohort. To control for differences in state size, job avail 
ability is defined as the number of newly hired teachers divided by total 
public school teacher employment in the state. Relative salary is mea 
sured as the average teacher salary divided by the mean earnings of 
college-educated workers in each state. Other variables are unchanged 
from column one.
Probit estimates appear in columns two, three and four of table 4.1. 
In column two, neither salary nor job availability has a statistically sig 
nificant effect on certification, though the sample size is, of course, 
much smaller than in column one. The effects of grade point average 
and college quality are very similar to those reported for the larger 
sample. In column three we have interacted both salary and job avail 
ability with indicators of teacher quality. Most coefficients have large 
standard errors, a consequence of including so many interaction terms. 
There are no significant interactions involving salary except for mathe 
matics and science graduates, who are more responsive than the aver 
age graduate to an increase in teacher pay, though the effect is only 
marginally significant. However, a striking pattern emerges with 
respect to job availability. Graduates of better colleges are much more 
sensitive than others to market conditions. The implied elasticity for 
graduates of selective and above average colleges is near unity, though 
the large standard errors imply that these estimates should be regarded, 
again, as no more than suggestive. 7
In the fourth column of table 4.1 we restrict the sample to persons 
who did not major in education. Members of this group who obtained
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teacher certification did so while completing an academic major. 
Among these students, both salary and job availability have a positive 
and statistically significant influence on the decision to acquire certifi 
cation. Of the two, job availability has the larger and more important 
impact.
In summary, an empirical investigation of certification decisions 
shows that the number of students completing teacher education 
responds positively to both salaries and job availability, though there is 
considerable imprecision in our estimates of the magnitude of these 
effects. In addition, job availability appears to be more important to 
graduates of better colleges and to students with academic majors, a 
point to which we return below.
Teacher Attrition and Job Availability
In practice, salaries and job availability are linked. Higher salaries 
reduce turnover among current staff. As exit from the profession falls, 
so does the demand for new teachers. Indeed, it did not take long for 
school systems that raised pay in the 1980s to see feedback from the 
former to the latter.
Even the infusion of new teachers, lured to Rochester by the pub 
licized pay increases, was slowed because the high salaries con 
vinced older teachers to defer retirement (New York Times, April 
10, 1991).
High salaries also jeopardize the job security of new recruits. In Con 
necticut, where average teacher pay rose 50 percent in real terms dur 
ing the 1980s, high labor costs compelled many towns to lay off their 
newest teachers when government revenues fell during the last reces 
sion. 8
As dramatic as such cases are, the impact of salaries on the exit of 
younger teachers is probably more important. Investigating teachers' 
career paths in Michigan during the 1970s and 1980s, Richard Mur- 
nane and colleagues found that a $4,000 pay raise (in 1988 dollars) 
reduced the probability that a teacher would quit at the end of the first 
year by one-third.9 The percentage of elementary school teachers esti 
mated to teach longer than five years rose from 43 percent to 54 per-
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cent. The gain was even greater for high school teachers, from 27 
percent to 42 percent. Median career duration among the latter rose 
nearly two years. While Michigan was in some respects an anomalous 
case, with many younger persons leaving the state for regions experi 
encing greater economic growth, estimates for North Carolina teachers 
confirmed that salaries have a strong effect on the duration of teaching 
spells. A raise of $4,000 was found to increase median career duration 
among high school teachers by three and a half years, with the percent 
age of teachers serving five years or longer advancing from 56 percent 
to 64 percent.
To illustrate the effect such responses have on the demand for new 
teachers, we construct a simple model of the composition, by cohorts, 
of the teaching workforce. A representative career is divided into three 
segments: an early, seven-year period when exit rates are high, a mid 
dle period of twenty-three years when exit rates are low, and a final 
period of ten years when exit rates again rise. This is a stylized repre 
sentation of the U-shaped pattern found in empirical studies of teacher 
attrition (Gilford and Tenenbaum 1990). Baseline values of these exit 
rates are chosen so that the proportion of teachers in each cohort 
reflects the actual composition of the U.S. workforce as of the mid- 
1970s. (First-year teachers are 6 percent of the total; mean work life is 
fourteen years; etc.) Demand for new teachers is set to 10 percent of 
each graduating cohort.
We simulate the effect of a pay raise on attrition and new teacher 
demand under three sets of assumptions:
1. The impact of higher salaries is felt only during the first phase of 
a career. 10 Annual survival rates are assumed to increase by 3 per 
cent, generating changes in the length of the work life and the 
five-year survival rate roughly equivalent to the effects of a 
$4,000 raise on the behavior of Michigan and North Carolina 
teachers, as described above.
2. Higher salaries affect exit during the mid-career and final career 
phases as well. We assume an increase of only .5 percent in the 
one-year survival rate for mid-career teachers. A higher value, 3 
percent, is assigned to teachers in the final career phase, reflect 
ing the sizable influence of salary increases on the timing of 
retirement.
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3. One-year survival rates are increased by 5 percent in the first 
career phase, 1 percent in the middle phase, and 3 percent in the 
final phase. The implied change in the five-year survival rate 
remains within the response observed among North Carolina 
teachers to a $4,000 raise.
A complete description of the construction and calibration of the 
model is provided in appendix 4A.
Simulated responses are depicted in figure 4.2. Even under our most 
conservative assumptions, demand for new teachers falls by 10 percent 
initially, by 15 percent after ten years. When changes in survival rates 
are larger and more pervasive, as in case three, demand for new teach 
ers falls fully one-third. Note that the changes we have assumed in one- 
year survival rates are far from extreme. Given that a $4,000 raise rep 
resents only 12 percent of the average 1988 salary in Michigan and 16 
percent of the mean salary in North Carolina, it is likely that even our 
third simulation underestimates the response to salary increases of 20 
percent or more in "high-growth" states.

















Effect on attrition limited to 1st 5 years; 
change in 5-year survival rate = .08
Effect on attrition throughout work life; 
change in 5-year survival rate = .08
Effect on attrition throughout work life; 
change in 5-year survival rate = .14
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Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality 65
Screening and the Quality of Teacher Applicants
Figure 4.2 shows how an increase in teacher salaries feeds back on 
the demand for new teachers. Since the supply of new teachers is sensi 
tive to job availability, this feedback dampens their response to higher 
pay. This analysis does not establish, of course, that raising salaries 
does no good. Indeed, with fewer jobs to fill, school districts can be 
more selective in their hiring decisions. A pay increase should consti 
tute, at worst, a mixed blessing: new teachers of better quality, albeit 
fewer of them.
This argument supposes that more capable individuals will continue 
to apply despite declining demand for teachers. 11 Given the opportunity 
cost of their investment in teacher education, however, these persons 
are more likely than the average applicant to pursue an alternative 
career when their job prospects deteriorate. Much depends, then, on the 
way job applicants are screened. If the market fails to show preference 
to better candidates for the jobs that remain, their share of the applicant 
pool may fall.
Previous investigations of teachers' entry into the labor market have 
provided little systematic information about the way job candidates are 
screened. While it has been recognized that newly certified teachers 
with the highest test scores and the strongest academic records are less 
likely to enter the teaching corps, this phenomenon is generally 
explained as a consequence of individual choice: "Presumably, the 
most able could have obtained teaching jobs" (Nelson 1985). 12 Infor 
mation that would permit a test of this conjecture—the identity of per 
sons who actually sought teaching positions—has been missing from 
the data sets most often used to investigate the career paths of new 
teachers. 13
This is not the case in the Surveys of Recent College Graduates, 
which identify job applicants. Figure 4.3 displays certification, applica 
tion and entry rates among new bachelor's degree recipients by college 
quality. These data exhibit the pattern found in other studies: the higher 
the quality of the undergraduate institution, the less likely a student is 
to enter a teaching career. This is partly due to differences in applica 
tion rates: 75 percent of the certified graduates of selective and above- 
average schools seek teaching positions, compared to 85 percent else-
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where. A larger share of better educated students select out of the 
applicant pool at this stage. However, as figure 4.3 also shows, this pat 
tern is not reversed at the next stage, when applicants are screened for 
the available positions. Applicants from more selective colleges do not 
fare better in the job market; indeed, remarkably, they do somewhat 
worse. This pattern also characterizes data disaggregated by survey 
years and by region.
If teacher candidates from better colleges are no more successful 
than graduates of the least selective colleges, the offsetting effects 
described above come into full play. The more capable applicants, who 
would be attracted to teaching by higher salaries, are at the same time 
discouraged by the reduction in job openings. The poorer their chances 
of obtaining a job, the more likely the second effect is to cancel the 
first. The net result: little change in the applicant mix and little 
improvement in the quality of new recruits.
Evidence presented earlier shows that this is not a remote theoretical 
possibility. As reported in table 4.1, certification decisions are more 
sensitive to job availability, the better the college attended. It is difficult 
to explain why this should be so, unless these graduates felt the effects 
of a declining job market. Still, the evidence examined so far is not 
wholly persuasive. A variety of confounding factors might obscure the 
positive effect that college quality has on job prospects within teach 
ing. Since this point is central to our argument, we devote the remain 
der of this section to it.
To begin, not all applicants are equally serious about teaching. For 
some a teaching job may represent a fallback option should a preferred 
job fail to materialize. This may be especially true of applicants from 
better colleges. To assess the importance of this phenomenon, we 
adjust the figures on job applicants by excluding all persons whose 
subsequent activities suggest they may have turned down teaching jobs 
(among them, all full-time students). Remaining applicants either 
obtained a full-time public school position or gave evidence of an 
unsuccessful search in one of the following ways:
1. By working part time despite expressing a preference for full- 
time work
2. By taking a teaching job in a private school 14













Selective Above average Average Below average
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3. By working outside their field of study because "no jobs were 
available" in their fields
4. By working in a job holding little or no career potential
5. By reporting they were involuntarily unemployed at the time of 
the survey (late winter or spring following graduation)
Excluding all job seekers who do not fit one of the preceding 
descriptions considerably reduces the number of graduates available 
for a teaching job; however, the decline is quite similar across college 
rankings. Application rates conditional on certification fall by 20 per 
centage points among graduates of selective colleges and by a uniform 
15 percentage points in each of the other classes. Substituting adjusted 
application rates for the original rates would not, therefore, substan 
tially alter inferences based on figure 4.3. Nonetheless, we retain the 
distinction between nominal applicants and those meeting the more 
restrictive definition for use in further analysis.
It is also possible that graduates of better colleges do not search as 
widely for a teaching job and are more particular about the positions 
they are willing to take. Although the SRCG do not generally ask 
respondents how hard they looked for a job, some relevant information 
was reported in the 1976 and 1978 surveys. Persons who sought teach 
ing jobs in 1976 were asked how many applications they filed. This 
question was asked again in 1978, though only of those applicants who 
did not subsequently teach. The results, presented in table 4.2, do not 
exhibit a clear-cut relationship between the intensity of job search and 
the quality of the undergraduate institution. While graduates of the best 
colleges filed fewer applications on average, the difference does not 
seem large enough to explain the hiring patterns we have observed.
Teacher trainees from better colleges may also put themselves at a 
disadvantage by restricting their job search to a subset of school dis 
tricts with superior pay and/or working conditions. To test this hypoth 
esis, we look for a positive association between college quality and the 
pay and working conditions enjoyed by new public school teachers. In 
the first column of table 4.3, we report coefficients from a regression of 
teaching salary on dummies for college ranking, controlling for year 
and region. (The omitted category is "average.") The results reveal a 
slight association between the quality of a new teacher's college and
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that teacher's earnings. (The difference between select and below-aver 
age is significant at 10 percent. However, these differences amount to 
only a few hundred dollars. When we allow for the fact that teachers 
from better colleges are more likely to work in metropolitan areas, 
where costs of living are higher, the gap seems trivial. There is little 
support here for the notion that teachers from better colleges have, as a 
group, held out for jobs offering substantially higher pay.
Table 4.2. Application Rates by College Ranking
Number of applications 
College ranking_________1976____________1978"______
Selective 1L716J 
Above-average 14.3 14.1 
Average 16.6 19.5 
Below-average 12.2 19.4 
Number of observations 1,804 444 
SOURCE: Surveys of Recent College Graduates, 1976 and 1978. 
a. Question was asked only of applicants who did not subsequently teach.
Since the SRCG do not obtain information on working conditions, 
we turn to the Schools and Staffing Survey of 1987-88.for evidence on 
teaching environments. 15 As shown in columns two and three of table 
4.3, graduates of better colleges tend to work in schools with smaller 
percentages of poor students and higher percentages of students bound 
for college. However, the differences by college quality are small, par 
ticularly among the top three rankings.
The poverty rate is a proxy for behavioral and learning problems 
found more often among low socioeconomic status students. The 
Schools and Staffing Survey also asked teachers for a direct assessment 
of the severity of the following problems: physical and verbal abuse of 
teachers, fighting, pregnancies, vandalism, and the carrying of weap 
ons to school. For each of these items, we constructed two measures of 
severity, the first indicating that the teacher regarded it as a serious 
problem in the school, the second that it was judged a moderate prob 
lem. The Mantel-Haenszel chi-square statistic was computed to mea 
sure the association between college background and the perceived 
severity of each problem. In only three cases—the perception of physi 
cal abuse of teachers, verbal abuse of teachers, and vandalism as mod-
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erately severe problems within the school—did this statistic exceed the 
10 percent level of significance. Moreover, the association was in the 
wrong direction, i.e., teachers from better colleges were more likely to 
work in schools in which they found these problems moderately 
severe. This is likely due to the fact that more of these graduates work 
in large cities.
Table 4.3. Teaching Pay, Working Conditions by College Ranking
Student College 
poverty rate" application ratec
Mean Mean 









































SOURCES: Surveys of Recent College Graduates; Schools and Staffing Survey 1987-88.
a. Teaching pay coefficients obtained from regression of full-time public school teaching salary
on college ranking, regional and year dummies. Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for het-
eroscedasticity.
b. Student poverty rate = proportion of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.
c. College application rate = proportion of graduating seniors applying to college. Calculated for
secondary schools only.
In conclusion, we find virtually no evidence to support the claim 
that graduates of better colleges do not find teaching jobs because they 
are less willing than others to accept low pay and difficult working 
conditions. Still, it is possible that other confounding factors obscure 
the relationship between college quality and labor market outcomes. To 
assess this hypothesis, we regress the probability that an applicant 
obtains a full-time public school teaching position on a set of labor 
market conditions and personal characteristics. The latter include 
aspects of the candidate's academic background and professional prep 
aration—grade point average, certification fields, college quality, major 
subject—as well as demographic variables that may influence a hiring
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decision—age, gender, marital status, race, and ethnicity. Two addi 
tional variables indicate how much time an individual has had to obtain 
a job. The first is the number of months that have elapsed since gradua 
tion, the second a binary variable indicating that the applicant did not 
receive a teaching certificate until after graduation.
Since the probability that an applicant will receive an offer depends 
greatly on the need for new public school teachers, we include various 
indicators of demand. Our first measure is the ratio of newly hired 
teachers to the size of the graduating cohort. Because there are too few 
observations to obtain accurate state-level values, this variable is con 
structed as the ratio of regional aggregates. We also use, in place of this 
measure, a set of regional and survey year fixed effects. Finally, we 
estimate a model containing a full set of state and year interactions, 
allowing demand to vary by state and by year.
The sample is limited to persons who meet the more stringent 
(adjusted) definition of applicant given above; however, quite similar 
results obtain when the sample is based on the original, unadjusted def 
inition of a teaching applicant. 16
The first two variants of the model were estimated by probit. Results 
were so similar that we report only the first variant in table 4.4 (column 
one). The third variant was estimated as a linear probability model due 
to the large number of state by year effects (column two). Since the 
coefficients of the linear model are easier to interpret and support the 
same conclusions as those in column one, our discussion focuses on 
them.
The introduction of background controls has, if anything, strength 
ened our earlier conclusion. Not only does college quality fail to 
improve an applicant's job prospects, there is evidence, albeit margin 
ally significant, that graduates of above average and average colleges 
fare worse on the job market than graduates of below-average schools 
(the omitted category).
Results are only slightly more encouraging with respect to other 
aspects of academic background. A degree in mathematics or science 
raises an applicant's prospects of success by 8 to 9 percent (the sum of 
the coefficients on a math or science major and math or science certifi 
cation, statistically significant at 10 percent). However, the effect of a 
bachelor's degree in education is equally strong, a disconcerting find 
ing, given efforts to recruit more teachers with subject area majors.
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Table 4.4. Influence of Teacher Attributes on Job Offers
(1)
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SOURCE: Surveys of Recent college Graduates, 
a. Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity.
Since the model includes an interaction between education majors 
and persons with certificates in early childhood and elementary educa 
tion, this coefficient applies specifically to applicants for secondary 
school positions. The implication is that an individual who wishes to 
teach mathematics or science at the secondary school level is better off 
majoring in education with a teaching field in math or science than 
completing an academic major in one of those disciplines. Of the vari 
ables measuring the quality of an applicant's academic record, only
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grade point average has a significant, positive impact on the probability 
of a successful job search. It is somewhat curious that school districts 
care about grades but not about the quality of the institution or aca 
demic program awarding them, an indication that grades may matter as 
much for the information they contain about an applicant's affective 
characteristics (e.g., diligence) as for the signal they furnish of cogni 
tive ability. 17
Recapitulation: Critical Features of the Labor Market
In the introduction to this chapter, we listed several features of the 
teacher labor market that interact in ways that undermine the attain 
ment of policy objectives. We now restate the argument of the preced 
ing pages to highlight their role.
One would expect an industry that raises wages to improve the qual 
ity of the workers it recruits in two ways. First, the number of appli 
cants rises. Even if there is no change in the average ability of those 
applicants, the mere fact that there are more of them permits employers 
to be more discriminating about those they hire. In addition, the quality 
of the applicant pool improves. The marginal applicants who are 
attracted by higher salaries are persons whose reservation wages 
exceeded the pay formerly offered by the industry. Unless the skills 
required by this industry are wholly idiosyncratic, it is to be expected 
that persons who command higher salaries elsewhere will, on average, 
perform more capably in this sector as well. Thus there are two chan 
nels by which the ability of the workforce rises: one, an increase in the 
number of applicants relative to vacancies, allowing employers to raise 
the standards job applicants must meet; and two, an influx of more 
capable applicants at the margin, raising the quality of the applicant 
pool. Under these conditions, it would seem next to impossible for a 
salary increase to fail of its purpose.
However, as we have already seen, this argument overlooks some 
important features of the teacher labor market. First, public schools 
pay teachers on the basis of their experience and their academic cre 
dentials—not on the basis of their teaching performance. Pay increases 
are not targeted to the type of persons one wants to attract into teaching
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but are delivered across the board. As a result, more older workers 
decide to stay on, vacancy rates fall, and the demand for new teachers 
declines. Indeed, our calculations indicate that pay raises on the order 
of 20 percent could easily diminish the demand for new teachers by 
one-third. Nor is it possible to circumvent these consequences by 
removing the worst of the older teachers from their jobs—tenure and 
other forms of job security close this option.
The decline in demand for new teachers will clearly delay any 
improvement in the workforce. But the problems are not merely transi 
tional. The decline in job openings feeds back on the quality of appli 
cants, since it is costly to enter the applicant pool. Prospective public 
school teachers are required to spend time and effort acquiring a 
license to teach before knowing whether they will have a job. Since 
this license is of no value outside the occupation, application rates 
become a function of job availability as well as wages. In recent years, 
teacher labor markets have been characterized by excess supply. This 
situation is exacerbated when salaries rise, for the number of job open 
ings declines at the same time the number of job seekers rises. The 
effect of excess supply is not neutral when it comes to teacher quality: 
the better an individual's options outside teaching, the more costly the 
investment in a teaching credential if, in fact, no job materializes. 
Thus, persons with attractive options will be less likely to enter the 
applicant pool as job opportunities disappear, just as they were more 
likely to enter the pool when salary increases made teaching more 
competitive with other occupations. Whether they enroll in programs 
of teacher education depends critically on how confident they remain 
of their own job prospects in a declining market. The evidence exam 
ined above suggests they do not feel very confident, and with good rea 
son. Applicants from better colleges, as well as graduates of more 
rigorous programs of study, have no discernible advantage in the mar 
ket for public school positions. As a result, the decline in job openings 
poses a significant deterrent to prospective teachers with attractive out 
side options.
It is unlikely that this deterrent fully offsets the incentive created by 
higher salaries in the first place. On the contrary, there will probably be 
more applicants for teaching positions. But—and this is the key 
point—there will be more applicants of every type. Since persons with 
attractive options outside teaching are more responsive both to the
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incentive and to the deterrent, their share of the applicant pool is not 
likely to increase very much. Indeed, under plausible assumptions it 
declines, as we show in appendix 4C.
Even this might not matter greatly if school systems concentrated on 
hiring the best of those who apply: after all, the need for new teachers 
has diminished; districts can be more selective. But districts do not 
appear to select on the basis of the indicators of quality we have used. 
Indeed, if they did, high-quality applicants need not have been discour 
aged in the first place. The result: with no improvement in the applicant 
pool, and no marked tendency on the part of districts to select on the 
basis of our indicators of quality, there is little or no improvement in 
the qualifications of new teachers.
Responses to Skeptics
At this point a skeptic might interrupt as follows: "Your results 
merely demonstrate that school officials do not agree with the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education and other blue-ribbon task 
forces about the criteria to be used in screening teacher applicants. The 
commissions thought it was of great importance to hire teachers with 
stronger academic records; educational practitioners apparently think 
otherwise. The fact that school officials do not give much weight to 
these criteria when deciding whom to hire only shows that you have 
been looking at the wrong set of characteristics, not that raising pay 
has failed to improve the workforce."
However, the mere fact that school districts are not using our indica 
tors of quality does not mean the indicators are valueless. It may be, 
instead, that the practices of school officials need to change. As noted 
in chapter 2, significant positive relationships have been shown 
between these indicators of teacher quality and student achievement. 
Recall, too, that by principals' own ratings of their new teachers, 
higher salaries do not appear to have contributed very much to the 
quality of the workforce. Principals in states that have raised pay the 
most are only slightly more positive about the new teachers they have 
recruited than are principals elsewhere. This finding poses questions 
about the value of the information used to make personnel decisions.
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Unfortunately, little is known about the way school districts screen 
job applicants. Scholarly research takes the form of case studies and 
provides scarcely more than anecdotal evidence (Murnarie et al. 1991; 
Gilford and Tenenbaum 1990; Wise et al., 1987). Yet what we know 
does not inspire confidence. So far as we can tell, applicants for teach 
ing positions are not generally asked to teach a class as part of the 
interview process. Some research suggests that school recruiters give 
too much weight to the impression an applicant makes during a job 
interview, too little to a record of academic achievement assembled 
over a period of many years. Webster's (1988) study of hiring and 
teacher evaluation in the Dallas school system showed that teachers' 
scores on tests of verbal and quantitative ability were the best predic 
tors of student achievement test gains; however, interviews and per 
sonal references were more important than test scores and transcripts 
in determining who was hired. Likewise, a telephone poll of large 
urban school systems conducted for the Dallas schools and cited in the 
same study found that interviews generally carried the most weight in 
the selection of teachers. Results were more negative yet in Perry's 
(1981) examination of labor market entry for a small sample of teacher 
training graduates in Texas: among those who sought teaching jobs, 
there were no significant differences between successful and unsuc 
cessful candidates with respect to grade point averages, student teach 
ing evaluations, and recommendations.
It could be argued that schools currently overlook applicants with 
strong academic records, if such individuals show less promise for 
other reasons. One liability is sufficiently well documented to merit 
further discussion. As noted in chapter 3, individuals with strong aca 
demic backgrounds are more likely to leave teaching within a few 
years. Teachers' quit rates are positively related to scores on the SAT 
and the NTE (Schlechty and Vance 1981; Murnane and Olsen 1990) 
and to college quality (Ballou and Podgursky 1993a). Thus, on this 
argument, school officials are right to reject candidates with stronger 
academic backgrounds, given the costs of high turnover.
Two propositions need to be distinguished here. The first is that 
school officials turn down applicants who are more likely to quit. We 
do not doubt that this is factually correct. Whether they have arrived at 
the optimal trade-off between turnover and quality is another question. 
A few calculations based on a simple model of the makeup of the
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teaching workforce suggest that current practices are far from optimal. 
(Details are presented in appendix 4B.)
To keep the analysis simple, we suppose there are two types of 
teachers, low quality and high quality. Given the same level of experi 
ence, the latter make better teachers. However, they also exhibit higher 
rates of attrition. Assumptions about quit behavior are based on the 
studies of teacher attrition cited above. Seven-year survival rates 
among the low-quality teachers are assumed to range between 50 and 
60 percent. High-quality teachers are one-half to two-thirds as likely to 
last this long. In addition, we assume that teachers reach full effective 
ness after four years, as research on education production functions 
indicates that virtually all the gains from experience accrue in the first 
few years (Hanushek 1981). Finally, new teachers are assumed to be 
only half as effective as they eventually become. Solving the model for 
mean teaching effectiveness reveals that preference should be given to 
low-quality applicants only if they are at least 96 percent as effective as 
a high-quality applicant with the same experience.
This result is highly robust to reasonable changes in the model's 
parameters. Lengthening the period during which teachers learn on the 
job to seven years lowers the critical ratio by only 5 percentage points, 
from 96 percent to 91 percent. Similarly, even if beginning teachers are 
only one-fifth as effective as they later become (thus raising the value 
of experience), it is optimal to prefer low-quality teachers only if they 
are at least 91 percent as effective as applicants of higher quality. Vary 
ing turnover rates makes little difference, provided the implied differ 
ence in survivor functions remains within the bounds that have been 
reported in the literature.
We conclude that while school officials may be motivated by the 
desire to hold down turnover, it is exceedingly difficult to defend hiring 
practices that give preference to individuals of less initial ability on 
these grounds. These are not, of course, the only costs associated with 
turnover. Since the mean spell length for teachers of low quality (under 
our assumptions) falls between 16 and 18 years, while the mean spell 
for high quality teachers lies between 7 and 9 years, keeping a position 
staffed with a high-quality teacher will require recruiting almost twice 
as often. However, the expected difference—the cost of filling a posi 
tion once every 7-9 years instead of once every 16-18 years—appears 
to be no more than a trivial addition to the costs schools routinely incur
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in order to deal with turnover. It should also be noted that this analysis 
has assumed that once teachers hit their stride, their teaching never 
deteriorates thereafter. A more realistic assumption would, of course, 
reduce the bias that presently favors low-attrition, low-quality instruc 
tors, making it even harder to defend current practices.
In conclusion, it is very difficult to make the case for the optimality 
of current hiring practices on the basis of differential turnover rates. On 
the contrary, recruiting persons who might teach for a few years (as 
opposed to a long career) represents one of the most promising ways to 
raise the quality of the workforce.
In a society with abundant opportunities for talented college grad 
uates and a tradition of labor market mobility, it will never be pos 
sible to persuade two million of them to teach their whole lives. 
Public rhetoric that implies personal failure when a teacher leaves 
the classroom after successfully teaching for a number of years 
may deter many of them from ever setting foot in a classroom 
(Murnane et al. 1991).
This does not, of course, exhaust the objections schools might have 
to hiring teachers with strong academic records. Rather than attempt to 
anticipate all such arguments, let us suppose that these officials are 
right. Suppose, then, that the criteria we have been using bear little 
relationship to teaching effectiveness, and that they are rightly disre 
garded by districts when new teachers are hired. Presumably there are 
some other criteria that districts use to assess candidates. 18 One of two 
things must be true. Either these criteria are idiosyncratic to teaching 
(so that persons who fare well by these measures do not have superior 
alternatives outside teaching), or at least some of the characteristics 
and traits that make a good teacher enhance one's marketability in 
other careers. The first of these alternatives is not very plausible; more 
over, if true, it substantially weakens the case for raising teacher sala 
ries. Higher pay will increase the number of applicants, but not their 
quality—indeed, quality may fall, if the idiosyncratic qualities that 
make good teachers (e.g., love of children) are associated with low res 
ervation wages. If these qualities are also hard to observe ex ante, as 
seems likely given they are unrelated to signals of productivity in other 
occupations, an increase in the number of applicants that does not raise
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mean quality leaves schools hiring essentially the same kind of teach 
ers as before.
Consider, then, the second alternative, implying that good teachers 
must be bid away from other occupations. Everything we have said 
about graduates with strong academic records remains true of this 
group. In particular, persons with better options outside teaching are 
more likely to be deterred by a declining demand for new teachers, 
since they will have paid a higher opportunity cost if no job is forth 
coming. They will overlook the general decline in job openings only if 
they can be confident that their own job prospects remain good. Yet 
what grounds can they have for this belief? Note that we are discussing 
a career decision on the part of college undergraduates. If good grades 
and high test scores do not matter, what indicators of their own 
employability will they possess? At the point where the decision must 
be made, these individuals will have little else to go on when attempt 
ing to assess their chances on the teacher job market. They will not yet 
have done any student teaching. They will have had no opportunity to 
show instructors in their professional education courses that they pos 
sess the commitment, enthusiasm, imagination, etc., that will make 
them good teachers. If one's academic record is irrelevant, it becomes 
very difficult to assess with any accuracy one's chances on the job mar 
ket. This is not to say that only accurate assessments matter. Indeed, it 
may be that those who enroll in teacher education are, on the whole, 
overly optimistic. But excessive optimism would presumably affect all 
types of potential candidates—it is not a mechanism on which we can 
rely to select into the applicant pool those who will make the best 
teachers.
To this point we have considered arguments that might be raised by 
a reader who accepts our analysis of the teacher labor market but 
denies that there is anything much to worry about in the way this mar 
ket functions. We now turn to a different kind of objection, namely, that 
the features of the labor market that we have deemed important cannot 
represent more than minor hindrances to efforts to recruit better teach 
ers. This argument derives some plausibility than the observation that 
nothing in our analysis would seem to pertain uniquely to teacher labor 
markets. In all professions, an increase in salary will reduce exit rates, 
leading to a drop in demand for new recruits. Other professions, too, 
have their licensing requirements, many of them involving much more
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professional education than teaching. Are we arguing for the implausi 
ble proposition that no professional workforce can be improved by an 
increase in its compensation? Or have we exaggerated the importance 
of these factors?
In fact, there are some critical differences between teaching and 
other professions. These differences have a substantial effect on the 
opportunity costs of professional training and the deterrent posed by a 
decline in job openings.
Professions like medicine, law, and accounting offer a broad range 
of employment opportunities. At one end are the most prestigious hos 
pitals, clinics, and firms offering large salaries and prospects of organi 
zational advancement. At the other end are small entrepreneurs in 
private practice. When the supply of new professionals rises relative to 
demand on the part of established firms, the overflow enters private 
practice where conditions are quite competitive. For this very reason it 
is difficult to conceive of circumstances that would produce an across- 
the-board increase in incomes together with rising excess supply. If the 
best-established firms (hospitals, etc.) offer higher pay in conditions of 
stable demand, the resulting increase in supply will drive down 
incomes in private practice, which will in turn moderate the supply 
response.
In addition, we are aware of no other profession where compensa 
tion and contract renewal are so largely divorced from evaluations of 
performance as they are in public school teaching. In most cases, when 
new recruits enter the employ of established firms, they face extended 
probationary periods when their performance is carefully monitored. 
Young lawyers at large law firms face highly competitive "up or out" 
tournaments in promotion to partner. In other professions, such as den 
tistry and veterinary medicine, pay and advancement within the organi 
zation are explicitly tied to individual or small group performance. 
More generally, the use of performance incentives is widespread 
throughout the corporate sector (Milkovich and Newman 1993). Pay 
flexibility implies, of course, that efforts to improve the workforce 
need not involve across-the-board raises. 19
Since the least successful job seekers can enter private practice, an 
investment in professional training is rarely a complete waste. One can 
generally earn a living practicing one's profession, though perhaps not 
on the scale one hoped for. Matters are quite different in teaching. If a
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newly certified teacher does not obtain a public school job, the invest 
ment in acquiring certification is basically wasted. There is virtually no 
private practice. There are a limited number of positions in private 
schools and in tutoring services (e.g., Sylvan Learning Centers), 
though not enough to absorb all unsuccessful applicants for public 
school jobs: More important, few of these alternative employment 
opportunities require a license. In general, state certification is not 
needed to teach in the private sector, nor is it of much help in securing 
a teaching job. Even those private schools that nominally require their 
teachers to be certified often allow them to earn this license after they 
have begun working. Thus, the incentive to undertake an up-front 
investment in a teaching license depends critically on the availability of 
public school jobs and little else.
Finally, teaching differs significantly from other professions in that 
the quality of one's academic record plays a major role in determining 
access to the best programs of professional education and the best jobs. 
Candidates from the most selective schools (and the top of the class at 
these same schools) unquestionably fare better in the market. Rankings 
of the programs are well known in the profession and guide recruit 
ment. Jobs at the most prestigious law firms, hospitals, or corporations 
tend to go to the graduates of the top programs, where admissions are 
based, in turn, on undergraduate records and examination scores. Com 
pared to students considering teaching careers, those contemplating 
careers in law, medicine, accounting, etc. are far better able to assess 
their chances of obtaining a high-paid position. As a result, even if high 
salaries create an excess number of applicants, clear signals are sent to 
the best candidates that their services are still in demand.
Still, it may be that we have attached too much importance to these 
factors. Yes, higher salaries may make it harder for new graduates to 
find a job. But is it that difficult or costly to obtain a teaching certifi 
cate? Implicit in our analysis must be some implausible assumptions— 
perhaps that prospective teachers are unusually risk averse, or that they 
overestimate the decline in job openings (a mistake that would, pre 
sumably, right itself with time).
It is difficult to respond to this objection, as the empirical literature 
provides few reliable estimates of key determinants of teacher supply. 
There is virtually no research on the importance of job availability; 
indeed, it is common to find market-clearing assumptions in both theo-
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retical and empirical models (e.g., Manski 1987; Zarkin 1985). Yet 
according to the estimates in table 4.1, demand for new teachers is an 
important determinant of certification rates. Indeed, interactions of job 
availability with college quality and academic major were more impor 
tant than interactions of the same indicators with pay. If these estimates 
are taken at face value, they support the conclusion that higher pay will 
lower overall applicant quality: larger salaries attract more applicants 
of every type (roughly in proportion to their original shares of the 
pool), while declining job opportunities selectively screen out the best.
Yet the estimates in table 4.1 are not very precise. Most of them are 
based on a single cross-section from 1990. Rather than rest the full 
weight of the analysis on these findings, in appendix 4C we present an 
alternative examination of the relationship between salaries, job avail 
ability, and the career decisions of prospective teachers. The model we 
employ assumes risk-neutral agents with perfect knowledge of salaries 
and the probability of obtaining a teaching job—thus prospective 
teachers are not overreacting in either sense mentioned above. There 
are two kinds of teachers: high ability and low ability. The decision to 
pursue a teaching career is based on a comparison of the income 
derived from teaching (including nonpecuniary benefits) with the 
income available from one's best alternative choice. Thanks to the 
structure of the model, elasticities of dubious accuracy are not required 
to evaluate the effect of raising teacher pay; rather, the data required 
are average length of teaching careers, earnings outside education, and 
the opportunity cost and out-of-pocket expense of teacher training. 
Some assumptions must be made about unobservables, notably the 
nonpecuniary returns to teaching. However, extreme assumptions are 
not required to generate our central finding, that higher salaries can fail 
to produce any improvement in teacher recruitment.
Finally, we return to the possibility that salaries have simply not 
increased enough. If teacher supply is not very responsive to salary, or 
if teachers are skeptical that wage gains will be preserved, increases in 
pay must be larger and more lasting to have a significant impact on 
teacher quality.
As we have noted, there is considerable uncertainty about the mag 
nitude of salary elasticities, given the lack of reliable data on teacher 
supply. Consider, however, the case of Connecticut, where teacher sal 
aries rose 50 percent in real terms between 1980 and 1990. Connecti-
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cut teachers are now the highest paid in the nation, earning an average 
salary of $48,850 in 1992-93. The policy pursued by Connecticut prob 
ably represents the upper bound on what is politically feasible with 
respect to teacher pay. Those who continue to call for higher salaries 
for teachers can scarcely expect that other states will do more than this.
The result has been a glut of teachers on the market. In the 1992-93 
school year Connecticut districts received 559 applications for each 
elementary school vacancy. There is excess supply even in such tradi 
tionally hard-to-fill subjects as math and science. In the same school 
year, districts received 40 applications per vacancy in biology or gen 
eral science, 13 for each vacancy in earth or physical sciences. 
Between 50 and 100 applications were received for every opening at 
the secondary level in humanities, social science, arts, and mathemat 
ics (Beaudin 1994-95). While many candidates filed multiple applica 
tions, this behavior does not explain away these ratios. A 1993 survey 
of newly trained teachers who succeeded in obtaining public school 
employment found that half had submitted seven or fewer applications. 
The modal response was one, and only 2.6 percent of the respondents 
blanketed the state. Many of these individuals worked as substitute 
teachers, teacher's aides, or part-time teachers. Indeed, these appear to 
be the most important avenues into public school employment; nearly 
three-quarters of these teachers indicated they found their current posi 
tions through personal networking (substitute or student teaching, 
direct contact with the district, information from a colleague or friend) 
as opposed to advertisements or placement bulletins.
There can be no doubt that this kind of labor market is discouraging 
to prospective teachers. 20 When newly trained teachers must take low- 
paid, low-status jobs as aides or substitutes, when personal contacts 
("who you know") become the most important means for obtaining a 
public school position, talented individuals with attractive outside 
options are likely to continue to pass up teaching in favor of alternative 
careers.
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Conclusion
In chapter 3 we concluded that the salary increases awarded teachers 
in the 1980s have done little to improve the workforce. In this chapter 
we have looked at the workings of the teacher labor market in an effort 
to understand why this policy misfired. Several factors seem to be 
responsible, among them an exacerbation of excess supply, resulting in 
declining job opportunities for new teachers and an increased likeli 
hood that an investment in teacher training would be wasted. The last 
factor is not neutral when it comes to teacher quality: the better an indi 
vidual's options outside teaching, the more costly the mistake if no job 
materializes.
All this might not matter very much if the market signaled the best 
prospective teachers that their services remain in demand. This does 
not appear to occur. On the contrary, when hiring new teachers, school 
districts appear to place little or no weight on measures of academic 
achievement and cognitive ability that are valued in other professions.
Several years ago John Chubb and Eric Hanushek anticipated this 
discussion in their essay for the Brookings publication, Setting 
National Priorities:
Some analysts argue, for example, that higher salaries will 
improve the pool of teachers. This argument, with which few 
would disagree, does not, however, establish that the quality of 
teaching will improve, because it is still necessary to select and to 
retain the better people from any enlarged pool. The research on 
performance indicates that schools have not developed effective 
salary policies. The exact mechanism leading to this result is not 
really known; it could be poor selection, poor promotion, or poor 
retention. But the outcome is clear (Chubb and Hanushek 1990).
While we would agree with the conclusion of these authors, we believe 
the reasons for policy failure have been more obscure than they sup 
pose. Precisely because selection is poor and because tenured teachers 
are more likely to remain in their jobs when salaries rise, there is no 
assurance that even the first objective of salary reform can be achieved, 
namely an improvement in the ability of those who seek to become 
teachers.
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NOTES
1. In 1988, 19 percent of the U.S. workforce was unionized. The share of public sector 
employees was 43 percent. Among public school teachers it was 75 percent (Corme, Hirsch, and 
MacPherson 1990).
2. There is also an irregular route into teaching, as virtually all states allow districts facing a 
shortage of applicants to hire uncertified teachers on an emergency basis. Continued employment 
is contingent on completion of conventional licensing requirements within a set period of time. 
According to the 1990-91 Schools and Staffing Survey, fewer than 5 percent of new teachers are 
hired on these terms. It is impossible to be more precise, since the item on the SASS refers to 
teachers hired on a "provisional" basis. In many states, new teachers certified through traditional 
routes are considered to have "provisional" certificates, with a "standard" certificate awarded after 
the completion of a certain number of years of service and, in some states, additional education. 
This inconsistent terminology may well have resulted in some misclassification of new teachers. 
Since the error would have been one-sided, it seems safe to conclude that the proportion of new 
teachers with emergency certificates could have been no greater than 5 percent.
3. Although the fact that the aggregate number of applicants exceeds total vacancies does not 
imply an absence of shortages, since some areas may have too many applicants while others have 
too few, there is little evidence that shortages occur to any significant extent. The 1990-91 Schools 
and Staffing Survey reports that qualified candidates were found for more than 99 percent of all 
public school teaching positions.
4. The SRCG provide the location of college and workplace in only one-half of the survey 
years. When both are available, data indicate that approximately 90 percent of teachers work 
within the same region in which they attend college. As one would expect, the proportion is 
smaller for graduates of selective colleges, though still over 80 percent.
5. One might think that market conditions at the time of graduation would also matter; how 
ever, the costs of pursuing a teaching job at this stage (mailing out resumes, going to interviews) 
are considerably smaller than those associated with the investment in training. In fact, they do not 
appear to deter applicants even when job prospects are poor. In their responses to the SRCGs, a 
negligible proportion of newly certified graduates indicated that they declined to apply for a 
teaching job for the reason that "jobs are hard to find."
6. This would not be true had new teacher markets been supply-constrained. However, given 
that teacher labor markets have generally been in a state of excess supply, the numbers of new 
teachers hired represent demand.
A longer series is not available. Published data provide only the aggregate number of teachers, 
not the number newly hired. Since most of the demand for new teachers is replacement demand, 
trends in aggregate employment can provide a highly misleading picture of the job market for new 
teachers.
7. Additional variants of the model (not reported here) included controls for working condi 
tions (weighted averages of the characteristics of the communities and schools where new teach 
ers had been hired) and alternative measures of salary (e.g., beginning teacher pay rather than 
mean salary). Neither specification changed the central finding on the interactions of job availabil 
ity and college quality.
8. "The [Connecticut] Educational Enhancement Act ... is widely identified with higher 
teacher salaries. . . . Because retirement benefits are based on a teacher's highest salary during his 
last three years on the job, the EEA has had the effect of encouraging teachers to stay on the job 
longer. That trend, coupled with municipal budget cuts, will mean some of the younger teachers
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who have been subjected to rigorous standards and testing as part of EEA will be losing their 
jobs" (Daily Hampshire Gazette, June 11, 1991).
9. Other controls in the model included age, gender, subject specialty, cohort, race, and district 
characteristics.
10. This is in accordance with the finding of Murnane et al., that the effects of salary on attri 
tion are limited to the first several years of a teaching career. However, this result is not common 
to all studies of teacher attrition. For example, Mont and Rees (1996), estimating separate hazard 
functions for a sample of New York state teachers with less than four years' experience and a sec 
ond sample of teachers with more than four years' experience, find strong negative effects of sal 
ary on quit rates in both groups.
11. The argument of this section is presented in greater detail in Ballou (1996), which includes 
several sensitivity tests.
12. A similar explanation was offered when a study of entry by North Carolina teachers 
showed that certificants with higher NTE scores were less likely to take a teaching job (Murnane 
and Schwinden 1989). While the authors note that the data do not allow them to disentangle the 
influence of supply factors from demand factors in accounting for this phenomenon, they surmise 
that candidates with higher scores enjoyed better options in the labor market and therefore chose 
not to teach.
13. These data sets include the National Longitudinal Survey of 1972 (Vance and Schlechty 
1982; Weaver 1979; Nelson 1985) and High School and Beyond (Hanushek and Pace 1995).
14. Since the sample is restricted to certified graduates, this seems to be a reasonable assump 
tion. Persons who intended to teach all along in a private school need not, in general, have 
invested time and effort obtaining a certificate. Nonetheless, there are some reasons to suspect that 
our results may be sensitive to this treatment of private school teachers. We have investigated this 
issue using a more complicated version of the model that estimates both the probability that an 
individual sought a teaching job and the probability than an offer was received. In this framework, 
there is no need to impose the assumption that all certified private school teachers were disap 
pointed public sector applicants. The results were robust to this alternative specification. A full 
discussion of this and other sensitivity tests is provided in Ballou (1996).
15. To provide results comparable with those from the SRCG, we have restricted the sample to 
public school instructors with three or fewer years of experience.
16. As noted above, we have presented elsewhere a two-equation version of the model control 
ling for selection into the applicant pool (Ballou 1996). Results from this model are equally nega 
tive about the importance of college background in hiring decisions.
17. Interactions of GPA with education major are positive (though the effect of GPA is not sig 
nificantly different for education majors and other majors). Thus, education majors are at least as 
likely as others to benefit from higher grades. Interactions of GPA with college quality are not sta 
tistically significant.
18. Case studies of teacher selection reported in Wise et al. (1987) indicate that these criteria 
vary considerably from one school system to another. Principals need to be persuaded that a given 
teacher will "fit in" at their schools. There are no overarching criteria that appear to predict 
employability across various school systems. If this view is correct, it supports our contention that 
prospective teachers find it very hard to assess their own prospects in the market.
19. Teaching salary structures are rigid even by the standards of the civil service, the other 
major category of government employees. In the federal Civil Service, for example, entry GS lev 
els can be adjusted to permit differentials for professions or fields in greater demand. Once hired, 
all employees undergo annual performance appraisals, which determine the rate at which they 
progress within a grade or move up grades. Merit pay is used to a limited extent in the GS grades, 
more extensively at managerial levels (Milkovich and Wigdor 1991).
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20. Although the State of Connecticut claims that salary reforms and stricter licensing stan 
dards have led to improvements in the quality of its workforce, it does not report the kind of data 
that would allow this claim to be verified. Since 1988-89, the state has published biannual data on 
"newly hired" educators, a category that includes former teachers returning to work and teachers 
migrating in from other states, as well as those newly trained in Connecticut who were subject to 
stricter licensing requirements (Beaudin, various years). This provides a very imperfect basis for 
gauging the quality of new teachers, who in both years made up less than 30 percent of the newly 
hired. Worse, since salaries of new teachers rose sharply in 1985-86, the state provides no bench 
mark for the quality of its workforce prior to the onset of reforms.
Efforts to obtain a more informative breakdown of the data from the Connecticut Department 
of Education were not successful. To some extent, we can make good the deficit with data on Con 
necticut teachers from the Schools and Staffing Survey of 1987-88. Of 353 full-time public school 
teachers with at least three years' experience who responded to the SASS, 10 percent had gradu 
ated from selective colleges. An equal percentage had graduated from the institutions we have 
termed below-average. How does this compare to the state's survey of its newly hired instructors? 
In 1988-89, three years after the sharp up-turn in salaries, the proportion of newly hired teachers 
who graduated from selective institutions was 9.6 percent, those from below-average institutions 
11.4 percent. Thus, so far as we can determine, there was no improvement over this period. This 
changed somewhat by 1990-91, when the proportion of newly hired teachers from selective col 
leges rose to 12.3 percent, while the share from "average" colleges dropped by a comparable 
amount. There were, however, two confounding factors. Since the number of newly hired teachers 
also fell by one-fourth between these two years, it is unclear whether to attribute this change to 
changes in supply or greater selectivity in hiring. In addition, the state's economy was severely 
affected by the recession of the early 1990s, a circumstance that may have increased the number of 
well-qualified applicants for teaching jobs.
The latest published figures are from 1992-93. At this point the state changed its reporting 
practices: the latest figures refer not to all "newly hired" but to beginning teachers only. Of this 
group, 14 percent had graduated from selective colleges. While this would appear to constitute 
evidence of improvement, these figures are not directly comparable to those reported earlier. 
Since graduates of the best colleges have higher rates of attrition, they are better-represented 
among beginning teachers. Indeed, the state's own published data on teachers newly hired by 
urban school systems show as much. In the 1990 school year, 18.2 percent of the experienced 
teachers who were newly hired by these districts had attended selective colleges. Among novice 
teachers who went to work in the same districts, the share was 28.5 percent. (Unfortunately, the 
state provides this breakdown only for these districts in this year.) Indeed, if this difference were 
to characterize the state as a whole, and not just its urban school systems, one would expect to see 
a much higher share of graduates from selective colleges in the 1992-93 figures. The fact that only 
14 percent of newly trained teachers had such a background suggests that quality in this pool actu 
ally declined between 1990 and 1992. One must be cautious, of course, in extrapolating patterns 
from the urban school systems to the rest of the state. But certainly one would also want to be very 
cautious in claiming that the state has seen much improvement in the quality of newly recruited 
teachers, at least by this measure.
Appendix 4A 
Teacher Attrition and Demand for New Teachers
Model
To analyze the impact of attrition on new teacher demand, we construct a 
model of the composition of the workforce by cohorts.
Assumptions:
1. There are T teaching positions, identical with respect to pay scale and 
working conditions.
2. An individual's working life lasts M years. Every year a cohort of N work 
ers comes onto the labor market, some of whom fill vacancies in order to bring 
the workforce back up to T. There are no subsequent opportunities to enter the 
occupation.
3. Each teacher makes an annual decision whether to continue teaching. Ex 
its are permanent. Thus there are no interrupted spells of employment.
Notation
Ps = the probability that a teacher who has taught for s years decides to re 
main a teacher for one more year (hence, Ps is one minus the year s hazard rate)
7it = the probability that an individual remains a teacher at least through t 
years (t>l)=IIs=1 , t.,Ps
P = the probability of entering the profession (becoming a first-year teach 
er);
T = the total number of teaching positions to be filled
N = the size of a graduating cohort (normalized to one) 
M = maximum length of a teaching career (=40 years)
We assume that empirical frequencies equal the corresponding probabilities 
(a large numbers assumption). It follows that the total size of the workforce in 
a steady state satisfies
T = P0[Zt=2,M 7tt +l],
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where the right-hand side merely sums the (normalized) number of teachers in 
each cohort over the number of cohorts active in the workforce. P0, the number 
of new teachers, solves as
(1) P0 = T/[E7Ct +l].
To simulate the impact of a salary change on P0, we make various 
assumptions about the effect of higher pay on the Pt , t>0, compute the resulting 
7Ct, and use (1) to find the residual demand for new teachers. To project P over 
a multiyear period, we iterate this procedure, updating the 7it year by year.
Calibration
The behavioral parameters take the following baseline values:
P. = -7
P2 = .85
P3 through P6 = .95
P7 through P30 = .98
P31 through P40 = .9
In the first simulation, corresponding to the uppermost curve in figure 4.2, 
retention probabilities during the first six years are increased by 3 percent (e.g., 
P, increases from .7 to .721). Since the simulation is intended to mimic the im 
pact of a 12 percent salary increase on attrition, this is equivalent to assuming 
a retention elasticity of .25 during the first phase of a worklife, and 0 thereafter. 
The implied five-year survival rate increases from 51 percent to 59 percent, a 
change well within the ranges reported in Murnane et al. (1991).
In the second simulation, corresponding to the middle curve in figure 4.2, 
we retain the changes made in the first simulation. In addition, P7 through P30 
increase to .9849 (an elasticity of .04), while P31 through P40 increase to .927 
(an elasticity of .25). The five-year survival rate is unchanged from the first 
simulation, since the values of Pt , t<7 have not changed.
In the third simulation, corresponding to the lowest curve in figure 4.2, we 
increase Pt, t<7 by 5 percent and Pt for 7 < t < 30 by 1 percent. The five-year 
survival rate increases from .51 to .65.
Nonidentical Cohorts
In the foregoing model the workforce initially exhibits a steady-state com 
position, in which every cohort follows an identical career trajectory. This tra 
jectory is perfectly mirrored in the composition of the workforce: thus there are 
more new teachers than second-year teachers, more second-year teachers than
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third, and so on. This was notably not the appearance of the U.S. workforce in 
the 1980s, which contained disproportionately many teachers in mid-career 
who were hired during years of rising enrollments. As a check on the relevance 
of our initial analysis, we have recalibrated the model allowing for mid-career 
cohorts that were 50 percent larger (at the time of entry) than other cohorts now 
in the early or late stages of their careers. The results show that the relative de 
cline in the demand for new teachers is virtually the same under the modified 
model as under the original assumptions.
Reentry of Former Teachers
Assumption 3 abstracts from the fact that many teaching careers are inter 
rupted. In a steady state, this is an innocuous abstraction, since we can regard 
the retention rates in the model as net of such flows. However, for the purposes 
of this analysis, we need to recognize the existence of a pool of former teachers 
who would not return to teaching in the absence of a pay raise, but who might 
reenter the profession in response to higher salaries. Since reentry further de 
presses the demand for newly trained teachers, the estimates we report are up 
per bounds on the number of new teachers who will be hired following a pay 
raise. Indeed, under the reasonable assumption that turnover will be lower 
among reentering teachers (who are already familiar with working conditions) 
than among newly trained teachers, demand for the latter will decline by more 
than one for each former teacher who returns.

Appendix 4B 
A Model of Turnover and Workforce Quality
Description
Denote teachers of low quality as type 1, those of high quality as type 2. Pjt 
denotes the probability that a teacher of type i chooses to remain in teaching 
another year, given he or she has taught for t - 1 years already, while n-is is the 
s-year survival rate, the product of the Pit from t=ltot = s-l. (P;i = 1 by def 
inition.) To abstract from temporary withdrawals, teachers who have exited do 
not return. Finally, q. denotes teacher quality or effectiveness, varying across 
types and over time. During the first years of teaching q. is rising, after which 
it stabilizes at a value assumed constant over the rest of the worklife.
The object is to contrast two policies, one staffing a teaching position with 
instructors of low quality, the other hiring only high-quality teachers. Mean 
quality under a policy of hiring teachers of type i is
Z q 71 fL n
1=1,40 it it t=l,40 it
given a worklife of forty years. After n years, teachers of each type reach their 
full effectiveness (qj). Effectiveness when first hired is a fraction of this, i.e., 
q. = bq., b < 1. In every year through year n, they gain a constant fraction of 
the difference between initial and final effectiveness. (In reality, on-the-job 
learning is front-loaded; the assumption that it occurs in constant increments 
biases the conclusion in favor of teachers with lower attrition rates.) Effective 
ness of type 1 teachers is a constant fraction of the effectiveness of type 2 teach 
ers with the same experience: q h = kq for all t, k < 1. Last, the attrition rate 
for teachers of low quality is a fraction of that for teachers of high quality at the 
same point in their careers: Plt= rP2t for all t.
Apart from the P , the key parameters of the model are k, r, n, and b. If we 
fix b, n, and r in accordance with the results of investigations of teacher attrition 
and the contribution of experience to teacher performance, we can solve for the 
value of k (the relative quality of the two types) necessary to justify a policy 
that gives preference to low-quality applicants.
Calibration
Values of PJJ are set to produce survival rates consistent with findings in the 
literature on attrition (e.g., Murnane et al. 1991). For type 1, P 12 through P17 = 
(.85, .85, .95, .95, .98, .98} yielding a seven-year survival rate of .63. P lt re 
mains .98 thereafter until t = 30, at which time it drops to .9. The mean spell
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length in teaching is 18.6 years. To obtain values for type 2, r is set to .9 for the 
first six years, thereafter to .95. This gives a seven-year survival rate of .33 and 
a mean spell length of 7.9 years. In the baseline case, b = .5. For sensitivity 
analysis it is reset to .2.
Appendix 4C
Wages, Career Choices and the Composition of the Applicant 
Pool with Respect to Ability
The Model
We employ a simple model of the prospective teacher's career choice. Al 
though actual career choices involve several decisions (whether to enroll in a 
teacher education program, whether to apply for a job, whether to accept any 
offers), we will collapse these distinctions and speak of a single decision to un 
dertake teacher training and pursue a teaching career. This choice is made 
while an individual is still in college. We abstract from decisions to enter teach 
ing at later stages in one's worklife, though such choices could be included via 
straightforward modification of the model.
Certified individuals who obtain a teaching job following graduation have 
an expected lifetime income of V, which is a function of teaching salaries plus 
nonpecuniary benefits (e.g., long summer vacations); V includes, of course, the 
option value of switching to another career at a later point in one's worklife.
There are two alternatives to teaching. Noncertified graduates pursue an al 
ternative career from the outset, earning A over the course of a lifetime. Those 
who acquire certificates but fail to obtain a teaching job enter a fallback career 
in which they earn A-C, where C represents the opportunity cost of teacher 
training. 1 Such costs arise because students must forgo other coursework and/ 
or internships in order to complete the pedagogy courses and student teaching 
practicum needed for a certificate. Alternatively, a student may preserve his or 
her outside options in full, but only at the cost of prolonging his education in 
order to complete additional requirements for certification.
Agents are assumed to maximize expected lifetime earnings, inclusive of 
nonpecuniary benefits. A college student therefore elects to pursue a teaching 
career when
(1) jcV + (1-7C)(A-C) > A
where n denotes the probability that a teaching position is obtained ("offer 
rate"). To keep the analysis tractable, we make the following simplifying as 
sumptions.
1. Individuals are distinguished by two characteristics, a taste for teaching 
called the nonpecuniary benefits of teaching, x, and ability, a. E(tlcc) need not
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equal the unconditional expectation E(i); however, we assume that second mo 
ments of the distribution of I are independent of a (as would be the case if, for 
example, T and a were bivariate normal). The earnings expected in an alterna 
tive career and the opportunity costs of certification (A and C, respectively) are 
increasing functions of ability but are independent of T.
2. The offer rate, n, is invariant with respect to ability.
3. Teachers earn an annual wage of w and annual nonpecuniary benefits of 
T. Both are also assumed constant over time for any individual.
4. The expected length of a teaching career, S, is the same for all persons of 
a given level of ability, as are expected earnings when one leaves teaching.
Assumption 1 captures the essential features of this career choice, in which 
individuals weigh the satisfaction provided by teaching against the higher fi 
nancial rewards that may be available in other occupations. In Assumption 3 
we have abstracted from salary growth. The assumption that T is constant over 
time is restrictive in this context, but much less so in the refined model present 
ed further on.
Assumption 4 is primarily an expositional convenience, since we relax it be 
low. It is easiest first, however, to derive our results under this simplification. 
It may be worth noting that Assumption 4 is not so far-fetched as it first ap 
pears. To be sure, some persons are more drawn to teaching than others and are 
likely to remain teachers longer. However, individuals are not well-informed 
about the strength of others' interest in teaching, and are therefore unlikely to 
know whether their own interest is stronger than average or not. Thus, a pro 
spective teacher wondering how long he or she will remain interested in teach 
ing might well take the mean spell among persons of his or her own ability level 
as a guide.
The assumption that n is independent of ability follows, of course, from our 
findings that quality of college attended and academic degrees had no influence 
on applicants' chances on the teacher labor market. Thus districts are effective 
ly hiring at random. In these circumstances, higher pay can produce an im 
provement in the quality of new recruits (by these indicators) only if it raises 
the average quality of the applicant pool.
Since our interest is in the composition of the applicant pool by ability, we 
select two levels of a, high and low, and conduct the analysis conditional on 
these values (represented henceforth by the superscripts H and L). Let S de 
note the mean career length of low ability individuals, and S the mean spell
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length among high ability persons. It follows from Assumption 3 that the ex 
ante value of a teaching career, V, is equal to
(2) V^Cw+^s'+b'CM-S1) i=H,L
where b' represents annual earnings in the career to which the teacher devotes 
the other M-S* years of his working life. (Discounting is implicit.) Substituting 
V 1 into (1) yields the probability that an individual elects a teaching career, P1 , 
as
(3) pio = Prob(T > (« 1 -n)/n)Cl - S 1 w - bCM-S 1) + A'yS1).
The term to the right of the inequality represents a threshold value of x, call 
it T, which must be exceeded before someone of ability level i decides on a 
teaching career; that is,
PO = l,i g (I) dl
where g' is the probability density function of T conditional on a'. Given our 
previous assumptions, T will be greater on average among high ability appli 
cants than low. Persons with attractive career options who choose to teach do 
so because they expect higher job satisfaction; the lower one's ability, the more 
likely one is to be attracted by the salary.
We are now in a position to investigate the effect of a wage change on the 
composition of the applicant pool by ability. There are two channels by which 
higher pay affects P. First, V rises. Second, since job vacancies are declining at 
the same time the supply of applicants increases, n falls. This feeds back upon 
application decisions. Differentiating P with respect to w and n yields
(4a) 9 
and
(4b) 9P/97i= (1/7C2) (d/S 1 ) g'Cc').
Since the applicant pool improves if the increase in application rates is propor 
tionately greater among persons of high ability than low, we convert (4a) and 
(4b) into partial elasticities,
(5a)e! =
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(5b) £l n = (1/7C) (CVS 1 ) g'CtX . 
Combining these expressions, we obtain the total wage elasticity as
/c \ i i ' i I Tf i P = F + F F\*J\,sJ O C/ I O O
t,w p,w p,n rt, w
where the final term represents the elasticity of the offer rate, n, with respect to 
the wage.2
L HWe want to examine the conditions under which e > e , implying a de 
terioration in the quality of the applicant pool. The following ratios are useful:






Using (5c), we obtain after some algebraic manipulation 
(7) eLt>w - eHtjW = e"p)W [k, - 1 + k3(k2-l)e7t,w].
The sign of (7) can be obtained by evaluating the terms inside the square 
brackets. Moreover, if the bracketed expression is close to zero, even a large 
partial wage elasticity, eHp w is consistent with our finding that higher pay has 
produced little change in the composition of the workforce. Teacher supply 
might be quite responsive to changes in the wage, yet the full effects of higher 
salaries, allowing for feedbacks through n, remain quite small.
Evaluation of elasticities
To evaluate (7), we will identify graduates of the nation's least selective 
four-year colleges as "low ability" and graduates of selective institutions as
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"high ability." Data on teacher attrition suggest that the mean teaching career 
among type L persons is approximately sixteen years, while the mean among 
type H is about nine years. Approximately 60 percent of all applicants have 
found full-time public school positions (thus n = .6). The probability that a low- 
ability individual pursues a teaching career is approximately .18, that of a high- 
ability person .06. From distributional assumptions, we can back out (to an un 
known scalar) the values of g and g implied by these values of PL0 and PH0 . 
For this purpose, we assume that T is a N([i,o2) variate. Thus g = .26/o, while 
g =. 12/CT, where o is the variance of x. Observe that while this unknown scalar 
affects the magnitude of e'p w , it drops out of the ratios k k and k
This leaves, finally, the variables C and C , the opportunity costs of acquir 
ing a teaching license and applying for teaching positions, and en w , the feed 
back of wages on offer rates. The costs of acquiring a license take a variety of 
forms. Some students prolong their schooling. Others forgo the chance to take 
courses that would enhance their marketability in alternative careers. For those 
selecting the former option, Concludes the opportunity cost of the individual's 
time over the year required to complete pedagogy courses and student teaching, 
plus any out-of-pocket expenses of attending school. Those electing the latter 
course of action incur an opportunity cost equal to the value of the courses they 
might have taken. This is more difficult to measure, though it is reasonable to 
suppose it is positively related to the costs (in tuition and fees) of attending the 
institution offering these courses. 3 If we suppose that such individuals might 
have prolonged their schooling but preferred to complete teacher training with 
in a conventional four-year span, it is reasonable to take the cost of an addition 
al year of formal education as an upper bound on these costs.
New graduates seeking teaching positions are also likely to experience a pe 
riod of enforced idleness as they wait for districts to make hiring decisions. 
There may be a protracted spell of underemployment if unsuccessful job seek 
ers attempt to work their way into a school system by serving as a substitute 
teacher or accept temporary jobs in order to try again the following fall.
Whatever form these costs take, they tend to be higher for students at selec 
tive institutions. Studies of the determinants of earnings have found that grad 
uates of the best colleges earn 20 percent more than those who attended the 
least selective schools (Solmon, 1975; James et al. 1989). The difference in tu 
ition and fees between the most selective colleges and the least far exceeds 20 
percent, of course, though some students at the former may arrange to complete 
pedagogy courses at less-expensive schools in fifth-year programs.
This analysis suggests that the opportunity cost of acquiring certification 
will not far exceed the annual earnings of new graduates in entry-level jobs 
plus the out-of-pocket costs of an additional year of formal education. In ad 
dition, C is at least 1.2 times C . It is likely, however, that this considerably
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understates the true ratio. For many students at nonselective institutions, the 
opportunity costs of studying teacher education approach zero (given the deci 
sion to attend college in the first place). A study of the transcripts of college 
students at seventeen major universities in the south found that elementary 
school teachers took two-thirds more education courses than state regulations 
required, secondary school teachers nearly one-third more than necessary 
(Galambos 1985). The failure of education students to take more challenging 
courses in college has led many states to impose such requirements on would- 
be teachers (Toch 1991). Enactment of a binding constraint of this type implies, 
of course, that the marginal opportunity cost of enrolling in an education course 
is seen as negligible. For students with no realistic prospect of entering another 
profession, an education major appears to be an easy way of getting through 
college.
On the strength of the foregoing analysis, we assume (conservatively) that 
certification costs for high-ability persons are equal to what they might have 
earned as teachers during the year required to obtain a certificate, i.e., C = w. 
For low-ability individuals, we assume that C is only half this large. We also 
comment below on the consequences of relaxing these assumptions.
The final term in (5c) is en w . Since this term is negative, its interaction with 
ert lowers the total application rate elasticity. It is straightforward to demon 
strate that e,^ equals ev w -ea w , the difference between the elasticities of the va 
cancy rate and the application rate with respect to w. As we saw in connection 
with figure 4.2, a 12 percent increase in teacher pay might easily lower vacancy 
rates by 20-25 percent, at least through the first ten years following the pay 
change. This is an understatement of the change in n, of course, since it repre 
sents only ev w and ignores any response in application rates. Since ea w is surely 
not zero, an estimate of en w = -2 would seem to be conservative.
When these values are substituted into the formulas for kb k2, and k3 , 
eLt w- eHt w is shown to be nearly zero, indicating that essentially no change 
takes place in the mix of ability levels in the applicant pool. (Table 1 summa 
rizes parameter values and calculations.) This result is, of course, sensitive to 
the specific assumptions employed here. Reducing the ratio of CH to CL to 1.3 
would raise k2 , implying a very slight increase in the share of high ability ap 
plicants. On the other hand, if CH were equivalent to two years' income at the 
teaching wage of w, rather than one, e\w - eH, w would rise to nearly .23 eHp w 
even if CH = 1.3CL, implying an increase in the share of low-ability individu 
als in the pool.
Absent better information about the parameters of the model, these results 
are suggestive, not definitive. However, this is enough for our purpose, which
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is to show that the claims in the text do not require implausible assumptions 
about the behavior of prospective teachers. On the contrary, under quite rea 
sonable assumptions, it is apparent that the feedback of higher pay on offer 
rates is strong enough to produce the results described in this chapter.
Appendix Table 4C.1. Difference in Total Wage Elasticities
Variable Low ability High ability
Teaching spell (S)
Probability of applying (P0)
Implied value of g
Offer rate
Certification/application costs











eLt,w - eHt,w = eHP,w [k, - 1 + k3(kr l)e7I,w] = .006eHp>w, 
with k, = .72, k2 = .20, k3 = .185
A Refinement: Fully Optimizing Agents
We now relax Assumption 4 to allow for fully optimizing agents who fore 
cast S as a function of their own taste for teaching, T. To do so, we need to im 
pose more structure on V while preserving enough of the original simplicity of 
the model to obtain interpretable results.
Assumption 4a. Certified individuals anticipate that the length of their 
teaching careers will depend on future comparisons of the full teaching income, 
W+T, with the income available in the best alternative occupation. The alterna 
tive offer for year t is expected to be drawn from a distribution with probability 
density function f\. The subscript t indicates that this distribution need not be 
stationary. Indeed, it would be reasonable to expect a high degree of serial cor 
relation in this series (e.g., bt might be a martingale). College students deciding 
whether to pursue teacher education will not, of course, know the future values 
of the bt ; however, they are assumed to know (or at least have beliefs about) 
f1^ As a result, they anticipate teaching in year t with probability
(8) P't = Prob(w + T>bt) =|W+T f st (b)db.
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The mean of the distribution of b is increasing in ability. Other things equal, 
more capable individuals expect to have shorter careers. However, f(b) does 
not depend on T. Given ability, taste for teaching conveys no information about 
future alternative wage offers.
Assumption 5. Prospective teachers who foresee an interruption in their 
teaching careers expect to be able to return to teaching at will (i.e., with an offer 
probability of 1).
Assumption 4a makes career length an endogenous function of w and x. The 
assumption that i remains constant over time is not as restrictive as appears, 
since changes in the attractiveness of teaching vis-a-vis other careers can be in 
corporated in the sequence of alternative offers, bt . Note, too, that a high degree 
of serial correlation in the bt implies that individuals will tend to sort into one 
of two trajectories: those who find out early that teaching is not for them and 
exit in the first few years of their worklives, and those who make a career of it. 
This closely accords with observed career paths. Assumption 5 makes job 
availability an issue only at the beginning of a worklife.
It follows from Assumptions 3, 4a, and 5 that the ex ante value of a teaching 
career, V, is equal to
V1 = Z, (w+x)Pt + E(b\ I b^w+r) (l-Pt) 
while
(9) PJ0 = ProbCrcV + ( I-TC)( A'-C) - A1 > 0)
as before. Since V' is monotonically increasing in T while A' and C' are inde 
pendent of T,
(10) rcV1 + (l-rcXA'-CO - Aj = 0
implicitly defines T1 , which is, again, the value of 1 on the margin of indiffer 
ence between a teaching career and an alternative career. Thus we can write the 





where 3T'/3w and 3i'/37i are obtained from (10) via the implicit function theo 
rem. Since T and w are perfect substitutes, 3T'/3w = -1. It is straightforward to 
show that
where S' equals the expected length of a teaching career for marginal applicants 
of type i (i.e., those for whom T = T'). Then
(lla)3Pi) /9w = 
and
(1 Ib) aPi /dn = (1/Ti2) (CVS 1) g(Tj)
which differ from (4a) and (4b) only in that S' is no longer the mean career 
length among teachers of type i, but rather the length of a teaching career 
among marginal applicants. Note that the simpler model presented above can 
be regarded as a special case arising when agents lack sufficient information on 
ft(b) to evaluate (8) and therefore set P't equal to the mean among persons of 
their own ability level.
Evaluating elasticities in the refined model
Because marginal applicants have lower values of T, they will have shorter 
expected spells than inframarginal applicants. Thus it is no longer appropriate 
to set SL = 16 and SH = 9. Without more information on the distribution of al 
ternative offers, bt , we cannot say how much the marginal values differ from 
the average. However, it is possible to establish some useful bounds. Since S L 
must be at least as large as SH , setting S L=SH establishes a lower bound on k2 of
CL gL/PL0 =37 . 
C"gH/PH0
Similarly, since S H will not exceed the mean career length among type 
H teachers, a reasonable lower bound on k3 is given by
CH/97iw = .185.
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Inserting these values into (7), we find that
L _ pcH -^t,w c t,w •*
Since this is a lower bound, the implications of the refined model are 
very similar to those obtained above. There is not likely to be much 
improvement in the composition of the applicant pool; indeed, quality 
may deteriorate. For example, if S H at the margin were 7 years, rather 
than 9, the lower bound on e\ w - e1] w would rise to .02eHp w.
NOTES
1. C does not capture all the opportunity costs of certification, since teacher training can lower 
earnings after a teaching career has ended. Since these latter costs are not relevant for the analysis 
here, they are ignored in what follows.
2. It will be evident from (4a) that in differentiating T1 with respect to w, we have ignored any 
effect of w on S 1 ; that is, the derivative does not include 3S'/9w. This may appear inconsistent with 
our claim that higher wages reduce job vacancies by inducing teachers to remain on the job 
longer. In fact, as we show below, when fully informed agents choose S as a function of w and i, 
the derivative of PQ with respect to w does not contain 3S'/3w. Since the current model can be 
regarded as an approximation to a fully optimal decision on the part of an agent with limited 
information, it is inappropriate to include such a term here either. (This point is made more explic 
itly below.)
3. This may include a consumption value ("a great course from an inspiring lecturer") as well 
as the impact on future earnings.
4. In fact, use of entry-level wages understates C, which is the difference in lifetime earnings 
associated with having to obtain a teacher's license and wait out the application process for a 
teaching job. This cannot be less than the earnings that one might earn during that year; however, 
it could well be more, if it delays one's entry onto a career path in which earnings in later years 
will considerably exceed entry-level salaries.
CHAPTER
Prospects for Reform
The argument of the preceding chapters can be summarized as fol 
lows. Teacher salaries rose substantially during the 1980s. Nationwide, 
the mean increase was 20 percent in real terms. In several states 
increases exceeded 30 percent. Yet a comparison of new-to-experi 
enced instructors turns up little evidence that higher salaries brought 
about significant change in the qualifications of persons newly 
recruited to the profession over this period. The modest improvements 
that occurred were not limited to states where teacher salaries rose the 
most, either in real terms or relative to the earnings of other college 
graduates; by most measures, there was little if any association 
between salary growth and improvements in the quality of teacher 
recruits.
The explanation, we believe, resides in various structural features of 
the teacher labor market. As a result of rigid pay structures, raises have 
been awarded across the board to all teachers, regardless of effective 
ness. Because tenured teachers retain their jobs virtually at will, the 
predictable consequence is a decline in job availability. This feeds back 
on the quantity and quality of applicants for the remaining vacancies 
(and, of course, diminishes the inflow of new teachers, delaying any 
improvement in the workforce that might occur). Applicant quality is 
affected because application is not costless: would-be teachers must 
invest in an occupation-specific credential—a teaching license—in 
advance of securing a job. The poorer are job prospects, the higher is 
the opportunity cost of this investment for those with attractive options 
outside teaching. These are, of course, the very persons one hoped to 
recruit by raising pay. Were the market to send a strong signal to these 
individuals that their services remain in demand, this consequence 
might be avoided. But no such signal appears to be sent on a systematic 
basis: applicants with the kinds of academic backgrounds that indicate
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command of subject matter and above-average cognitive ability do not 
appear to be any more successful than others in their job searches. 
Under such circumstances, raising salaries may fail to yield any mea 
surable improvement in the workforce.
These features of the market would seem to explain, then, why we 
have found it so difficult to detect a positive outcome of the salary 
reforms of the 1980s. We do not want to overstate the case, however. At 
the close of chapter 3 we acknowledged that higher salaries might have 
had some positive effect on teacher recruitment that we were simply 
unable to detect. Similarly, despite the negative feedbacks that we 
identified in chapter 4, higher salaries may still produce some gains: a 
somewhat better applicant pool, more selective hiring, an overall 
improvement in the quality of newly recruited teachers, perhaps in 
ways that we have found difficult to measure. But whatever has been 
accomplished by recent increases in teacher pay (results that appear to 
be quite modest, at best), more could have been accomplished if the 
labor market for teachers did not exhibit the various structural imper 
fections described in the preceding chapter.
This conclusion has important policy implications. On the basis of 
the evidence in chapter 3 alone, one might conclude that salary 
increases have not been large enough, and that with further increases 
the United States will finally begin to recruit the kind of workforce we 
desire. American education is often compared unfavorably to public 
schooling in nations like Japan and Switzerland, where salaries are 
higher and where the academic qualifications of teachers are consider 
ably higher than those of American instructors. The case for raising the 
salaries of American teachers continues to be pressed, presumably in 
the belief that only if we increase pay will our teachers meet compara 
ble standards (Bishop 1993; Bok 1993).
This policy prescription is, in our view, a mistake. Given the struc 
tural imperfections in the market, further raises are likely only to yield 
more of the same results—exceedingly modest if not utterly negligible 
improvements—at high cost to taxpayers. In our judgment, further 
increases in teacher salaries should be conditional on the removal of 
structural impediments in the market, requiring significant changes in 
the way teachers are licensed, recruited, and compensated.
We are not the first, of course, to be interested in such changes. Rec 
ommendations of this kind have been advanced for a variety of rea-
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sons, some having little to do with teacher recruitment. Our purpose 
here is not to evaluate all of these claims. Rather, we are interested in 
these reforms insofar as they remove the various imperfections and 
rigidities in the labor market that have undermined past efforts to 
recruit better teachers. With this goal, we examine some of the more 
prominent proposals and the efforts to implement them in recent years. 
What is the outlook for complementary reforms?
Salary Differentiation
As just noted, when teacher salaries are increased across the board, 
job opportunities decline, discouraging prospective applicants and 
delaying improvements in the workforce. To avoid these side effects, 
raises might be targeted to new teachers, either by paying bonuses to 
beginning teachers or by frontloading salary increases onto the first 
years of a teaching career. For new recruits who borrowed to finance 
their college education, loan forgiveness would serve the same pur 
pose.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to design a policy of this kind that will 
prove acceptable to a majority of teachers and still solve the problem. 
While small bonuses might be tolerated, raising the regular salaries of 
new teachers above those of more experienced instructors will not. In 
order to preserve a conventional, upward-sloping salary/experience 
profile, a large raise for first year teachers will have to be accompanied 
by a still substantial (though somewhat smaller) raise for second-year 
teachers, and so on. But this largely vitiates the attempt to keep 
vacancy rates from dropping, since it is in the first six or seven years of 
a teaching career that quit rates are highest. Moreover, even this sort of 
salary reform will be unpopular. The median level of experience in the 
profession is now fifteen years; a policy that restricted raises to (say) 
teachers with no more than ten years' service would leave the majority 
with nothing.
Alternatively, salaries could be differentiated on the basis of merit. 
Merit pay has had a rocky history in public education (as have other 
efforts to differentiate teacher salaries on the basis of specialized 
knowledge, market conditions, or superior performance). This is due in
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no small part to the opposition of teacher unions. Unions have lobbied 
legislatures against merit pay; when unable to block such measures 
outright, they have influenced legislation in ways that promote the 
interests of their membership (Uzell 1983; Brandt 1990). At the local 
level, unions have opposed school boards and superintendents who 
support merit pay (Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford, 1994). In the face of 
this opposition, merit pay plans that survived have often been con 
verted into forms of job enlargement offering extra pay for extra work 
(Murnane and Cohen 1986; Cornett 1991). Elsewhere, the size of merit 
bonuses have been reduced to the point where administrators often 
wonder if plans are worth the time spent on them (Hatry, Greiner, and 
Ashford 1994).
The opposition to merit pay does not come from teacher unions 
alone. Educators as well as some economists have argued that because 
it is difficult to spell out the practices that make someone a good 
teacher, administrators are often unable to justify merit awards to their 
staffs. The tenuous connection between stated criteria and effective 
teaching makes it hard to explain why instructors were denied high rat 
ings and bonuses. Those passed over become demoralized and embit 
tered, impeding efforts to build effective instructional teams. For these 
reasons, merit pay plans that have not evolved into arrangements to pay 
teachers for assuming extra duties have often been abandoned within a 
few years of their adoption (Murnane and Cohen 1986). In one promi 
nent study conducted by the Urban Institute, three-fourths of the dis 
tricts that had been using merit pay in 1983 were no longer doing so 
when recontacted ten years later (Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford, 1994).
Given the negative publicity merit pay has received, it comes as 
something of a surprise to find that the record on merit pay is not 
unequivocally negative. The same Urban Institute study found many 
administrators and teachers who believed that merit pay had a positive 
influence on their schools. The fact that most plans have been aban 
doned within a few years is not necessarily a sign of ineffectiveness; 
plans are abandoned for a variety of reasons, not least of them costs. 
Merit pay has been particularly vulnerable during budgetary cutbacks 
because it is typically structured as an add-on to base pay. As noted, 
plans are also terminated following a change of superintendent or 
school board. Merit pay may not "work" because it is opposed by
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unions, but that is not the same as saying it is opposed because it does 
not work. 1
Whatever the other problems with merit pay, special difficulties will 
beset a policy that relies on merit bonuses to raise the quality of new 
recruits. Prospective teachers will discount compensation that is con 
tingent on future performance, given uncertainty whether and when 
such awards will be made. In addition, to attract significantly better 
recruits, the sums involved will need to be substantial. For the policy to 
succeed, many new teachers will have to earn more than teachers with 
much longer service, effectively creating an unacceptable two-tier 
workforce.
An alternative to merit pay would award bonuses on the basis of 
measured competencies, a policy termed "pay for knowledge and 
skills" (Odden and Conley 1991). Such plans differ from merit pay in 
that the desired competencies are specified in advance in terms of 
objective criteria (e.g., test scores on subject matter exams). We are 
unaware of any large-scale implementation of a compensation policy 
of this type. In some respects, such a policy might be an improvement 
over merit pay. Clearer criteria for awards would presumably help in 
the recruitment of new teachers, who may well know whether they 
meet the standard. However, unions would likely be opposed, given 
their resistance to the testing of teachers for other purposes. Since 
acceptance by rank and file would presumably hinge on the proportion 
of teachers deemed to have demonstrated the skill, pressure would 
build to set standards that most teachers could pass. Programs of 
teacher education could be expected to develop extra courses and prac- 
tica for teachers who need to be brought up to speed and to exert addi 
tional pressure to ensure that persons who completed these courses 
were judged to have met the standard.
In summary, while the evidence suggests that compensation could 
be more flexible than at present, considerable opposition would need to 
be overcome before differentiation of salaries on the basis of ability 
could proceed to the point where it solves the problem with which we 
began: raising pay without triggering a substantial reduction in job 
opportunities. The history of efforts to introduce merit pay and other 
performance incentives into public schools does not leave grounds for 
much optimism.2 A policy that drew some distinctions among teachers 
would be superior to one that relied solely on across-the-board raises to
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attract better teachers, but the difference in practice is likely to be mod 
est.
Lowering Entry Barriers
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it will be difficult to raise salaries 
without reducing the number of job openings. At a minimum, this will 
delay any improvements in the workforce. Yet the effects may be still 
worse, if declining job prospects discourage more capable persons 
from applying in the first place. Unfortunately, this is only too likely. 
Public school teachers must be certified in the subjects they will teach. 
As a rule, this credential is earned before prospective teachers know 
whether they have jobs. If a position is not forthcoming, the effort to 
obtain a certificate is wasted, a consideration that can deter them from 
making the investment in the first place. Conversely, if professional 
training could be postponed until prospective teachers were assured of 
obtaining a job, a decline in job opportunities ought to have little effect 
on the number of willing applicants. The fear of making a fruitless 
investment in teacher training would no longer deter interested individ 
uals. 3
The usual route to certification involves college course work in an 
approved program of teacher education. Much of this course work may 
overlap with that in traditional academic disciplines, especially for 
those seeking secondary school certification, but some of it consists of 
methods courses (usually termed "professional education") plus a stu 
dent teaching internship or practicum. In most states these additional 
requirements involve a minimum of eighteen semester hours for high 
school teachers (Burks 1987). Elementary school instructors and spe 
cial education teachers are usually required to do more.
Though these requirements may not seem very burdensome (espe 
cially for secondary school teachers), they can constitute a consider 
able barrier to entry. The barrier is obviously greatest for persons who 
have already completed an undergraduate degree and who return to 
school at a high cost in foregone income. Barriers are also substantial 
for students who begin thinking about teaching only towards the end of 
their undergraduate years, with courses to make up. Other students
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(e.g., those majoring in the sciences) are often required to take a care 
fully sequenced set of courses in order to complete their majors. As a 
result, they, too, may find it difficult to schedule the necessary profes 
sional education courses within a normal four-year period. If they are 
fully resolved on a teaching career, they can circumvent this problem 
by taking their subject area courses within a School of Education 
(obtaining, for example, a degree in "physics education"), but such a 
degree will be much less marketable should they find themselves at any 
point looking for a job outside teaching. In states that have increased 
required course work in teachers' subject areas, this option may no 
longer exist; there may be no alternative to a prolongation of one's 
undergraduate education. At the University of Massachusetts, for 
example, all prospective secondary school teachers are advised that the 
usual program of study leading to certification requires nine semesters.
The best evidence that certification requirements pose a genuine 
barrier to entry is the behavior of would-be teachers. Substantial num 
bers of noncertified graduates take teaching positions in private schools 
for salaries well below those in public schools. Part of the appeal of the 
private sector is the absence of entry barriers, offering new graduates a 
chance to see whether they like teaching before they go to the expense 
of acquiring certification. Still more to the point, as shown in chapter 4, 
certification rates are quite responsive to the availability of jobs. If cer 
tification were costless (or nearly so), it would be difficult to explain 
why job availability affects the number of interested applicants.
If certification requirements were relaxed, public schools would be 
able to recruit more widely. One might wonder how much good this 
will do, given the evidence presented in chapter 4 that schools do not 
recruit optimally at present. However, prospects for improvement are 
enhanced given that noncertified applicants are likely to be of higher 
ability. The reason is that certification acts as a reverse screen, impos 
ing greater costs on individuals with more attractive alternatives to 
teaching. This is most clearly true of persons who must return to school 
or prolong their undergraduate educations in order to complete addi 
tional coursework, but it also characterizes persons who might have 
improved their marketability in another career (say, by taking com 
puter science courses or learning a second language) had they not been 
required to complete professional education courses. The same consid 
erations do not arise for students who would not otherwise enter a pro-
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fession and whose alternative occupational choices require no specific 
academic training beyond the mere completion of a college degree (if 
that). In addition, attrition from teaching rises with academic ability. 
Thus, more capable students can anticipate having fewer years in 
which to amortize their investment in an occupation-specific creden 
tial. Finally, academically talented students are likely to find profes 
sional education courses intellectually unsatisfying compared to 
traditional liberal arts studies, or, at the very least, to anticipate an 
unsatisfactory experience, given the low regard in which such courses 
are held.4
To summarize, the barriers to entry posed by certification require 
ments are higher for more capable students with attractive career 
choices outside education. To attract such persons to teaching, legisla 
tures might lower entry barriers in lieu of raising salaries. Or both mea 
sures might be enacted together, since a reduction in entry barriers 
complements a pay raise by blunting the deterrent effect of a decline in 
job openings. Still better results could be achieved by using examina 
tions and interviews to identify selected individuals who ought to be 
exempted from traditional licensing requirements, thereby raising their 
representation in the applicant pool.
What, then, is the justification for requiring certification of public 
school teachers? Economists have advanced arguments based on infor 
mation and agency problems to support licensing in labor markets that 
would otherwise suffer from a suboptimal supply of quality—variants, 
essentially, of Akerlof's (1970) analysis of the market for lemons. The 
relevance of these analyses for teacher labor markets is doubtful, as 
they rest on the assumption that the government possesses information 
private buyers lack. In this market, government entities (school dis 
tricts) are the buyers of services, and could on principle have access to 
the same information about job applicants used by other government 
agencies to issue certificates.
Murnane et al. (1991) note that teacher certification has traditionally 
been defended as a protection against incompetent or corrupt school 
administrators. Indeed, certification was once the primary requirement 
for teachers; only later did states expect their teachers to hold a 
diploma from a four-year college. In those circumstances, licensing 
requirements may indeed have provided some assurance that teachers 
would meet a minimum standard of competency. It is far less certain
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they do so today. The indifference of many private school administra 
tors to the certification of their faculty (see chapter 6) suggests that this 
credential conveys no information about teaching competence that is 
not readily available in other forms. 5 Indeed, even within public educa 
tion there is growing recognition that the entry barriers erected by cer 
tification requirements are too high. In recent years, many states have 
instituted alternative routes to certification, most often for the purpose 
of easing the transition from other occupations into teaching. Although 
they differ in details, these alternatives typically allow new teachers to 
complete professional education courses while employed on a provi 
sional basis in a public school system, usually under the guidance of an 
established, mentor teacher. As a result, few of the costs associated 
with certification need be incurred until a job is found.
Most alternative certification programs were started recently on a 
very small scale. Only ten states certified more than 300 instructors by 
alternative routes between 1988 and 1990 (NASDTEC 1991). None 
theless, in several of these states, teachers with alternative certification 
provided more than 10 percent of all newly hired instructors (Feist- 
ritzer and Chester 1993). In these states, at least, a significant number 
of public school districts have been willing to hire teachers who lack 
prior course work in professional education. Indeed, in Connecticut 
alternative route certificants have been more successful in finding 
classroom positions than those certified by conventional programs, 
though the numbers have been so small (about fifty per year) that it 
may be unwise to draw broad conclusions about the demand for such 
instructors. Some of the worst fears raised by critics do not appear to 
have been borne out. Despite charges that these teachers would not be 
adequately prepared for the problems they will face in the classroom, 
the retention rate among alternatively certified teachers in New Jersey 
has exceeded that of new teachers with traditional licenses (New Jersey 
State Department of Education 1991). A study of the alternative certifi 
cation program established by the Dallas Independent School District 
found that recruits generally out-performed new teachers from tradi 
tional programs. They received more favorable ratings from supervis 
ing teachers and teacher advisors and outscored traditional certificants 
on the exit exams required of teacher training graduates (Lutz and Hut- 
ton 1989).
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Despite the promise shown by these programs, most have been 
designed in ways that prevent them from playing a much larger role in 
the preparation of new teachers. As noted, many programs are small. 
Readily identifiable bottlenecks—for example, a limited number of 
places in mandatory summer workshops—restrict the number of 
entrants. Such workshops themselves can constitute a barrier to entry if 
participants are not certain that a job awaits them. The Connecticut 
program is a case in point. Participants must complete an eight-week 
workshop meeting full-time during the summer, a requirement incom 
patible with most forms of full-time employment. Yet there is no guar 
antee of a job when the workshop is over; indeed, barely half have 
subsequently taught in the state's public schools (Feistritzer and Ches 
ter 1993).
Because alternative certification programs were designed to facili 
tate mid-career changes, many will not accept individuals who recently 
graduated from college (say, within the past five years). This precludes 
the participation of a younger, more mobile part of the workforce. 
Other programs, created expressly to meet shortages, allow districts to 
hire alternatively certified teachers only after a declaration that no reg 
ularly certified instructor could be found (Feistritzer and Chester 
1993). In many programs, there is a major focus on recruiting minority 
teachers for urban schools. While these are worthwhile goals, they 
make it clear that alternative certification programs are not primarily 
regarded as a vehicle for recruiting bright persons into teaching with 
out requiring them to pass through a year of preservice training. 
Finally, while lowering entry barriers is an important step, none of 
these programs deals with other impediments to the entry of older 
teachers, notably salary rigidity. Yet salary flexibility may be essential 
to attract individuals who have been successful in other careers.
A more radical reform would permit school districts to hire unli 
censed teachers. Limited experimentation is underway with this policy. 
Some states permit charter schools to employ noncertified instructors. 6 
Texas has recently begun a special program whereby districts may hire 
exceptional individuals whose backgrounds have been outside educa 
tion. No course work in professional education is required. Contracts 
are individually negotiated; salary offers are not constrained by the 
schedule. Despite these promising features, it does not appear that this 
program will be a significant source of teaching talent. Individuals can
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be hired under this program only after a special petition has been 
approved by the Commissioner of Education; reviews are conducted on 
a case-by-case basis. According to the Texas Education Agency, 
approximately 100 petitions had been received by the start of the 1995 
school year. While the agency would not reveal the precise number 
approved, we were told that it was far below the number of petitions.
Proposals to reduce or eliminate certification requirements are vig 
orously opposed by segments of the education community that benefit 
from current practices. These include the faculty of conventional 
teacher education programs as well as certified teachers and their 
unions. Restrictions on the size of alternative certification programs 
and the population of eligible participants may well represent an 
accommodation with these interests. Sometimes the accommodation is 
blatant: under the alternative program that awards California's Univer 
sity Intern Credential, the teachers' union in the district hiring the 
intern must approve the application (Feistrizter and Chester 1993). 
Similarly, conventional teacher education programs have been given 
significant roles in selecting candidates for alternative certification and 
designing program requirements. Faculty at these institutions have 
shown themselves far less receptive to reforms that by-pass them alto 
gether (see, for example, the attack on Teach for America in Darling- 
Hammond 1994). There can be little doubt that these faculty will con 
tinue to function as advocates of "teacher professionalization" and to 
inculcate their views in the teachers and administrators with whose 
training they are entrusted. This raises the prospect that certification (or 
the equivalent course work) may remain a de facto prerequisite for 
many jobs, even if licensing requirements are reduced or eliminated.
The defense of traditional teacher preparation mounted by faculty in 
schools of education should not obscure the central issue. The question 
is not whether preservice training provided in programs of teacher edu 
cation is valueless (though the attitudes of many administrators in the 
private sector suggest that it may be very close to that). Studies demon 
strating that new teachers who have passed through traditional pro 
grams out-perform those who have not miss the point. Defenders of the 
traditional licensing system must do more than show this training is 
useful; they must show it is indispensable—that no reliable alternatives 
exist to identify individuals whom it would be better to hire without 
this previous training than lose to public education altogether.
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Raising Standards
In the previous chapter we argued that an excess supply of teachers 
discourages individuals with strong academic backgrounds from pur 
suing this career, especially as such persons fare no better on the job 
market than other candidates. Yet there would seem to be an obvious 
solution to this problem, namely to raise academic standards for teach 
ers along with salaries. Ideally, higher standards would improve the job 
prospects of better-qualified teachers while better salaries ensure a suf 
ficient supply of applicants capable of meeting the new requirements. 
Various standards have been proposed: additional postgraduate educa 
tion, more course work in subject areas, and a passing score on a 
teacher examination. Proponents regularly point to the success of 
nations like Japan, where teachers must meet exacting academic stan 
dards, and ask why American teachers cannot attain a comparable 
degree of professionalism.
Yet we are skeptical that it will prove possible to accomplish much 
by raising standards for American teachers, apart from screening out 
the illiterate and innumerate. Our skepticism is based in part on the 
proposals themselves. There is virtually no evidence, for example, that 
postgraduate education enhances teaching effectiveness (Hanushek 
1986). While advocates of additional education sometimes have in 
mind specific programs of study thought to be especially effective 
(e.g., the Holmes Group 1986), such claims often lack evidentiary sup 
port. Nor is it clear how to assure high-quality programs in the hun 
dreds of institutions that train teachers. On the contrary, requiring 
additional years of schooling before one can enter the classroom raises 
precisely the entry barrier most discouraging to candidates with a high 
opportunity value of time.
Many states have increased subject area course work for secondary 
school teachers. Some now require secondary school instructors to 
complete undergraduate majors in the subjects they will teach (e.g., 
history rather than social studies or history education). It is too early to 
tell what effect this has had on teaching quality. As of 1991, there was 
no significant difference between these states and others with respect to 
the proportion of new secondary teachers who had earned a degree in 
an academic major. Delays in implementation and the grandfathering
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of current trainees have held up progress. The long-term efficacy of 
this reform is also uncertain. Consider the requirement that all history 
teachers hold a degree in that subject. Well-intentioned though this reg 
ulation is, it cannot ensure that the prospective teachers bound by it 
will be as well-trained and enthusiastic as those who would have cho 
sen to major in history before the regulation took effect. An influx of 
prospective teachers into courses they would not otherwise take may 
put pressure on academic standards and dilute the quality of training 
that history majors formerly received. This is the more likely given the 
low college board scores (SAT, ACT) among education majors. This is 
not to say that this reform will yield nothing positive. But there will 
also be costs, not least of which is the loss of information formerly pro 
vided by the self-selection of students into more rigorous and demand 
ing majors.
This leaves teacher testing. The last fifteen years have seen a sub 
stantial increase in the use of teacher examinations. Virtually all states 
now test teachers at least once before they are granted regular licenses. 
Some tests are for admission to programs of teacher education; others 
are given upon the completion of such programs, as requirements for 
certification. Many of these examinations are tests of basic skills. No 
one claims that they select into teaching the best and the brightest, only 
that they screen out teachers lacking fundamental reading and mathe 
matics skills. Virtually all states allow an unlimited number of retakes 
on any required teacher examination (NASDTEC 1996). The circum 
stances are often remarkably easy. Those taking the California Basic 
Education Skills Test (CBEST), for example, are given four hours to 
take the test; they can spend all four hours on a single section and com 
plete the three sections of the exam in three separate sittings. More 
over, it is possible to fail one or even two sections and still pass by 
doing sufficiently well on the rest of the test. Of the half-million indi 
viduals who have taken this exam, 86 percent have passed. This rate is 
by no means exceptional: passing rates of 80-90 percent on teacher 
tests are commonplace (Childs and Rudner 1990). It is instructive to 
contrast this with the situation in Japan, where every year approxi 
mately 200,000 candidates take rigorous prefectural examinations for 
40,000 jobs (Leetsma et al. 1987).
As easy as these tests seem to be, teacher examinations have been 
opposed by teachers, their unions, and other professional educators.
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Many have expressed concern over high failure rates among minority 
candidates; indeed, the State of California has been taken to court on 
the grounds that its teacher examination is racially biased. This is by no 
means the only instance in which the disparate impact of an examina 
tion on minority candidates has resulted in a law suit. It is hard to envi 
sion teacher exams becoming any more rigorous in this climate. On the 
contrary, the disposition of some of these law suits points in the oppo 
site direction, as shown by the settlement of Alien v. Alabama State 
Board of Education, in which the state agreed to lower required pass 
ing scores. Examinees who failed the tests were to be given a second 
opportunity to be certified on the basis of a formula that gave equal 
weight to test scores and college grade point averages. Finally, if these 
adjustments did not produce a black pass rate equal to 90 percent of the 
white rate, the state agreed that additional numbers of black candidates 
would be certified (on the basis of class rank) to assure a final certifica 
tion rate within 10 percent of the pass rate among whites (Hood and 
Parker 1991).
Indeed, if the problem is the failure of school districts to give suffi 
cient weight to cognitive ability when hiring new teachers, it is clear 
that teacher testing is simply the wrong remedy. Passing scores can 
never be raised to the point where schools will be compelled to hire the 
brightest teachers. Nor should they be. Opponents of testing argue with 
some justice that an individual's eligibility to teach should not rest 
solely on performance on a standardized exam. The cognitive skills 
measured by these tests are only one predictor of teaching effective 
ness. Other attributes also matter in the classroom. More difficult 
examinations with higher minimum passing scores would screen out 
some teachers whose strengths lie elsewhere. In addition, tougher tests 
could produce local shortages. A standard high enough to force some 
districts to raise their threshold for new hires might deprive others of 
qualified applicants altogether, forcing them to employ permanent sub 
stitutes or resort to other stopgap measures that are worse than present 
policies.
Unfortunately, a more balanced approach, in which test scores are 
weighed with other indicators in the course of teacher selection, does 
not seem likely. The Educational Testing Service, which supplies 
nearly all of the tests, has validated the NTE (and its successor, the 
Praxis Series) for purposes of licensing only, not for hiring or reten-
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tion. School districts using these scores for the latter purposes would 
be in violation of ETS' express policy. 7 Moreover, as federal court 
decisions require validation of any employment test, such districts 
would be exposing themselves to costly legal action.
Let us instead consider an alternative, to raise standards for students. 
Indeed, if schools were held accountable for student achievement, 
there would presumably be little need for teacher examinations or other 
licensing requirements. Schools would choose to employ instructors 
capable of raising student test scores (or other agreed-on indicators). 
Since it is ultimately student learning that counts, this policy would 
appear to accomplish all that could be achieved by stricter licensing 
requirements without needlessly tying districts' hands. In addition, 
higher standards for students would have a positive effect—so the 
argument goes—on the effort of students and teachers. Indeed, it is pri 
marily for this reason, and not for their indirect impact on teacher 
recruitment, that higher standards are generally advocated.
Educational standards are much in the news as this book goes to 
press, and it may be premature to pass judgment on the final shape of 
reforms. Yet the obstacles to success seem even greater than in the case 
of higher standards for teachers. The testing of students raises the same 
concerns about disparate impacts on minorities as does the testing of 
teachers, with the difference that these concerns are intensified when 
the outcome is something as critical to further educational and eco 
nomic opportunities as high school graduation. Perhaps the most 
doubtful aspect of this policy lies in the notion that our political system 
is capable of Grafting a coherent set of objectives to guide local educa 
tion authorities. This was, indeed, just the purpose of Outcomes-Based 
Education, a movement that has stalled due to public disapproval of 
objectives that seem irrelevant, if not actually inimical, to the aims of 
education as various segments of the public conceive them.
Outcomes-Based Education is not the only effort to establish stan 
dards for public education that has foundered in the cross-currents of 
American politics. When curriculum guidelines for American history 
were issued under the Goals 2000 legislation, a furious debate was set 
off over the political content of the guidelines, and the U.S. Senate 
ended up repudiating the standards by a vote of 99 to 1. The lesson was 
not lost on the National Council of Teachers of English, who issued 
curriculum guidelines for English that steered clear of specifics,
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prompting this response from a senior advisor to the Secretary of Edu 
cation: "The report contains very vague and very general statements 
that don't tell parents or students what is important to learn and don't 
tell teachers what is important to teach" (New York Times, March 12, 
1996). States have also undertaken their own standard-setting exer 
cises, but these efforts often fall victim to many of the same political 
forces. The task is made all the more difficult by a strong tradition of 
local control over schools. According to the American Federation of 
Teachers, only thirteen states have developed standards clear enough to 
be used as part of a formal curriculum (New York Times, March 27, 
1966). As a leading student of education reform has recently observed:
The multiplicity of often conflicting goals, purposes, and inten 
tions that have become commonplace in American Education will 
make it difficult, if not impossible, to establish high standards. 
The politics of education guarantees a veto to a broad assortment 
of interest groups, creates entitlements for others, and permits 
exceptions for still others. These are the very conditions that cre 
ated the current educational system, in which schools expect little 
effort from students while offering them inflated grades and self- 
esteem. It is unlikely that standard-setting activities can be insu 
lated from the interest group politics that promotes uniformity of 
practice and tolerance of mediocrity (Ravtich 1995).
Suppose, however, that it proved possible to overcome all of these 
obstacles and adopt a clear set of standards against which students 
would be measured. It still does not follow that teacher recruitment 
would improve. Schools might escape accountability if the blame for 
student failure could be placed elsewhere. High failure rates might be 
masked by manipulating the population of test-takers (e.g., exempting 
the learning disabled) or replacing standardized tests with more subjec 
tive methods of assessment under the control of teachers (e.g., evaluat 
ing student portfolios).
Even if accountability were clearly established, there would remain 
questions about the appropriate sanctions. In a market system, a school 
that failed its clients would not survive. No such discipline exists 
within public education. It has proven to be exceedingly difficult to 
withdraw resources from failing schools. Administrators and teachers 
in these schools argue (with some justification) that their prospects for 
success can only be poorer if they are given less to work with. Such
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measures are easily portrayed as harmful to students. Similar objec 
tions apply to policies that do not withdraw resources but rather make 
increased funding contingent on improved performance.
This leaves little choice but to hold administrators or teachers indi 
vidually accountable. Of course, superintendents and principals are 
already largely responsible for improving student outcomes, though in 
some states the institution of tenure has made it difficult to remove 
ineffective principals. It is not clear what difference it will make to give 
students more standardized tests; the tests in use now show that stu 
dents are not learning enough. Of course, if the adoption of higher 
standards were accompanied by a more vigorous effort to remove 
administrators whose schools were not performing at an acceptable 
level, there might be some impact on teacher recruitment. Department 
heads might be instructed to spend more time with job candidates. 
More applicants might be observed teaching practice classes. Adminis 
trators might go to greater lengths to obtain information about appli 
cants who have graduated from distant liberal arts colleges. Yet it is 
also easy to see how such steps could be overlooked by administrators 
under pressure to produce quick results. In most schools, workforce 
turnover is simply too low to afford any basis for a rapid turn-around in 
student performance. Principals are likely to concentrate instead on 
policies that will elicit greater effort and better results from the staffs 
they have.
What of the second approach, holding teachers accountable for what 
students learn? It is difficult to link student achievement to the perfor 
mance of individual teachers. Many factors influence the amount stu 
dents learn, while the impact of teachers (for both good and bad) is not 
limited to the years and classes in which they see their students. The 
most that one might realistically expect from such a policy would be 
the removal of the worst teachers from their classrooms. Yet once 
again, there would seem to be ample cause at present to take such 
steps. While raising standards might increase pressure on administra 
tors to act, unless the policies that currently make it so difficult to dis 
miss poor teachers were also changed, higher standards for students 
would be likely to have little impact on faculty quality.
Many i%f not most public school systems award tenure to teachers 
after a few years' continuous service. In addition, as public employees, 
teachers are protected against arbitrary dismissal (without "just
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cause"). Most teacher contracts stipulate that reductions in force be 
conducted on the basis of seniority. As a result, teachers with more 
than a few years' seniority enjoy an extraordinary degree of job protec 
tion. Complaints by administrators that it is next to impossible to dis 
miss tenured teachers for poor performance are commonplace.
Hard data on the costs of such policies are difficult to come by; as a 
result, discussion of these issues is based largely on anecdotal evi 
dence. Estimates of the number of public school teachers who are 
incompetent range as high as 10 percent (e.g., McGrath 1993); the 
poor performance of many teachers on teacher competency examina 
tions suggests that in some states this figure is too low. 8 Yet the number 
of public school teachers dismissed for incompetence is exceedingly 
small. The cost of such efforts is a major deterrent: for example, a 1993 
survey by the New York State School Boards Association found that 
the average disciplinary proceeding against a tenured teacher or admin 
istrator cost taxpayers of that state $176,000 (New York Times, Sept. 
24, 1995). As a result, it appears that most school districts take such 
steps only in extreme cases. A review of employment records for all 
public school teachers in Washington State between 1984 and 1987 
turned up only 42 whose contracts were officially terminated 
(Theobald 1990). This is consistent with statistics from other states. 
Fewer than .6 percent of the teachers in 141 California districts sur 
veyed in 1982-1984 were dismissed for incompetence, a figure that 
includes untenured and temporary teachers (Bridges 1992). It is possi 
ble, of course, that many more have been "counselled out" or induced 
to leave by the threat of an attempt to dismiss them. Even so, it seems 
clear that many instructors of doubtful ability remain.
The ambiguity inherent in teacher evaluation and the job security 
of most teachers exert a powerful influence on administrators to 
tolerate the incompetent teacher and to avoid the use of dismissal. 
Although incompetence is sufficient cause for dismissing a ten 
ured teacher, it constitutes extremely problematic grounds for 
challenging the tenured teacher's employment contract with the 
district. Incompetence is a concept with no precise meaning; 
moreover, there are no clear-cut standards or cut-off points which 
enable an administrator to say with certitude that a teacher is 
incompetent. This ambiguity poses a serious problem for adminis 
trators because the burden of proof falls on them to demonstrate
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that a teacher is incompetent. Administrators can never be confi 
dent under these conditions that a Commission on Professional 
Competence or a court judge will uphold their judgment (Bridges 
1992).
Unfortunately, recent history suggests that it will be very difficult to 
take away these job protections. For example, school boards that 
signed contracts with private management firms to run their schools 
(e.g., Baltimore and Hartford) have nonetheless yielded to union pres 
sure and severely constrained managerial prerogatives in personnel 
decisions.9 As a result, these firms have taken on failing school systems 
with little or no authority to replace the work forces they find teaching 
in them.
Legislative efforts to strengthen the position of management have 
also been affected by union opposition. The Massachusetts Education 
Reform Act of 1993 is a case in point. When the act was passed, sup 
porters declared that teacher tenure had been abolished in the state's 
public schools. This claim was somewhat disingenuous. Although 
automatic renewal of contracts was replaced by the requirement that 
teachers be recertified every five years, this requirement can be met in a 
variety of ways that pose no threat whatever to a teacher's job. In-ser 
vice programs and workshops, conferences outside the school, and 
courses in the state's universities are all approved methods. (Even 
auditing a course counts.) Important job protections remain. As a read 
ing of the act shows, the term "tenure" has been replaced by the phrase 
"professional teacher status," which is granted, like tenure, to teachers 
with three years' service in a system. The due process requirements 
that have made it so difficult for administrators to remove ineffective 
teachers remain substantially in force. Dismissals are for just cause and 
require written notification with "documents relating to the grounds for 
dismissal." Dismissed teachers can request arbitration before a panel 
appointed by the Commissioner of Education. The outcome of arbitra 
tion is subject to judicial review. The act also stipulates that districts 
are not to lay off a professional teacher if an instructor lacking this sta 
tus is teaching a subject in which the former is certified. Collective bar 
gaining agreements that allow a more senior teacher to displace a 
junior one in the event of a layoff are not affected by the legislation.
The Massachusetts case is by no means exceptional, as a recent 
review of state actions makes clear (Lindsay 1996). The Virginia legis-
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lature failed to act on a proposal by the state schools superintendent to 
replace tenure with renewable contracts. Lawmakers in Minnesota 
declined to follow up the governor's challenge to "put a premium on 
excellence, not seniority." The California Assembly killed a proposal to 
replace tenure with renewable contracts. In states where legislation 
passed, changes were often minimal. Thus, in Pennsylvania, the proba 
tionary period before an award of tenure was lengthened from two to 
three years (and in South Dakota, from three to four years). After pro 
posing legislation that would make it easier to dismiss teachers who 
were given poor evaluations, the governor of Ohio ended up vetoing a 
law that, in his judgment, made teacher tenure still stronger. In New 
York, the state school boards' association has been unable to find a 
Senate sponsor for its proposal to replace tenure with renewable con 
tracts. According to the association's executive director, the reason is 
the opposition of the New York State United Teachers, which spent 
more than $3 million dollars on lobbying and campaign contributions 
in the 1994 elections, more than any other special-interest group in the 
state.
Conclusion
In chapter 4 we identified several features of the teacher labor mar 
ket that have frustrated efforts to recruit better teachers. In this chapter 
we have asked whether these impediments could be removed, clearing 
the way for higher salaries to attract more capable persons into the pro 
fession.
The outlook for such reforms does not look very bright. There 
seems little chance that the compensation of new (or better) teachers 
will be allowed to rise significantly while the incomes of the rest 
remain unchanged. Barriers to teacher entry have fallen, but very 
slowly: programs of alternative certification provide only a small share 
of new teachers and are often circumscribed in ways that prevent them 
from competing head-on with traditional programs of teacher prepara 
tion. Though most states now test teachers, these tests are a far remove 
from the rigorous examinations taken by teachers in Japan and some 
European nations. Since even basic skills tests are being challenged in
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the courts, more selective screening does not seem likely. Other efforts 
to raise standards and increase accountability have yielded modest 
results to date.
This is not to say that none of these reforms will ever amount to 
much. They may well succeed in other terms. We believe that in an 
increasing number of districts, the single salary schedule will give way 
to salary structures that include a modest role for merit pay, eliciting 
greater effort from teachers. We expect, too, that the on-going debate 
over educational standards will raise what is expected of students and 
that student achievement will rise. Where we remain skeptical is in 
doubting that these measures will have a substantial effect on teacher 
recruitment. None of the reforms we have examined are likely to be 
implemented on the scale required to fundamentally alter the way the 
teacher labor market works.
There are several reasons why. One is the difficulty of designing 
policies of sufficient flexibility to meet the various goals served by 
public schools. The diverse needs of a heterogeneous clientele have 
also made public education a political battleground where radical 
reform is unlikely. Yet in our view, the major obstacle is the influence 
wielded by teacher unions, associations of administrators, and educa 
tion schools in the formulation of education policy. These groups have 
strong vested interests in the present system of training and licensing 
teachers and in the terms of their employment. The consequences of 
their opposition are clearly apparent when reforms are blocked or 
repealed. Less obvious, but still important, is the ability of these groups 
to influence the policy-making process, shaping reforms in ways that 
serve their interests.
Twelve years ago, in A Nation at Risk, the National Commission on 
Excellence in Education advanced the following recommendations.
Salaries for the teaching profession should be increased and 
should be professionally competitive, market-sensitive, and per 
formance-based. Salary, promotion, tenure, and retention deci 
sions should be tied to an effective evaluation system that includes 
peer review so that superior teachers can be rewarded, average 
ones encouraged, and poor ones either improved or terminated 
(National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983).
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For all the effort that has gone into education reform since then, the 
nation is still waiting to see significant progress on most of these 
counts. Proposals that threaten the power of teacher unions or diminish 
the role of the nation's schools and departments of education in the 
preparation of teachers and administrators have been defeated outright 
or severely restricted in scope. In the twelve years that have elapsed 
since the publication of A Nation at Risk, numerous states have 
awarded teachers significant increases in salaries. Few, if any, have 
enacted the other changes needed to ensure that better teachers are 
recruited as a result.
NOTES
1. Other data show that many teachers are more open minded on the subject of merit pay than 
much union rhetoric would suggest. As is often the case, surveys have presented contradictory 
findings. Two Gallup polls conducted for the Phi Delta Kappan in 1984 and 1989 found a major 
ity of respondents (64 percent and 61 percent, respectively) opposed to merit pay (Gallop 1984; 
Elam 1989). However, a 1983 poll of teachers by the National School Board Association turned 
up 63 percent in favor (Cramer 1983). A 1990 survey by the National Center for Education Infor 
mation found that 70 percent favored pay on the basis of job performance in addition to seniority 
and education (Feistritzer 1990). Differences in survey design and the phrasing of questions are 
likely to have influenced responses and may explain some of these discrepancies. These polls also 
differed with respect to sample size, sampling technique, and response rates, further complicating 
the interpretation of results.
Additional information on teachers' attitudes toward incentive pay was obtained by the 
National Center for Education Statistics in the 1987-1988 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), 
which asked teachers their opinion of particular types of compensation and whether they received 
such remuneration. While it would be unwise to claim that any one survey provides a definitive 
answer to this question, both the sample size and the response rate were far higher for this survey 
than for any of those just cited. Opposition to performance incentives of any kind came from a 
minority of teachers. These data have been subjected to a multivariate analysis exploring the 
determinants of teachers' attitudes toward merit pay (Ballou and Podgursky 1993b). Teachers in 
schools using merit pay were more favorably disposed toward this kind of compensation than 
were teachers elsewhere. The effect was greatest among those who actually received a bonus, but 
attitudes were more positive even among nonrecipients. Teachers who were more likely to be 
working with students from disadvantaged backgrounds (e.g., minority teachers, employees of 
large urban school systems) were also more supportive, a pattern difficult to square with the 
notion that teachers resist performance-based pay because so many determinants of student learn 
ing are beyond their control.
These findings suggest that easy generalizations about teachers' views on incentive pay 
should be resisted. That teachers in districts using merit pay are generally more supportive than 
teachers elsewhere indicates that characterizations of merit pay as a frequent source of divisive- 
ness and ill-feeling may be overstated. Indeed, a different item on the same survey asked teachers 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: "There is great cooperation among the staff 
in this school." In schools lacking a merit pay plan, the response rates were 36 percent strongly
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agree, 43 percent mildly agree, 16 percent mildly disagree, and 5 percent strongly disagree. 
Response rates in schools with merit pay plans were 37 percent, 43 percent, 15 percent, and 5 per 
cent. There was virtually no difference between recipients' and nonrecipients' answers in the lat 
ter districts.
2. One such incentive that has attracted much recent attention is the career ladder. As the name 
implies, a career ladder involves a progression of steps through which the teacher advances in the 
course of a career. It is fair to say, however, that proponents of career ladders have never satisfac 
torily resolved a fundamental tension in the concept: how to provide career advancement for 
teachers that does not remove them from the classroom. Some career ladders expressly require 
that instructors continue to spend the same amount of time teaching as they move to higher levels. 
This has the inevitable consequence of turning a career ladder into a form of extra pay for extra 
work. In most career ladders, moreover, eligibility for advancement is based on years of service 
and completion of workshops, courses, and/or advanced degrees. In this respect, ladders differ 
only modestly from traditional salary schedules, which also reward experience and education. 
Some form of performance evaluation is also a criterion for advancement, a feature that has 
proven problematic. When promotion is limited to a relatively small number of truly outstanding 
teachers, ladders provoke the same objects as merit pay. Indeed, dissatisfaction is likely to be 
keener, since the amounts of money at stake are substantially greater. On the other hand, in many 
instances meaningful performance reviews are not undertaken and promotion comes too easily 
(Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford 1994).
3. This is brought out by equation (4b) in appendix 4C, where the derivative of the application 
probability with respect to the offer rate is shown to be a multiple of C, the opportunity costs of 
certification. With C=0, this derivative is also zero: a low offer probability does not deter job seek 
ers if no costs must be incurred acquiring a credential in advance of employment.
This is not to say that low offer rates might not discourage applicants for psychological rea 
sons. However, a rational actor should not be deterred by a low probability of success, if the costs 
of applying are zero. Costs are not, of course, strictly zero; prospective teachers must send out 
applications, go to interviews, etc. These costs are trivial, however, compared to the investment in 
acquiring certification.
4. To say that undergraduate training in education is held in low esteem is perhaps an under 
statement. Boston University President John Silber writes, "The willingness to endure four years 
in a typical school of education often constitutes a negative intelligence test" (quoted in Finn 
1991). Sowell (1993) concludes, "In short, some of the least-qualified students, taught by the 
least-qualified professors in the lowest-quality courses supply most of American public school 
teachers." An earlier, widely cited critique of teacher training by the president of the Council on 
Basic Education concluded that the subject matter taught at education schools reflected "intellec 
tual impoverishment" and was filled with jargon that "masks a lack of thought, supports a spe 
cious scientism .. . and repels any educated mind that happens upon it" (Koerner 1963).
5. This conclusion is supported by estimates of a hedonic wage equation for private school 
instructors. There is no consistent evidence that these schools place a positive value on certifica 
tion. Other measures of academic ability, by contrast, carry significantly larger hedonic prices 
(Ballou and Podgursky 1995c).
6. This freedom may be more apparent that real, if the authorities granting charters decide to 
require these schools to comply with the same regulations that apply to public schools. This seems 
all the more likely when the chartering authority is itself a local school board, the case in several 
states (e.g., California).
7. "As a matter of policy . . . assessment scores and other data from the Praxis Series may not 
be used ... to determine employment, retention, or termination of fully licensed teachers. School 
districts without authority to license teachers may receive the Praxis Series assessment scores or
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other Praxis assessment data of teacher applicants only to verify that the applicants have met the 
state licensing testing requirements" (Educational Testing Service 1992).
To validate the Praxis exam, ETS solicits the opinions of teachers, education school faculty, 
and other education professionals regarding test items. Respondents are asked what proportion of 
"minimally qualified" teachers would be able to answer a particular item correctly. No attempt is 
made to ascertain whether test scores predict differences in teaching effectiveness above the level 
of minimum competence. Nor has ETS made any effort to correlate student outcomes with teach 
ers' scores on these examinations. According to one ETS official whom we questioned, opposition 
of teacher unions figured among the reasons for this decision.
8. During the 1980s, 10 percent of experienced teachers in Texas and Arkansas failed teacher 
competency tests that amounted to little more than tests of literacy. A similar failure rate occurs on 
mandated certificate renewal tests in Georgia. A basic skills test for new teachers introduced in 
Florida in the 1980s produced failure rates of 63 percent for blacks, 50 percent for Hispanics, and 
12 percent for whites (Toch 1991, p. 164). Unfortunately, teachers are given so many opportuni 
ties to retake these examinations that few are actually dismissed. If 10 percent of the workforce 
cannot pass a basic skills test, the proportion who are incompetent for whatever reasons is proba 
bly considerably greater.
9. In an exception to this pattern, the Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania school district has contracted- 
out management of a single elementary school to a private firm, Alternative Public Schools, which 
has been given the authority to replace current teachers. The local union, an NEA affiliate, has 
taken the board to court. As of this writing, a lower court order to rescind the contract has been 
stayed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which has yet to rule on the legality of this contract.
CHAPTER
The Private Sector
There has lately been a remarkable growth of interest in the role 
market forces could play in education reform. At the heart of this argu 
ment is the claim that private schools provide a better education than 
public schools because they have been compelled to adopt policies that 
respond to consumers' demands and because they are not as heavily 
regulated. Public schools, it is alleged, could do likewise if they faced 
the same incentives and opportunities. Various mechanisms, ranging 
from charter schools to educational vouchers, have been proposed to 
empower consumers and provide them a sufficient range of options to 
make reform on the market model possible.
In this chapter we examine the implications of this argument for 
teacher recruitment and retention by examining the personnel policies 
of private schools. It is not obvious that a deregulated and competitive 
market, whatever its other advantages for consumers, will make it eas 
ier for schools to recruit good teachers. As noted in the preceding chap 
ter, many of the regulations and contractual constraints that limit 
managerial prerogatives in the public sector are thought to benefit 
teachers. One might therefore expect private schools to labor under a 
disadvantage in recruiting faculty. In particular, few private schools 
have been organized by unions. If a unionized workplace is more 
attractive than one that has not been organized, private school recruit 
ment will suffer. 1
To conduct this investigation we turn again to the national surveys 
that have provided data for earlier chapters. We also report information 
and insights obtained from discussions with more than thirty school 
heads, diocesan superintendents, and officials of Catholic, protestant, 
and independent national private school associations. These persons 
are collectively acquainted with the policies and practices of hundreds 
of private schools, both religious and nonreligious, in all parts of the
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country. We have also interviewed managers and owners of several 
proprietary or for-profit businesses providing K-12 educational ser 
vices. At various points below we draw on the comments of these edu 
cators to improve our understanding of the way this sector works.
Teacher Quality
Nationwide, public school teachers earn half again as much as 
teachers employed in private schools (see table 6.1). This difference is 
greatest in the northeast but is substantial in all regions. Part of the gap 
reflects higher levels of education and experience in the public sector. 
However, most of it remains after controlling for those factors, as 
shown by the difference in starting salaries (36 percent). 2
Despite the differences in pay, by most of our indicators private 
school faculties are as good as those in the public sector, if not better. 
As shown in table 6.1, a higher proportion attended selective colleges. 
Fewer went to colleges rated below average. 3 The private sector 
employs more secondary teachers with an academic major and recruits 
as many teachers with degrees in mathematics or science (relative to its 
size). There is no significant difference in teachers' undergraduate 
grades.
It may be wondered whether this comparison favors private schools 
simply because so many of them are located in the northeast, home to 
many selective colleges and universities. However, a regional break 
down reveals a private sector advantage in all parts of the country. This 
advantage grows more pronounced when attention is restricted to sec 
ondary schools, where academic credentials presumably play a larger 
role in hiring decisions.
On a few dimensions the comparison favors public schools. More 
private school teachers lack a bachelor's degree, nearly 3 percent, as 
opposed to fewer than 1 percent in the public sector. 4 In addition, 
because turnover is higher in the private sector, mean experience is 
lower. More than 7 percent of private school teachers were in then" first 
year of full-time teaching in 1987-88, compared to 4 percent in the 
public sector.
Table 6.1. Comparison of Public and Private School Teachers8
Public















































































































































SOURCES: Full-time teachers from 1987-88 Schools and Staffing Survey. Teachers in Catholic schools who have never married are omitted in order to 
exclude members of religious orders. Undergraduate GPA is taken from Surveys of Recent College Graduates for 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, and 1991. 
a. Percent of teachers except for GPA, which represents a numerical conversion of ordinal responses, 
b. Percent of graduates of rated colleges only.
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A final, albeit indirect, comparison of public and private school 
teachers is provided by the 1990-91 Schools and Staffing Survey, 
which asked principals and school heads to rate the effectiveness of 
their faculties. As shown in figure 6.1, principals gave similar ratings to 
new teachers in all four sectors: public, Catholic, other religious, and 
nonsectarian private schools. The modal response in each category was 
four. Intersectoral differences were slight and not statistically signifi 
cant. For experienced teachers, the comparison clearly favors private 
schools (figure 6.2). The mean public school rating (4.24) was below 
the mean in each of the private school sectors. Significantly more pri 
vate school heads rated their experienced staffs excellent. 5
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Figure 6.2 Experienced Ranking by School Type
Public Catholic
.2













In summary, private schools appear to recruit remarkably effec 
tively, given the substantial difference between their salaries and those 
in public school systems. What accounts for their comparative success?
Working Conditions and Benefits
Working conditions are part of the explanation. Generalization is 
hazardous, as there exist many types of private schools serving diverse 
clienteles. Nonetheless, the comments of administrators and the
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responses of teachers to national surveys indicate that private schools 
on the whole offer a more attractive and supportive environment in 
which to teach.
First, these schools practice selective admissions and enjoy the right 
to expel students who fail to conform to rules of conduct. The families 
that purchase their services are also more likely to insist on acceptable 
behavior at school. As a result, private school teachers face fewer of the 
disciplinary problems that confront their counterparts in public 
schools. Our discussions with educators leave little doubt that this is 
one of the reasons private school teachers accept lower salaries.
Private schools are typically only one-third to one-half as large as 
public schools at the same grade levels. Smaller size fosters a sense of 
community and belonging. By contrast, many public schools, designed 
to realize anticipated economies of scale, appear to be too large. A 
growing body of research shows that students at smaller schools, par 
ticularly elementary schools, have better records of achievement. 
Smaller high schools have been shown to promote higher levels of stu 
dent satisfaction, attendance and graduation rates and to diminish 
involvement with alcohol and drugs (Walberg 1993). 6
Size alone does not account for the shared sense of mission found in 
many private schools. Researchers have found that the religious beliefs 
and moral training central to a Catholic education contribute to a sense 
of community and common purpose that raises teacher efficacy and 
morale (Bryk and Lee 1993). Other religious schools as well as many 
nonsectarian schools can justly make the same claim. And, of course, 
parents who send their children to private schools have a stronger than 
average commitment to education.
Not surprisingly, these circumstances affect the way teachers per 
ceive their jobs. In table 6.2, we report the responses of private and 
public school teachers to items on the Schools and Staffing Survey that 
concern relations with students, administrators, and colleagues. On 
every item, private school teachers were more likely to express strong, 
positive attitudes about their schools. 7 Particularly striking are teach 
ers' perceptions of the support they receive from parents. Only 16 per 
cent of public school instructors strongly agreed when asked whether 
they received a great deal of support from parents. In the private sector 
the corresponding figure was 40 percent. The importance of this ques 
tion should not be underestimated: in the 1992 Metropolitan Life/Louis
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Table 6.2. Teachers© Perceptions of Colleagues, Students, and School 
Administration
Percent replying "strongly agree" 
Survey items (1987-88 SASS) Public Private
"School administration's behavior toward staff
is supportive/encouraging." 40.5 60.2
"I receive a great deal of support from parents
for the work I do." 16.0 40.0
"Most of my colleagues share my beliefs/
values about what the central mission of the
school should be." 35.6 59.0
"There is a great deal of cooperative effort
among staff members." 35.3 56.1
"In this school, staff members are recognized
for a job well done." 25.5 39.2
Percent replying "strongly disagree"
"The level of student misbehavior interferes
with my teaching." 33.0 52.5
"Routine duties and paperwork interfere with
my job of teaching." 8.9 29.5
"I have to follow rules in this school that
conflict with my best professional judgment." 40.6 58.2
SOURCE: Schools and Staffing Survey 1987-88. All differences are significant at 1 percent.
Harris poll of the profession, new teachers likely to leave teaching 
cited lack of support from parents more often than any other cause 
(U.S. Department of Education 1993). It also appears that teachers in 
private schools enjoy more autonomy in the classroom and exercise 
more influence over policies concerning discipline, curriculum, and 
student placement (table 6.3). They express a greater sense of their 
own efficacy. Seventy percent strongly disagreed with the statement, "I 
sometimes feel it is a waste of time to try to do my best as a teacher," 
compared to 54 percent in the public sector. These differences are also 
apparent in the responses teachers gave when asked whether they 
would still become a teacher if they had the choice to make again. Half 
of the private school teachers said they certainly would; only 37 per 
cent of public school instructors were this positive.
Table 6.3. Percentage of Teachers Who Thought That They Had a Great Deal of Influence on Certain Policies, by 









































SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education; National Center for Education Statistics; Schools and Staffing Survey; 1987-88 and 1990-91 (Teacher Question 
naire).
NOTE: Teachers were defined as having thought they had a great deal of influence if they responded with a 5 or 6 on a 6-point scale of influence, with 6 
representing a great deal of influence.
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Compensation Policies
As noted in the last chapter, virtually all public school systems use 
salary schedules to set teacher compensation, with a teacher's position 
on the schedule a function of experience and advanced college credits 
(or degrees). Formal schedules of this kind are much less prevalent in 
the private sector. Only two-thirds of the non-Catholic religious 
schools set compensation according to a schedule. Among nonreligious 
schools the share is barely half.
Of course, private schools that do not use a schedule may still pur 
sue policies similar to those in public education. Indeed, experience 
and level of education are major factors in determining the compensa 
tion of private school faculty, just as in public school systems. Often, 
however, these factors matter most when a school is making its initial 
salary offer to an experienced teacher. Thereafter, compensation may 
be determined in ways that bear little resemblance to public sector 
schedules. In some schools, all staff receive equal percentage raises as 
voted by the board of trustees. Faculty who obtain an advanced degree 
while employed at the school are much less likely to receive an auto 
matic raise. A small number of schools negotiate contracts individually 
with staff.
Where private schools have adopted salary schedules, adherence to 
the schedule is not as rigid as it is in public school systems. In many 
Catholic parishes, for example, the schedule is an advisory guideline 
prepared by the diocesan board. Actual salaries are set locally by the 
pastor and his or her board and often deviate from these recommenda 
tions. Since the diocese typically runs the high schools while local par 
ishes are responsible for grammar school education, there are 
frequently large disparities between the salaries paid teachers at the 
elementary and secondary levels, with the latter earning substantially 
more. By contrast, public school districts pay elementary and second 
ary school teachers according to the same schedule.
Policies also differ with respect to performance-based incentives 
like merit pay. As shown in table 6.4, nonsectarian schools are twice as 
likely as public schools to use merit pay, though the incidence among 
religious schools is lower. 8 Twenty-eight percent of the teachers in non- 
sectarian schools with merit pay plans are recipients, compared to 10
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percent elsewhere. The financial stake is considerably greater. 
Although direct measures are not available, regression analysis of sal 
ary data from the 1990-91 SASS shows that a recipient of merit pay in 
the private sector earns, on average, nearly 12 percent more than he or 
she would in the absence of merit incentives. In the public sector, by 
contrast, the average bonus is only 2 percent. (Full results from these 
regressions are presented in appendix 6a.)
Table 6.4. Use of Incentive Pay
Type of school
Incentive & coverage Public
Other Non- All 
Catholic religious religious private
Merit pay
Percent of schools with plan 
Percent of teachers with plan 
Percent of teachers receiving2



















SOURCE: Data are from the 1990-91 Schools and Staffing Survey.
a. Percentage of teachers in schools acknowledging use of such incentives who received an award, 
b. Computed from coefficients in a regression of log of salary on schedule variables and binary 
indicators for incentive plans. Complete results appear in appendix table 6a. Too few observations 
were available to estimate separate coefficients by type of private school.
Private school heads find other ways to reward superior perfor 
mance, assigning additional duties to good teachers (with correspond 
ing adjustments in compensation). The boundary between teaching and 
administration is much more porous in private than public education: 
many headmasters, assistant headmasters, and deans continue to teach, 
while classroom teachers are also likely to be active as coaches, coun 
selors, librarians, and resource teachers, and (in boarding schools) resi 
dence directors. Private school heads also retain considerable 
discretion with respect to the initial placement of a newly hired teacher 
on the schedule. Offers can be raised for teachers in hard-to-fill sub 
jects (though few of the educators we spoke to indicated that they had 
needed to do this). Special discretion is exercised when recruiting indi 
viduals whose personal qualities make them attractive applicants. Indi 
viduals who are making career changes to become teachers are
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frequently credited with prior experience, albeit outside the field of 
education, in order to bring them in at a salary level comparable to that 
of other older teachers.
Surveys focusing on formal compensation policy will fail to detect 
many of these practices. To ascertain their importance, we conduct a 
regression analysis of the salaries of public and private school teachers 
to determine how much variation in pay remains after controlling for 
the standard schedule variables. Further controls are added for the 
overall level of salaries at the school, as explained in appendix 6a. Pri 
vate schools that do not use schedules at all are omitted from the esti 
mation sample. While a perfect fit is not to be expected—our 
regression equations imperfectly mimic schedules in actual use—pro 
portionate unexplained variation in salaries is nearly double that in the 
private sector. This suggests that teacher attributes that we do not 
observe (but are known to school officials) play a larger role in deter 
mining compensation in the private sector. Of course, the additional 
variation in salary may not be related to differences in merit. However, 
the competitive pressures faced by private schools create a presump 
tion that systematic differences in compensation have an economic 
explanation. Pay differentials that are unrelated to teaching quality lack 
a clear economic rationale.
The advantages of flexible salary structures are clear. Resources are 
allocated more efficiently. The adverse effects of across-the-board 
increases are mitigated. Since these benefits accrue as readily to public 
as private schools, there must be other reasons why salaries are more 
flexible in the private sector.
In the first place, private schools face market sanctions if they fail to 
attract and retain the kinds of teachers that sustain the school's reputa 
tion. No such discipline exists in the public sector. As a consequence, 
incentive plans in the public schools are more likely to appear as zero- 
sum games to staff, in which the bonuses awarded some teachers 
reduce funds that could have been used to raise salaries across the 
board. This is emphatically not the case in private schools, where 
improvements in the quality of the school's staff and instructional pro 
gram enhance the school's reputation and increase the demand for its 
services. This feature of the private sector has no obvious counterpart 
in public education, where poor performance is as likely as not to be 
accompanied by demands for additional resources.
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Many private schools have explicit expectations that teachers will 
become part of a team and commit themselves to serving the mission 
of the school. A private school teacher who persists in complaining 
about salary differentials risks being perceived as one who puts per 
sonal gain before the good of the school. The possibility of contract 
nonrenewal may inhibit the more extreme kinds of actions that public 
school employees have used to undermine incentive pay plans. 9 In 
addition, decisions about merit pay are often made in a quieter, less 
obtrusive manner in private schools. By contrast, the very formality 
and publicity accompanying merit awards in the public schools appear 
to alienate teachers, many of whom are anxious about the prospect of 
being judged before their students and peers. 10
Recruitment Priorities and Constraints
Private schools face market pressures to provide satisfactory ser 
vices to their clients. For many of these clients, a strong focus on aca 
demics appears to be a high priority. Students in private schools take 
more courses in the core academic areas of English, mathematics, sci 
ence, social studies, and foreign languages. By graduation, the average 
difference amounts to two full-year courses (U.S. Department of Edu 
cation 1993). This focus on academics is found in schools that offer a 
comprehensive curriculum as well as those that specialize in a college 
preparatory program. Indeed, private school students are more likely 
than their peers in public school systems to be enrolled in college pre 
paratory classes even after controlling for student socioeconomic sta 
tus, race, and educational aspirations (Coleman and Hoffer 1987).
The emphasis placed on academics influences how these schools 
recruit and how effectively they make use of the talents of their staffs. 
When asked what they look for in a prospective teacher, private school 
heads regularly cite knowledge of subject matter. (The other responses 
most frequently given are enthusiasm for working with children and, in 
religious schools, a commitment to the moral and religious beliefs of 
the school.) By contrast, public school officials do not appear to give 
special weight to a strong academic background when recruiting teach 
ers. This difference in priorities is likely to be one of the reasons pri-
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vate schools obtain a comparatively high percentage of teachers from 
good colleges with academic majors.
Barriers to entry are also lower for private school instructors. In 
most states, private schools are free to hire teachers who lack state cer 
tification. Even in the states that nominally require certification of pri 
vate school teachers, enforcement appears to be lax, and exceptions are 
commonplace. Schools often hire unlicensed teachers on the under 
standing that they will earn certificates within a suitable period (e.g., 
three to five years). This extra flexibility can be quite important to pro 
spective teachers, who thereby postpone the costs of acquiring certifi 
cation until they have determined how likely they are to make a career 
of teaching.
Data on the percentage of noncertified teachers employed by private 
schools are presented in table 6.5. Although most Catholic school 
instructors are certified, barely half of the teachers in other private 
schools are. It may be wondered if private schools recruit noncertified 
personnel only because they must, given their noncompetitive salaries. 
This is not the case. The share of noncertified instructors is largest in 
nonsectarian secondary schools, where salaries are highest. School 
heads in this segment of the market indicate in private conversation 
that certification is simply of no importance to them when hiring fac 
ulty. 11
Table 6.5. Teachers Certified in Primary Teaching Field as a Percent of 
All Teachers
Private school teachers 
Public school





















SOURCE: 1987-88 Schools and Staffing Surveys. Sample restricted to full-time teachers in states 
which do not require that private teachers be certified. Teachers in Catholic schools who have 
never been married are dropped from the sample to avoid including members of religious orders.
In the previous two chapters we argued that applicant quality would 
improve if licensing requirements were relaxed, since these barriers to
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entry are greatest for individuals with attractive options outside teach 
ing. The data in table 6.6 confirm that private schools have increased 
their employment of graduates from selective colleges by recruiting 
noncertified teachers. This effect is particularly pronounced among 
teachers who attended the most competitive of these colleges and uni 
versities.
Turnover and Related Policies
As noted, teacher turnover is considerably higher in the private sec 
tor. Between the 1987-88 and 1988-89 school years, nearly 13 percent 
of private school instructors left teaching, twice the rate at which pub 
lic school faculty quit. Another 4.7 percent departed for positions in 
public systems (Choy et al. 1992). There is little doubt the loss of so 
many experienced personnel adversely affects instructional quality in 
the private sector. Since private schools could presumably reduce turn 
over to the levels found in the public sector by raising teacher pay, it is 
curious that they do not. Is turnover excessive, indicating some kind of 
market failure? Or are rates of turnover that would be viewed with 
alarm in public school systems simply a sign of a cost-effective person 
nel policy?
High turnover does not appear to prevent private schools from meet 
ing their staffing requirements. According to the 1990-91 SASS, 98.7 
percent of all private school positions were filled by a qualified individ 
ual, a figure only slightly below the public school rate of 99.4 percent. 
Private school heads to whom we spoke indicated that they were expe 
riencing no difficulty filling vacancies, even in such fields as mathe 
matics and science. (The only reservation concerned the recruitment of 
minority teachers.) Freedom to employ noncertified teachers is obvi 
ously one reason. Private schools administrators also enjoy greater lati 
tude in staffing positions when a qualified teacher cannot be hired on a 
regular basis. They are twice as likely as public school districts to hire 
a part-time teacher or increase teaching loads for current staff (Choy et 
al. 1993). This ratio widens to three or four when the comparison is 
restricted to public schools in large cities, where collective bargaining 
agreements curtailing managerial prerogatives are common.




































SOURCE: Full-time teachers from Schools and Staffing Survey, 1987-88. Sample excludes teachers in Catholic schools who have never married.
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Discussions of turnover among public school educators often con 
vey the impression that turnover per se is never good and that the 
appropriate goal of policy is to drive turnover rates as low as possible. 
This is false; the optimal rate of turnover among teachers is not zero. 
This is not merely because older teachers can burn out and lose effec 
tiveness. The optimal rate of turnover also depends on the quality of 
new recruits available to replace departing teachers. More capable indi 
viduals are less likely to spend their entire careers in teaching, creating 
a tradeoff between longevity and ability. We have already seen evi 
dence that private and public schools view this tradeoff differently. Pri 
vate schools are more likely to hire teachers with strong academic 
backgrounds interested in teaching for a few years.
High turnover can also be the deliberate result of policies adopted to 
deal with ex ante uncertainty about prospective teachers' ability. Such 
uncertainty requires that many candidates be given a low-cost opportu 
nity to see whether they have a career fit in teaching, and if not, to 
move on. To mitigate the impact on students, new teachers require 
assistance and mentoring. In addition, persons who fail to recognize 
that they do not have a good career fit in teaching need to be counselled 
out or dismissed. The evidence indicates the private schools do a better 
job of managing staff turnover on both these counts.
The mentoring of new teachers is now widespread: by 1991, two- 
thirds of public schools had implemented a mentor program for begin 
ning teachers. More than half (53.6 percent) of new public school 
teachers participated in a formal induction program with a mentor or 
master teacher (Choy et al. 1993). This was twice the private school 
incidence (27.3 percent).
This difference notwithstanding, instructors in public schools take a 
dimmer view of the help provided beginning teachers than do the fac 
ulties of private schools. Evidence comes from the 1990-91 SASS, 
which contained a series of questions concerning the assistance pro 
vided new teachers in four areas: student discipline, instructional meth 
ods, curriculum, and adjusting to the school environment. We have 
regressed teachers' responses to these questions on a dummy variable 
for school sector as well as controls for school level and teacher demo 
graphics. The sector coefficients are reported in the left-hand panel of 
table 6.7. In all four areas, teachers at private schools report signifi 
cantly more assistance for new hires. Further evidence on this point
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may be found in the responses of inexperienced teachers (<3 years) in 
the 1987-88 SASS who were asked to assess the helpfulness of superi 
ors and other teachers. Estimates controlling for type of school and 
selected teacher characteristics are reported in the right-hand panel of 
table 6.7: the results consistently favor private schools. In other regres 
sions (not reported) we find that inexperienced private school teachers 
also report much more cooperative relationships with other staff than 
do new instructors in public schools. These responses suggest that new 
teachers receive more help and on-the-job training in the private sector.
Some private schools have instituted formal internship programs. 
Interns are generally hired directly out of college; they are paid sub 
stantially less than regular teachers and are assigned to work with one 
or more of the school's experienced instructors. At the end of the year, 
interns may be offered a regular job, should a vacancy arise. More 
often they are helped to find positions in other schools, including pub 
lic systems. 12
New teachers who show little promise should be dismissed. In prin 
ciple, there should be little difference between the public and private 
sectors in this respect. New public school teachers are hired on a pro 
bationary status. They have no property right in their jobs and may be 
dismissed at the discretion of the school board. 13 Since it is extremely 
difficult to dismiss teachers once they become tenured, one might 
expect that public school administrators would make vigorous use of 
this probationary period to screen out ineffective teachers. Yet a 1984 
survey of 141 mid-sized California districts found that only 1 percent 
of teachers on probationary status were given notice for poor perfor 
mance over a period of nearly two academic years. To be sure, this 
understates the true extent of screening, if others were "counselled out" 
or induced to resign. Unfortunately, such practices make it easier for 
ineffective teachers to find jobs in other school systems.
In most of the private sector, by contrast, teachers are on "probation 
ary" status throughout their careers. With the exception of some Catho 
lic high schools where faculty have been organized, teacher contracts 
are written for one year and can be renewed or not as the school 
chooses. There is no tenure. While nonrenewals for incompetence are 
not frequent, they do occur. Virtually all of the school heads who spoke 
to us indicated that they had dismissed an ineffective teacher on at least 
one occasion.








"Indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree that this school is 
effective in assisting new teachers in each of the following 
matters."
l=Strongly agree ... 4=Strongly disagree 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Sample: Full-time teachers, 1990-91 SASS
"To what extent has each of the following people at this 
school helped you improve your teaching or solve an 
instructional or class management problem?"
l=No help ... 6=Extremely helpful 
(standard errors in parentheses)
Sample: Full-time teachers with tenure < 3 years, 
1987-88 SASS
(4) (7) 
(1) (2) Adjusting to (5) (6) Other (8) 
Student Instructional (3) the school Principal or Department school Other 
discipline methods Curriculum environment school head chair administrators teachers
2.12 2.13 2.04 1.99 4.20 5.31 4.43 4.64 
(.93) (.88) (.76) (.74) (1.72) (2.10) (2.15) (1.47)
_27g*** -.181*** -.252*** -.268*** .358*** .681*** 1.428*** .169*** 
(.021) (.020) (.017) (.019) (.071) (.084) (.086) (.060) 
-.303*** -.138*** -.227*** ..279*** .398*** .626*** 1.009*** .184*** 
(.018) (.017) (.026) (.017) (.058) (.069) (.072) (.049) 
-.173*** -.087*** -.107*** -.159*** .033 .258*** .568*** .141*** 
(.028) (.026) (.009) (.025) (.070) (.083) (.088) (.059) 
53,347 53,347 53,347 53,347 12,879 12,879 12,879 12,879
NOTE: OLS estimates. Other regressors not shown: male teacher, black teacher, secondary school dummy, years tenure at the school (columns 1-4 only). 
***Significant at 1 percent.
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Of equal, if not greater, importance for the quality of the workforce 
is the way schools handle reductions in the size of staff. In the public 
sector, layoffs are based on seniority. This is not the case among private 
schools. With the exception of some Catholic dioceses where contracts 
are collectively bargained, layoffs are never based solely on seniority 
(though length of service may be a consideration). 14 Rather, schools 
seek to retain their most effective teachers.
Over time, such policies can have a substantial effect on the quality 
of the workforce. For example, in a single year (1990), the contracts of 
1.3 percent of private school teachers were not renewed because of 
budget limitations, declining enrollments, or elimination of courses 
(Choy et al. 1992). (Schools that closed and laid off all staff are not 
included in this figure.) If this year is typical, then over a decade some 
10 percent of the workforce, many of whom have been deemed less 
effective than their peers, are put through a competitive screening pro 
cess in which they must prove themselves to alternative employers or 
leave teaching. 15
Market Forces and Public Education
To summarize, private schools employ a workforce that compares 
favorably with that in the public sector, despite paying salaries that are 
quite low by public school standards. While it's true that private 
schools serve a more select clientele, several other factors also play a 
role in this success. Salary structures are more flexible. Teachers may 
be hired who lack state certification. Private school heads find it easier 
to dismiss teachers who perform poorly or whose services are no 
longer required. Indeed, to a considerable extent, the reforms examined 
in the last chapter already characterize private schools.
Although private schools are subject to regulation, for the most part 
they are disciplined by the market rather than the state. To provide the 
services their customers desire, private schools emphasize academics 
and place a priority on recruiting teachers from good colleges with a 
strong background in their subject areas. New teachers receive more 
assistance than in the public sector; ineffective instructors are more
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readily dismissed or laid off. More schools use merit pay and other per 
formance incentives.
Teacher unions, so influential in public education, are virtually 
absent from the private sector. Private schools are much more difficult 
to organize: they are small and diverse, with strong traditions of inde 
pendence. Most are affiliated with churches and seek teachers who 
share a communitarian ethic difficult to square with self-aggrandize 
ment. These are not, however, the only obstacles to unionization. Free 
dom to hire unlicensed teachers gives private schools access to a huge 
potential supply of instructors. Salary growth is constrained by the fact 
that schools face a competitive market for their services.
In short, the vested interests that have constituted such formidable 
obstacles to reform in public education play a vastly diminished role in 
private schooling. By contrast, consumers exercise far more power. In 
our judgment, it is primarily this difference—rather than any measured 
difference in the achievement of public and private school pupils—that 
accounts for the burgeoning interest in such market-based reforms as 
charter schools, educational vouchers, and privatization of instruc 
tional services. The resistance to change on the part of those who bene 
fit from the way public education is conducted in this country has led 
many to conclude that the best hope for long-term improvement lies in 
the restoration of consumer sovereignty.
In any comparison of public to private schools, questions arise about 
the extent to which private sector performance is due to special circum 
stances not easily replicated in public education. This issue is central to 
the current debate over market-based reforms. Much of the clientele 
for private schooling consists of higher income families who provide 
stronger support for education at home. This is particularly true of stu 
dents in nonsectarian schools. Schools with a religious affiliation bene 
fit from a sense of community and shared values reinforced by the 
instruction in religion and morality. In addition, private schools prac 
tice selective admissions and expel students who fail to comply with 
school regulations.
Public schools, by contrast, must serve the entire population. They 
are expected to deliver services to all while simultaneously closing the 
gap between disadvantaged children and the rest of American society. 
Given the surpassing difficulty of this task, many educators regard the 
claims advanced for market-based reforms as fraudulent Charter
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schools and private schools accepting vouchers, it is argued, serve few 
of the students who pose the greatest challenge for the public schools. 
Indeed, school choice plans are thought to make the job of the public 
schools still harder, as charter schools and private schools attract the 
best students, leaving behind those children whose parents lack the ini 
tiative or ability to find schools for them. The more closely the market 
model is followed, the more ruinous the outcome for these children, if 
public schools that lose students also lose resources. Given that the 
marginal cost of educating another student is generally substantially 
below average cost, funding cuts based on per-pupil expenditures will 
lead to a reduction in program variety and an increase in class sizes. 
Other negative consequences are foreseen. The departure of the best 
students will deprive the remainder of positive peer effects. Communi 
ties will lose some of their most effective voices for school improve 
ment as parents most concerned about education opt for private or 
charter schools. 16
These are legitimate concerns. Fortunately, a number of experiments 
are now underway that may provide evidence on these issues. These 
include a variety of school choice plans: interdistrict choice, magnet 
schools, charter schools, and both public and privately funded vouch 
ers. Other market-oriented reforms include privatization of instruc 
tional and administrative services.
School districts have for some time subcontracted to private vendors 
noninstructional activities such as school bus maintenance and opera 
tion, food services, or facilities maintenance. A number of school dis 
tricts now contract out selected instructional activities (National 
School Boards Association 1995). Indeed, the subcontracting industry 
has grown sufficiently large, and the range of activities so wide, that 
new contracts are regularly reported in Education Week, a newsletter 
devoted to tracking industry developments has started up (Education 
Industry Report), and the Lehman Brothers investment bank now orga 
nizes an Annual Education Industry Conference for investors.
The largest and most visible example of private sector subcontract 
ing involves Sylvan Learning Systems. The core business of Sylvan 
Learning Systems is individualized mathematics and reading tutoring 
services sold to families at over 600 Learning Centers throughout the 
United States. Since 1993, however, Sylvan has signed contracts to 
provide compensatory education (Title I) services in Baltimore, Chi-
150 The Private Sector
cago, Washington, D.C., Prince Georges County and Dorchester/Talbot 
County (Maryland), Broward County (Florida), and Pasadena, Texas. 
In all of these cases, the teachers are Sylvan employees, and as such are 
not covered by the union salary schedules or the district collective bar 
gaining agreement. None are tenured. Compensation includes perfor 
mance incentives.
Huntington Learning Centers, best known for tutoring and test prep 
aration services, has contracted for some time with public schools to 
provide SAT preparation courses. Like Sylvan, it has begun contracting 
with several school districts to provide Title I services. Berlitz Jr., a 
division of Berlitz International, has contracted with public schools in 
ten states to provide foreign language and ESL training. Ombudsman 
Educational Services Ltd. operated alternative off-site programs for at- 
risk students in grades 6-12 in approximately 100 school districts in 
seven states during the 1994-95 school year (McLaughlin 1995; Beales 
1994). In response to poor student performance, the school board in 
Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania recently contracted with Alternative Public 
Schools of Nashville, Tennessee to operate an elementary school 
enrolling primarily minority students. This case is particularly contro 
versial since the company dismissed all of the incumbent teachers, 
hired its own teachers and aides, and terminated the union contract. 
This has put the company and district in a protracted and costly legal 
battle with the Pennsylvania Education Associated and its parent, the 
NEA. The final disposition of this case remains uncertain as this book 
goes to press.
All of these contracts have brought elements of the marketplace into 
public education. Contracts specify performance standards and hold 
firms accountable for results. For example, under its contract with the 
Baltimore school district, Sylvan provides 12 hours of free instruction 
for each student whose test scores fail to improve by a predetermined 
amount. Since public school officials decide who receives these ser 
vices and on what terms, contracting-out raises few of the equity issues 
associated with parental choice plans. There is no change in the 
school's clientele, no creaming of the best students: indeed, the major 
ity of these subcontracted services are provided to at-risk students.
That entrepreneurs stand ready to provide services to many kinds of 
students suggests market-based reforms need not increase educational 
inequality. Of course, the programs just surveyed are of limited scope
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and narrow focus. One might concede a role for privatization in these 
contexts and still oppose reforms that offer parents more choice of 
schools. Whether school choice will in fact exacerbate inequality rests, 
however, on several unproven assumptions. The first is that schools 
will selectively screen applicants, leaving many students with no effec 
tive choice. Failing this, it is argued that large numbers of parents will 
not choose responsibly anyway. Finally, public schools are assumed to 
be incapable of improving when faced with market competition.
There are not enough data yet on the way choice plans operate to 
know whether these conditions will hold. Some of the early evidence 
suggests otherwise. So far, states authorizing charter schools have pro 
hibited selective admissions policies. While it might be better still to 
permit schools to specialize in serving particular niches of the market, 
if open access is deemed an overriding goal, there is no reason choice 
plans cannot be framed in those terms.
Early studies report that charter schools serve the same diverse pop 
ulation as traditional public schools. Of 106 charter schools responding 
to a survey by the Education Commission of the States and the Center 
for School Change (1995), 67 indicated they served a cross-section of 
students. Fifty-one served at-risk students and 37 the learning disabled. 
(These responses overlap.) On average, 59 percent of charter school 
students were white, 23 percent Hispanic, and 11 percent black. This is 
not to say, of course, that the students who enroll in choice schools are 
a random subset of the public school population. It is often argued that 
any choice plan is necessarily selective, if only because parents with 
the best information and the greatest concern for their children's edu 
cation will be more likely to take advantage of it. There is obviously 
some merit to this argument; however, this point is easily overstated. 
Another early study of charter schools reports that "disproportionately 
many" of the children enrolled had fared poorly in their former schools 
(Finn et al. 1996) Rather than attracting those who would have been 
successful in any environment, these choice plans attract students who 
were previously struggling. A similar point was made in a recent study 
of parochial education: urban minorities, not the white middle class, 
were found to benefit most from a Catholic school education (Neal 
1995).
Ironically, there is one circumstance in which opponents of school 
choice are likely to be proved right—when the number of choice
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schools is strictly limited. In this case, the most astute parents are 
likely to secure the small number of available places for their own chil 
dren; other students will lack alternatives; and in the absence of mean 
ingful competition, public schools will not be compelled to change. 
Since those who predict the failure of school choice generally push for 
strict limits on such plans, there is a danger that school choice will not 
receive a fair test. Opponents may ensure that choice is tried only 
under conditions likely to prove them right.
The point is an important one. An experiment may be so hedged in 
with restrictions that it fails to constitute a legitimate trial of market- 
based reform. The argument has been well expressed by Myron Lie- 
berman in an analysis of the Milwaukee voucher plan. As implemented 
in 1990, the plan restricted participation to 1 percent of the Milwaukee 
public school enrollment. Eligible families' incomes could not exceed 
175 percent of the poverty line. Voucher students could not comprise 
more than 49 percent of the students in any one school. Neither for- 
profit schools nor schools with a religious affiliation could participate. 
No extra funds were provided for learning-disabled or emotionally dis 
turbed students, although participating schools were required to accept 
all voucher-carrying students. Finally, while the value of the voucher 
equalled barely half the per-pupil expenditure in Milwaukee public 
schools, participating voucher schools were not allowed to charge any 
tuition or fees in excess of the voucher.
Several features of this plan made it something less than a true test 
of competitive market forces. The scale was too small to encourage 
expansion of existing schools or new entries (since no school could 
come into being expressly to serve voucher students). The Milwaukee 
public schools had little to fear from a plan of this size. The schools 
with the best record of aiding urban minority populations—the paro 
chial schools—were not allowed to participate. Participating schools 
were given half the per-pupil allotment of the public schools and were 
not allowed to charge more, even if both they and parents wanted the 
additional services that extra payments would make possible (Lieber- 
man 1993).
These are not the only kind of restrictions placed on schools partici 
pating in choice plans. Under its charter school legislation, the State of 
Arizona appropriated just 1.6 million dollars for start-up costs in 46 
charter schools, much less than what it spends to start a single public
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school (New York Times, March 6, 1996). As a consequence, charter 
schools have spent operating money on buildings rather than teachers 
or books. A variety of regulations severely restrict access to credit. 
Charter schools are not allowed to sell bonds. Since they are chartered 
for only five years, they have no access to long-term credit. And they 
are not considered to own assets like buildings and supplies, which 
cannot therefore be used as collateral for loans. Similar restrictions 
apply to charter schools in Minnesota. They are forbidden to use oper 
ating funds to purchase land or buildings. Yet they are not permitted to 
accept private or outside grants after their start-up period. No other 
public schools in the state are prevented by law from accepting corpo 
rate or foundation grants (Finn et al. 1996).
Numerous other restrictions have been placed on charter schools. 
Most states give local school boards control over charter schools, 
including the decision to issue a charter in the first place. In others, 
charter schools can be created only by converting an existing public 
school after a vote of staff (and in some cases, parents). Such require 
ments often result in protracted struggles to win approval of charters. 
Indeed, when asked how they would advise state legislators establish 
ing guidelines for charter school creation, more respondents to the 
ECS-CSC survey mentioned school autonomy than start-up funds. 
Respondents recommended that charters be approved by some author 
ity other than the local district, that local districts not be allowed to 
pressure charter schools into accepting various restrictive arrange 
ments, and that charter schools not be bound by local labor-manage 
ment agreements (Education Commission of the States and the Center 
for School Change 1995).
Like other market-based reforms, charter schools have been vigor 
ously opposed by teachers' unions. Union opposition has been credited 
with helping to block charter school legislation in Illinois, Ohio, Con 
necticut, Washington, and Pennsylvania (Maus-Pugh 1995). The New 
Jersey Education Association has come out in support of a charter 
school bill that offers protection for school employees. Ballot refer 
enda on educational vouchers have been defeated in Colorado and Cal 
ifornia; teachers unions and other associations of professional 
educators played key roles in these contests.
We do not mean to imply that all opposition to school choice is 
either self-interested or ill-considered. On the contrary, legitimate
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questions have been raised about school choice and other market-based 
reforms. Our argument is only that there should be no presumption that 
opponents are correct. Indeed, it is more than a little puzzling that a 
society that owes so much of its prosperity to a comparatively free 
market place should be so mistrustful of entrepreneurial activity in 
education. The evidence reviewed in this chapter suggests that when 
schools are freed from state regulation and forced to respond to market 
forces, personnel policies will change for the better. Given the potential 
that such reforms exhibit for attracting better teachers into the nation's 
classrooms, continued experimentation with school choice and privati 
zation seems fully warranted. The greatest danger we foresee is that 
market forces will not be given a fair test, a danger compounded by the 
tendency of proponents to oversell the virtues of competition and 
promise more than can be achieved. In these circumstances, experi 
mental trials of market-based reforms are only too likely to fail, a cir 
cumstance that will be used to discredit all such efforts.
NOTES
1. For a discussion of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits of teacher unionism, see Everts 
and Stone (1984).
2. The private sector offers some in-kind benefits unavailable in most public schools, such as 
housing and meals for faculty and tuition waivers for their children. To some extent, these benefits 
compensate for lower salaries, though their importance is easily overstated. Only about 10 percent 
of the faculty in private schools receive tuition waivers at a point in time (McMillen, Rollefson, 
and Benson 1991). Housing (and to a lesser extent, meals) are usually provided to residence 
supervisors and therefore represent compensation for additional duties. Indeed, if all benefits are 
taken into account, public school teachers do better. Only three-quarters of private schools offer 
medical insurance to their teachers, compared to nearly all (96 percent) public schools. And while 
virtually all public school teachers are covered by a retirement plan, only 54 percent of private 
schools provide one.
3. A larger percentage of private school teachers graduated from colleges unrated by Barren's 
Profiles, though the implications for teacher quality are unclear. Many of these teachers graduated 
from Bible colleges and other little-known schools with a religious affiliation. These colleges have 
evidently chosen not to provide information to Barren's editors, possibly because they do not wish 
to broaden their applicant base.
4. Most of them teach in the early grades. Fewer than one-half of these instructors have any 
students above third grade, and fewer than 16 percent teach any high school classes, even subjects 
like art and music.
5. It may be objected that "excellent" does not mean the same thing in the public and private 
sectors, perhaps because the job of a public school teacher is more difficult. These intersectoral 
differences remain, however, after controlling for a variety of school and community characteris 
tics. Even if a comparison of absolute responses is felt to be questionable, it is revealing that pri-
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vate school heads rate their experienced teachers higher relative to new instructors than do public 
school principals. Thus, it appears the private sector does a better job of staff development and 
selectively retaining the best teachers. Further discussion of these data appears in Ballou and Pod- 
gursky (1995b).
6. There is also a widespread perception that class sizes are smaller in the private sector. In 
fact, the differences are slight, with private school classes smaller by only one or two students, on 
average.
7. The possible responses to each item were "strongly agree," "somewhat agree," "somewhat 
disagree," and strongly disagree." On virtually all items, a majority of teachers expressed agree 
ment (or, if the item was worded negatively, disagreement). Thus the most important difference 
was whether they agreed strongly or with reservations.
8. A strong egalitarian ethos in many religious schools appears to discourage the use of incen 
tive pay. Some administrators have expressed particular concern that differentials based on perfor 
mance would threaten the staff's sense of community and shared purpose. On the other hand, the 
practices of these schools might be different if there were not a much larger public sector setting 
compensation on the basis of teachers' education and experience. It is likely that public sector 
policies establish professional norms from which private schools find it difficult to deviate. Perfor 
mance-based compensation might be more widespread if education were wholly conducted by 
private schools competing in the market place.
9. For example, despite a formal confidentiality agreement between the Lebanon, Connecticut 
school district and the teacher's association, a list of awardees' names was circulated (apparently 
by unhappy teachers), causing problems with parents and teachers and contributing to the even 
tual termination of the merit pay plan (Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford 1994).
10. This also causes problems for administrators. Publishing the names of recognized "master 
teachers" has sometimes resulted in conflict between principals and parents when the latter insist 
that their children be taught by these instructors (Hatry and Greiner 1985).
11. Administrators of religious schools, on the other hand, are much more likely to respond 
that they value or even require certification. The reason, however, is revealing. Certified teachers 
enhance the school's legitimacy in the eyes of the public or regional accrediting boards, i.e., the 
school meets "all the requirements that public schools have to meet." Pedagogical concerns have 
rarely been mentioned.
12. It is instructive to contrast programs of this type with one of the largest, most highly publi 
cized mentor plans in the public schools, the California mentor teacher program. On paper the 
California plan looks promising: mentor teachers are paid an extra $4,000 annually and are pro 
vided release time for their extra duties. Through discussions with California educators we have 
learned, however, that no provision is made to reduce teachers' work loads on a regular basis (say, 
by one course). Teachers seeking release time must prepare lesson plans for a substitute, a task 
regarded as sufficiently onerous that many mentors choose to carry out their mentoring activities 
after school rather than during regular school hours. Perhaps partly as a result, mentoring has 
come to mean something other than supervision and help for beginning teachers. Instead, many 
mentors prepare plans to update or otherwise modify the school's curriculum or to introduce other 
pedagogical innovations. The final decision to implement these plans rests with the administrator, 
who may not adopt them.
13. Probationary teachers are generally entitled to some due process. Timely notice of nonre- 
newal must be provided. In addition, fourteen states grant probationary teachers the right to a 
hearing before dismissal. However, except when nonrenewal occurs on ground that infringe indi 
vidual liberty or when probationary teachers have established some property right in their jobs (an 
unusual event), contract renewal is a matter of board discretion. No advance hearings or statement 
of reasons is required (Valente 1987).
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14. It is interesting that even in those Catholic archdioceses where teachers are represented by 
unions, contracts often provide less protection for senior teachers than in the public sector. Thus, 
in one Massachusetts archdiocese, seven factors are used to determine who is to be laid off. Only 
if two teachers are equal on the other six does seniority prove decisive. These other factors include 
annual performance evaluations and ability to teach multiple subjects. Moreover, senior teachers 
are not allowed to bump instructors in other buildings, significantly limiting the damage that can 
be done.
15. Many of those laid off do not, in fact, find other teaching jobs, as an analysis of data from 
the Teacher Follow-Up survey to the 1987-88 SASS shows. Of the 13 percent of the private school 
workforce that left teaching after the 1987-88 school year, 7 percent indicated that their reason 
was a school staffing action rather than personal choice (Choy et al. 1992). Thus, .9 percent of the 
private sector workforce (.13 x .07) was essentially forced out through layoffs.
16. These are not the only objections to school choice. Rural areas will likely be underserved 
(though innovations in distance learning improve prospects for delivering services to areas of low 
population density). In many communities, transportation costs may limit the extent of the market 
and the amount of choice available to parents. Others have raised concerns about the transmission 
of values appropriate to a democratic, pluralistic polity (Levin 1989; Hawley 1996). As noted in 
the previous chapter, however, there is much disagreement about the values public schools should 
impart. Many would dispute the claim that graduates of public as opposed to private schools 
exhibit more public virtues or become better citizens (Lieberman 1993).
Appendix 6A 
Public and Private School Salary Regressions
The Model
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of base pay plus bonuses. 
Bonuses represent additional pay for performance of regular duties. This ex 
cludes extra compensation received for doing extra work (e.g., coaching, sum 
mer school).
The independent variables in the model fall into four categories: (1) a teach 
er's education and experience; (2) overall measures of salary in the district (or 
at the school); (3) in-kind compensation and religious affiliation (for private 
school teachers); (4) performance incentives.
Teacher's education and experience
There are five levels of education: less than a bachelor's degree, bachelor's 
degree, master's degree, special certificate (e.g., 6th year certificate), and doc-' 
toral degree. The bachelor's degree is the omitted category. The others enter 
the model as dummy variables, except for master's degree, which is interacted 
with the salary increment (premium) awarded teachers with a master's degree, 
as explained below.
There are three measures of experience: full-time public school experience, 
full-time private school experience, and prior part-time experience. For public 
school teachers, their full-time public school experience is interacted with a 
measure of the salary increment (premium) that their current districts pay for 
experience, as explained below. A similar measure is constructed for private 
school teachers' experience within that sector. Full-time experience outside the 
current sector and part-time experience enter the equation simply as the num 
ber of years in question.
School's pay level
The 1990-91 SASS furnishes three variables measuring the overall level of 
salaries in the district (or private school): (1) starting salary offered teachers 
with a bachelor's degree and no prior experience; (2) starting salary offered 
teachers with a master's degree and no prior experience; (3) salary offered 
teachers with a master's degree and twenty years' experience. The difference 
(2) - (1) (in logs) measures the premium on a master's degree and is interacted 
with a binary variable indicating whether the teacher holds a master's degree. 
We obtain the returns to experience by assuming equal percentage increases for 
each year of experience. We also assume a teacher reaches the top of the salary
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schedule after twenty years. The annual premium on experience is therefore 
computed as the difference (3) - (2) (in logs), divided by twenty. The censored 
measure of experience is the maximum of within-sector experience and 20, and 
is interacted with the premium on experience.
Thus, we have three controls for the salary schedule used by the district (or 
private school). The first is starting pay for teachers with bachelor's degrees. 
The second is a measure of the extra compensation the district pays to teachers 
with a master's degree. The third is a measure of the increment to experience 
times a given teacher's within-sector experience. To the extent that teachers do 
not receive full credit for prior experience in other districts, the coefficient on 
the third variable will be less than one. On the other hand, the imputed return 
to holding a master's degree will be too small if schedules fan out with experi 
ence (i.e., experienced instructors obtain a larger percentage increase in pay 
when they obtain a master's degree). In this case, the coefficient on the MA 
variable will exceed one (to compensate). There are other nonlinearities in 
schedules, so that our model will, at best, only approximate schedules in actual 
use.
In-kind compensation and religious school indicators
There are three measures of in-kind compensation: housing, meals, and tu 
ition (for faculty children). Unfortunately, the SASS reports only whether a 
teacher receives each form of compensation, not the dollar value. Thus, each 
enters as a binary indicator. In the private school equation, we use also include 
two dummy variables indicating whether the school is Catholic or of another 
religious affiliation. Different intercepts capture the degree to which different 
types of schools might deviate from their stated policy. Such deviations are 
common. As explained in chapter 6, Catholic parishes often set salaries in their 
grammar schools at a lower level than recommended by the diocesan schedule.
Performance-related bonuses
There are four incentives: (1) serving as a mentor/master teacher; (2) teach 
ing in a shortage field (e.g., math or science); (3) teaching in an undesirable lo 
cation (e.g., inner city school); (4) merit pay. Since these are intradistrict 
bonuses, the undesirable location premium is defined only for public schools 
(since most private schools are their own district and have only one location). 
Being a mentor/master teacher may involve extra duties, so that to some extent 
the extra pay is for extra work.
Awards may be given as cash bonuses, as advances on the salary schedule, 
or in other unspecified forms. Unfortunately, the data do not include the mag 
nitude of these awards. Only binary indicators are available. Thus, the coeffi-
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cient on a binary indicator for merit pay recipients becomes an estimate of the 
average size of a merit award (as a percentage of pay).
In fact, the situation is somewhat more complicated than this. There are two 
relevant binary variables for each type of incentive. The first indicates whether 
the school offers such a bonus (e.g., has a merit pay plan). The second indicates 
whether the teacher "receives the incentive." Presumably this means the teach 
er is receiving a bonus, not simply that the teacher is a participant in the plan 
(and therefore responding to the incentive). However, there may be teachers 
who gave the question the latter interpretation.
In addition, there are some discrepancies in the way these variables are de 
fined at the school level and at the teacher level. For example, the school is 
asked "Is there a formal program to help beginning teachers (such as a master 
or mentor teacher program) in use in this school?" The teacher is asked whether 
he or she receives the following pay incentive: "additional pay for assuming 
additional responsibilities as a master or mentor teacher (e.g., supervising new 
teachers)." Ambiguity arises because some schools may assign teachers to help 
new instructors without calling them mentors or master teachers, and because 
some schools with master or mentor teacher programs assign them duties other 
than supervision of new teachers (e.g., curriculum development).
Ambiguities also arise with respect to the other incentive plans. Schools (or 
districts) are asked whether they have a plan, questions that either explicitly or 
implicitly refer to the current year. Teachers are asked whether they receive 
such an incentive. Thus, a teacher hired in a shortage field who was advanced 
on the salary schedule at the time of hire would presumably indicate (even sev 
eral years later) that he was receiving the incentive, since it had been built into 
his base. But if the school had subsequently discontinued the policy, it would 
indicate that it had no such plan. Similar discrepancies could arise for merit pay 
if a teacher was receiving a merit bonus for performance the previous year, but 
the plan itself had been discontinued (not an uncommon event).
These distinctions are of some importance, since there are, in fact, many dis 
crepancies between the answers given by schools and by the teachers who work 
in them. Many teachers claiming to receive these incentives are employed in 
schools that say they do not offer them. These discrepancies may be the result 
of coding errors or mistakes either on the teacher's part or the part of the district 
office, or they may represent accurate responses which differ for the reasons 
stated above. Due to these ambiguities, we introduce three sets of variables 
capturing the effect of incentive plans on a teacher's pay.
First, for each incentive we introduce a dummy variable indicating whether 
the district or school has a plan or policy of that type. Note that this variable 
applies to all teachers at that school, not just those who receive the bonus. This 
is a background control for any factors that cause such schools to deviate from
160
what the model would otherwise predict salaries to be. Thus, our estimate of 
the average size of a bonus does not pick up mere school effects.
Second, we include a dummy variable indicating whether the teacher re 
ports receiving the incentive. And third, we interact this indicator with the first, 
giving us a dummy variable for those teachers who say they receive the incen 
tive from districts that say they offer it. The average bonus for these recipients 
will be the sum of the coefficients on the second and third dummy variables 
(for each incentive plan). The average bonus (if that is what it is) for recipients 
in schools that do not offer these plans is the coefficient on the second indicator 
variable.
Data
Data were obtained from the 1990-91 Schools and Staffing Survey. Sepa 
rate estimates were obtained for public and for private schools. Among the lat 
ter, only schools that used a salary schedule were retained in the estimation 
sample. (Those that did not answered a slightly different set of questions. It is 
possible to overlook the differences and pool the two sets of private schools by 
making some adjustments to variable definitions; when this is done, very sim 
ilar results are obtained).
Only full-time teachers were used, excluding both part-time employees and 
teachers with part-time administrative responsibilities. Unpaid volunteers were 
dropped. All remaining teachers earned annual salaries of at least $5,000. The 
private school sample also excludes teachers who are members of religious or 
ders, whose compensation is often not market-based.
Because the model combines variables from different components of the 
survey, teachers whose schools or districts failed to respond to the survey were 
also dropped from the estimation sample.
Results
Results are presented in appendix table 6A. 1. The coefficients on incentive 
variables are frequently insignificant in the public sector equations. Some of 
those that are significant have a perverse sign (e.g., teaching in an undesirable 
location). The average merit pay bonus is about 2 percent of pay. Mentor teach 
ers receive even less, about 1 percent. (When the dependent variable is defined 
to include extra pay received for extra duties during the school year, the coef 
ficient on mentoring rises to about 2 percent. Other incentive coefficients are 
not affected.)
In the private sector, incentives are larger and more consistently significant, 
despite the smaller sample size. Merit pay increases salaries by nearly 12 per 
cent on average. Mentor teachers earn an extra 4 percent. (When the dependent 
variable includes extra pay for extra duties, these coefficients rise to 14 percent
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and 5 percent, respectively.) In both the public and private sectors, bonuses for 
teaching in a shortage field are either very small (<2 percent) or estimated so 
imprecisely that they fail conventional significance tests.
We have also reestimated the model deleting the binary indicators for teach 
ers who claimed to receive incentives in schools that did not offer them; i.e. we 
assumed such responses were errors and coded these persons as non-recipients. 
Results were virtually identical to those obtained above.
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Appendix Table 6A.1. Salary Regressions






Premium for master's x MA
Special certificate (e.g., sixth year)
Doctoral degree
Premium for experience x experience <20
Prior public school experience




Teacher receives tuition reduction
School has mentor plan
School has merit pay plan
School pays for undesirable location
School pays for shortage fields
Teacher receives mentor pay
Teacher receives shortage pay
Teacher receives location pay
Teacher receives merit pay
Mentor pay: receives x school has plan
Shortage pay: receives x school has plan
Location pay: receives x school has plan



























































SOURCE: Schools and Staffing Survey, 1990-91.
CHAPTER
Conclusion
The argument of this book can be summarized in the following five 
propositions.
1. Higher teacher salaries have had little if any discernible impact 
on the quality of newly recruited teachers.
Using such indicators as the quality of the college from which teach 
ers graduated and the degree of difficulty and rigor in their undergradu 
ate major, we find essentially no relationship between salary growth 
and the qualifications of new teachers compared to experienced teach 
ers in the same state. We have put the data through a variety of tests to 
see whether our negative findings might be due to various biases. None 
of these tests has changed our conclusion. While it remains possible 
that weaknesses in the data or faulty analytical techniques have caused 
us to miss improvement that took place, it seems surprising that a 
response to higher pay would be so difficult to detect, and that there 
would be no obvious connection between the amount teacher pay rose 
and the improvement in the quality of a state's new teachers.
2. The failure of this policy can be traced, in part, to structural fea 
tures of the teacher labor market.
Teacher salaries are not differentiated on the basis of performance. 
When teacher pay rises, it rises for all teachers. As a result, quit rates 
fall and jobs become more difficult to find. The fact that prospective 
teachers must invest in occupation-specific training that has no value 
outside public education makes them sensitive to declining job pros 
pects. This effect is greatest for those with the most attractive options 
outside teaching, who incur the greatest loss if they train to become 
teachers and cannot find a teaching job. By contrast, persons with no 
professional prospects outside education will scarcely be deterred by a 
decline in job opportunities.
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3. Recruitment of better teachers is further impeded by the fact that 
public schools show no preference for applicants who have strong aca 
demic records.
Even a declining job market might not discourage bright applicants 
from pursuing teaching careers if they could be confident that their 
chances of obtaining jobs remained good. Unfortunately, there seem to 
be no grounds for such confidence. Public schools are no more likely to 
hire these candidates than those with far weaker academic records.
4. A variety of reforms have been proposed that might lower entry 
barriers and improve job prospects of more capable prospective teach 
ers.
Differentiating salaries on the basis of performance (or measured 
competencies) could provide encouragement to better teachers without 
stimulating a general increase in teacher supply. Licensing require 
ments could be relaxed, particularly for individuals who demonstrate 
promise in other ways. Standards could be raised for teachers or, alter 
natively, for students, leading schools to value instructors with stronger 
cognitive skills. Teacher tenure and other job protections could be 
weakened, making it easier for administrators to dismiss ineffective 
teachers. Such reforms face a host of practical and political difficulties, 
not least the opposition of powerful entrenched interests that benefit 
from the way teachers are currently trained, licensed, and employed.
5. To judge from the practices of private schools, market-based 
reforms would improve the quality of the teaching workforce.
Private schools place more emphasis on academics and the recruit 
ment of faculty who have strong academic records. They are more 
likely to differentiate salaries on the basis of performance and to dis 
miss ineffective teachers. While there remain many unanswered ques 
tions about school choice, the record so far would seem to encourage 
further experimentation. Entrepreneurs appear ready to provide ser 
vices to a wide variety of students, not just the most affluent or advan 
taged. Unfortunately, opposition to market-based reforms is intense. 
This opposition has influenced charter school legislation and the 
design of other choice plans, with the unfortunate consequence that 
market-based reform may not receive a fair trial.
It is customary at the conclusion of a work of this kind for the 
authors to present their policy recommendations, a set of proposals that 
would, in their view, correct the problems they have been at pains to
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identify. We offer no such list. There are a great many proposals on the 
table already. Instead, we close by highlighting those reforms now 
underway that seem to offer the best opportunity of improving the way 
the teacher labor market functions.
On the supply side of the market, licensing requirements should be 
relaxed so that promising applicants can seek jobs without first invest 
ing a year in the acquisition of a credential they may never use or use 
only a short while. This policy is already a feature of alternative certifi 
cation programs established to recruit minority teachers and instructors 
in shortage areas. Many private schools that prefer their teachers to be 
certified also hire instructors who lack this credential, allowing them to 
complete the necessary course work once they have started teaching. 
Induction and internship programs provide on-the-job assistance to 
beginning teachers. Given that such policies are widely and success 
fully followed in the private sector, we see no justification for current 
licensing requirements. At a minimum, alternative certification pro 
grams should be expanded to serve the more general purpose of 
recruiting better teachers all around.
Still, such changes may not accomplish much if school districts con 
tinue to prefer applicants with traditional training and to overlook non- 
education majors with strong academic backgrounds. Altering 
behavior on the demand side of the market will require more radical 
reforms. For reasons detailed in chapter 5, we are skeptical that current 
efforts to enhance public schools' accountability will have much effect 
on the way teaching applicants are screened. We are more optimistic 
about reforms—like the charter school movement—that create schools 
that must compete for students, run by entrepreneurs less likely to be 
bound by traditional views. Unfortunately, reforms attempting to create 
a competitive market in educational services are strongly opposed by 
vested interests within the professional education community, raising 
the possibility that charter schools will become isolated pockets of 
quality while business goes on as usual in the schools attended by the 
great majority of the nation's children.
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The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit 
research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to 
employment-related problems at the national, state, and local level. It is an 
activity of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was 
established in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn, 
founder of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of 
employment income during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn 
Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of 
publications. Activities of the Institute are comprised of the following 
elements: (1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional 
social scientists; (2) a competitive grant program, which expands and 
complements the internal research program by providing financial support to 
researchers outside the Institute; (3) a publications program, which provides 
the major vehicle for the dissemination of research by staff and grantees, as 
well as other selected work in the field; and (4) an Employment Management 
Services division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment 
and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute's research, grant, and publication 
programs are to: (1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of 
public and private employment and unemployment policy; and (2) make 
knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit 
of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include: causes, 
consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and 
income maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work 
arrangements; family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional 
economic development and local labor markets.
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